Transformative Justice in the Syrian Transition

Abstract

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, then President of Syria, in 2024 ended over fifty years of authoritarian rule, opening a critical opportunity to rebuild Syria on more equitable foundations. Transformative justice holds that returning to pre-conflict society is not a return to peace, if that society was defined by structural inequality and violence. Rather than restoration, it demands transformation of the systems and conditions that produced inequality in the first place, with particular attention to how to transform the power hierarchies and norms that disadvantage women and minorities. In Syria’s case, the transitional government’s steps, while encouraging, risk reinforcing gendered narratives that reproduce unequal power dynamics. This article puts forward recommendations on how to apply transformative justice in the Syrian context, including overhauling legislation, institutions, and socio-economic conditions in order to dismantle authoritarian tendencies and entrenched inequalities. In a moment where the transitional government is seeking international acceptance and financial support, the EU holds significant influence in steering the interim powers to implement transformative measures. Supporting an inclusive and equitable Syria aligns with the EU’s commitment to human rights and the rule of law and can contribute to the EU’s objective of regional stabilisation.

Keywords: Syria, Transformative Justice, Transition, Gender-sensitive Introduction

On the 8th of December 2024, the Assad government, which had ruled Syria for 53 years through father and son, collapsed following an offensive launched by the Islamist political and militant organisation Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Since then, the leader of this group, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has been acting as the interim president of Syria. Al-Sharaa formed an interim government and published a constitutional declaration in March 2025.

The end of the Assad dictatorship presents an opportunity for the Syrian people to transform the very foundations of their society. The 14 years of civil war preceding the events of December 2024 were characterised by extreme destruction, war crimes, displacement and loss. Yet, the end of the Assad government not only signifies an end to the civil war, but also to 53 years of severe repression, human rights violations, and structural discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, sexually and gender diverse individuals, and women.  

For this reason, this opportunity must be used not to ‘rebuild’ or to ‘repair’ as such, but to transform.

The destruction and violence of the Syrian civil war have been well documented. Beginning in 2011 with protests against the dictatorship of President Bashar al-Assad, a harsh government crackdown led to rapid escalation into a fourteen-year war between the Syrian government, supported by Russia and Iran, and a constellation of anti-government rebel groups backed by various foreign powers (Center for Preventive Action, 2026). Atrocities were committed across the entirety of Syria by all actors involved.

Amnesty International documented a "horrific number of war crimes and crimes against humanity, mainly committed by government forces" (Amnesty International, 2014). The Assad government was responsible for indiscriminate shelling of densely populated civilian areas, including schools, homes and hospitals, the use of internationally banned cluster munitions, and multiple uses of chemical weapons. Non-state actors committed serious violations across all sides of the conflict; they launched indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, carried out arbitrary arrests of residents in territory under their control, took hostages, engaged in torture, among other war crimes (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

In a civil war it is difficult to obtain precise figures, yet it is evident that the human and societal costs of the conflict are staggering. It is estimated that over 500,000 people have died since the start of the conflict, (Center for Preventive Action, 2026), hundreds of thousands of people have gone missing and the whereabouts of tens of thousands detained remain unknown (OHCHR, 2021). As of early 2026, 5.5 million Syrians remained internally displaced, while hundreds of thousands are returning despite inadequate infrastructure (UNHCR, 2026). Syria remains in a precarious situation, with an estimated 15.6 million people in Syria needing humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2026).

The civil war had a significant impact on women and girls, exposed to a wide spectrum of violence including: kidnapping, forced disappearance of women political activists and female members of families of male activists, executions, rape and other sexual violence, torture, enslavement, forced recruitment by militias, forced detention and denial of fair trials…forced displacement and migration, forced and early marriages in refugee communities in neighbouring countries, and denial of basic services including healthcare. (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016, p. 7)

The gendered impacts of the conflict also were clear in the political, social and economic spheres, with poverty, marginalisation and the consequences of conflict making women more vulnerable to violence, aggravated by a culture of impunity and an expectation of women’s “stoicism and silent endurance of violence” (Alsaba & Kapilashrami, 2016, p. 13).  

Any meaningful justice process in Syria must look beyond the fourteen years of civil war to the over fifty years of Assad family rule. The foundations of systemic violence were laid under Hafez al-Assad, the father of Bashar, who seized power in 1970 and constructed an authoritarian state built on a pervasive security apparatus, the suppression of political opposition, and the institutionalisation of torture, enforced disappearance, and extrajudicial killing as tools of governance (EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby, 2019). The patterns of violence, the perpetrating institutions, and the culture of impunity that characterised Assad’s rule for half a century hold direct continuity with the atrocities of the civil war period. A justice framework that fails to reckon with this longer history risks addressing symptoms while leaving their structural causes intact.

Equally, the fall of Assad in December 2024 did not bring an immediate end to the violence. Any justice framework must therefore extend its scope beyond the civil war period to encompass violations committed since the establishment of the transitional government. In March 2025, approximately 1,400 members of the Alawite minority community, predominantly civilians, were killed along the Syrian coast, principally by units integrated into the new government’s own security apparatus (Center for Preventive Action, 2026). Shortly thereafter, in southern Syria, the Druze community accused the transitional government of backing Bedouin tribal forces in attacks that left over 1,000 people dead in the summer of 2025 (Center for Preventive Action, 2026). Minority communities are particularly concerned about the possibility of a renewed vulnerability to violence under the transitional government.

Therefore, a transformative justice framework is required; understanding that for many Syrians, ‘peacetime’ was characterised by inequality, discrimination and violence. This article argues that rather than rebuilding and restoring the structural discrimination and everyday violence that existed in Syrian society prior to the civil war, an approach that transforms Syrian society at the very foundations is required. The EU has a role to play in supporting the Syrian people and their government, this includes using its political and financial leverage to encourage institutional reform while channelling support and funds towards Syrian civil society, truth and accountability mechanisms, and locally led and owned reconstruction efforts.

The article proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of the current policies of the transitional government led by al-Sharaa, and the ways in which this approach fails to achieve transformative justice. Then, the article will put forward how transformative justice could be applied in the case of Syria, through reparations, constitutional, legislative and institutional reform, and truth and accountability mechanisms, and highlight the ways in which the EU can support these efforts.

Methods  

This article is based on qualitative desk-based policy analysis. Primary source documents were collected and considered from the transitional government, as well as additional evidence from Think Tanks, advocacy groups and NGOs working on transitional justice in Syria. This search mainly focused on documents produced following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 but considered recommendations on transformative governance produced prior to this date. These documents were analysed using a framework of transformative gender-sensitive justice to assess the current approach of the transitional government and to put forward policy recommendations.

The Current Transitional Approach and Its Shortcomings to Achieve Transformative Justice

The current transitional government in Syria has presented a vision for a democratic future for Syria. In the constitutional declaration issued in March 2025, a five-year transitional period was established, with the intention of holding national elections at the end of this period (Syrian Arab Republic, 2025). In response to the democratising efforts of the al- Sharaa government, the EU has begun to normalise relations with Syria and provide political and financial support to the recovery and reconstruction effort (Crosson, 2026). In this section, the article will outline the steps taken by the transitional government in Syria towards justice, truth, and remedy, while outlining the shortcomings of their approach, specifically, the lack of transparency, clarity, and inclusivity.

For example, to form the interim parliament in October of 2025, indirect elections took place for two-thirds of the seats. 119 representatives were appointed by local committees for each electoral district; members of these committees were appointed by the Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections. The remaining third of the seats for the parliament were appointed directly by al-Sharaa on July 1 st 2026. Al-Sharaa also appointed the 11-member Supreme Committee for the People’s Assembly Elections, made up of notable political figures from across Syria, and included two women, far from an equitable representation (Salhani, 2025).

Consequently, this initial process of those leading this transitional process has consolidated the power of al-Sharaa and the local elites who are aligned with him, as they hold great influence over the composition of the assembly (Karam, 2025). This is reflected in the results of the indirect elections to the Assembly, now dominated by Sunni Arab men, the ethnic and religious group to which al-Sharaa belongs, with only six women and ten minority representatives selected out of the 119 seats contested. Al-Sharaa appointed 15 women when selecting the remaining 70 members of the Assembly in July 2026, taking the total of women in the Assembly to 21 in the 210-seat chamber. Representation is an essential first step in building a more equitable society, and given al-Sharaa’s decision not to include quotas for women or for ethnic and religious minorities in the Assembly, this demonstrates that representation is not a priority for this transitional government. This is important as without significant representation, there is a concern that the issues that affect these groups may be  overlooked, and laws could be passed that entrench existing biases and discrimination rather than transforming them.

As mentioned, al-Sharaa also signed into action a constitutional declaration which will cover a five-year transitional period. This Syrian Interim Constitution was released on 13 March 2025, comprising 53 articles. The constitution enshrines separation of powers, judicial independence, freedom of expression, freedom of the media, the right to cultural and religious diversity, and the rights of women (Syrian Arab Republic, 2025). It recognises international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as domestic crimes. It also states that Islam is the religion of the president and that Islamic jurisprudence is the main source of legislation. The Declaration also criminalises calls for division or secession, affirming Syria as indivisible, and foreclosing discussions of federalism or decentralisation.

Constitutions can be primary tools for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of a people, but they also can be misappropriated as instruments of top-down control of a population and entrench hierarchies along gendered and racialised lines. Sadeghi (2026) highlights how the Declaration was “drafted by a small, male-only committee of Sunni Arabs, with only one constitutional law specialist” (p. 23). There was little transparency around the process of selecting this committee, and the draft of the constitution required approval by the al-Sharaa- led government. Subsequently, this interim document has effectively no contribution from the Syrian people, continuing the same authoritarian tendencies of the preceding Assad governments and excluding the Syrian people from imagining and creating a different future.

There are particular concerns that this document can lay the groundwork for increasing centralisation of power in the hands of al-Sharaa. First, there is uncertainty of precisely how the democratic transition will occur at the end of the interim transition period, raising concerns that it could be elided all together. The transitional constitution outlines the interim nature of the document, stating that there will be an adoption of a permanent constitution and democratic elections at the end of the five-year interim period. Yet there is no indication of how this document will be drafted, by whom, or how they will be selected. Second, there are concerns about particular articles in the constitution, and their potential for abuse and power consolidation. For example, article 23 allows for limitations on rights and freedoms for reasons of national security, territorial integrity, public safety and public order (Syrian Arab Republic, 2025, p. 8). Thus, with little to no oversight, the protection of human rights could be overruled. Article 41 authorises the President to declare a state of emergency for up to three months, with the approval of the National Security Council and consultation with the Speaker of the People’s Assembly and the President of the Constitutional Court. Yet it is only if it is to be extended for a second time that the approval of the Assembly is required. (Syrian Arab Republic, 2025, p. 12). This state can be declared if there is a serious and immediate danger to national unity or the integrity and independence of Syria. A state of emergency is an ambiguous concept, and this ambiguity is significant, given that it mirrors previous Syrian constitutions during the Assad era, which enabled the decades-long state of emergency and consolidation of a dictatorship (Sadeghi, 2026, p. 25).  

Additionally, the wording of the Declaration presents concerns for feminists in the country, with phrases that often interweave masculinity and militarism into the very foundational document of the state, in a manner which implicitly excludes women from the political imagination of the nation as constructed by al-Sharaa and the interim government (Sadeghi, 2026, p. 24). The introduction makes repeated references to the “sons of Syria” and the return of the “homeland to its sons” (Syrian Arab Republic, 2025, p. 3). This gendered wording works to construct women as unequal citizens within this foundational document, implying Syria as belonging to the sons, and therefore, not to the daughters. Furthermore, the Declaration “confines women’s participation in political life to parenting and reproduction, and excludes them from substantive political roles” (Sadeghi, 2026, p. 5). Importantly, in Syria, as in many countries, women’s constitutional rights are often overshadowed by personal status law. In the case of Syria, this regulates family matters including marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance and guardianship. Therefore, rather than transforming gender relations in Syria, this document serves to reinforce existing gendered power hierarchies and gendered public/private divides.

The constitution also established the intention to create a Transitional Justice Commission which was announced on the 17th May 2025 in Presidential Decree No. 20. A positive step, it was promised that this commission would have “effective, consultative, and victim-centered mechanisms to determine accountability, the right to truth, and redress for victims and survivors” (Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic, 2025). Unfortunately, the Commission has been limited to focusing on those crimes committed by the Assad government. While the Assad government is responsible for the large majority of crimes committed during the civil war, they were certainly not the only perpetrator. Limiting this truth-seeking commission to certain crimes excludes the victims/survivors of atrocities committed by non-state actors and creates a hierarchy of victimhood. Ultimately, this will “perpetuate exclusion and deepen divisions”, rather than bring about communal healing and reconciliation (Autin, 2025).

Overall, the current approach of the interim Syrian government presents a dilemma for those invested in a truly democratic, equal and inclusive Syria. While there may be rhetorical support for a democratic future for Syria, rather than presenting a vision for a transformed Syria, the current trajectory reinforces power hierarchies along racialised and gendered lines and suggests the possibility of authoritarian consolidation.  

Implementing Transformative Justice in Syria

After highlighting the shortcomings of the current transitional government, this article will now propose an alternative: the implementation of transformative justice in Syria, and the ways in which the EU can support these efforts. This article argues that a gender-sensitive, transformative justice approach is required in this transitional period for Syria, in order to prevent a return to a pre-conflict society that was replete with gendered and racialised  everyday and extraordinary violence. In the context of this article, transformative justice is defined as “a comprehensive tool to dismantle the structure of oppression towards equality, justice, sustainable peace, and guarantees of nonrecurrence for both women and men” (EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby, 2019, p. 4).

Transformative justice recognises that women’s experiences in post-conflict settings are often informed by pre-existing ‘peacetime’ inequalities (Boesten & Wilding, 2015). This is grounded in the concept of the continuum of violence, which suggests that violence is not limited to times of war, but permeates daily life, it is in the home, in the workplace and in the street. It also does not disappear at the end of conflict, but continues into displacement camps, migration routes and beyond. In this sense, the continuum of violence rejects a binary between “war” and “peace”. While the form and scale of violence might be very different during conflict, “such violence is rooted in existing and surviving gender ideologies and inequalities” (Boesten & Wilding, 2015, pp. 75-76). Accordingly, after conflict, many women do not want a return to peacetime dynamics, as that infers a return to structures, systems and practices which were imbued with patriarchal gender norms and behaviours. With this in mind, in a post-conflict setting like Syria, many women are demanding a period of societal transformation that addresses the underlying inequalities which are creating the conditions for the gendered harms they experience (Boesten & Wilding, 2015).

In order to achieve an equitable, inclusive and just peace, transformation in Syria must begin with meaningful participation and representation of women and minoritised communities in decision-making positions across all institutions and transitional processes. This requires understanding and taking account of their diverse roles and experiences before, during and after the conflict, and will help inform a more complex yet equal vision for the future of Syria (Boty, 2025). Significantly, in conflict, women are often stereotyped as merely victims, and not as active contributors to efforts for reconciliation and peace (Sjoberg, 2014). Therefore, it is essential not to reproduce these biases and instead ensure women’s full and equal participation. One way to achieve this is through quotas, which, although critiqued, ensure benchmarks for the representation of certain communities.

A second key element of healing is listening to, understanding, and documenting the experiences of victims/survivors of the dictatorship and civil war. Importantly, this requires allowing space for the complex and diverse experiences of conflict, and does not exclude certain stories or prioritise certain narratives. In contrast to the approach of the current transitional government, this requires an independent body that addresses crimes committed by all parties of the conflict, including the Assad government, non-state actors, and international actors. It should also create space for historic crimes committed under the entire Assad dictatorship, and the structural violence which (re)produces rights violations. Furthermore, it should not create a hierarchy of victimhood by prioritising certain crimes over others. Feminists have suggested that often women’s experiences of sexual violence, in particular in detention, receive special attention, while their experiences of structural violence, displacement or domestic violence may not be recognised to the same extent (EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby, 2019, p. 9). Importantly, truth-  seeking processes can help a society to understand the circumstances that led to large-scale violations of their rights, and this “provides a vital safeguard against the recurrence of violations” (EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby, 2019, p. 18). The EU has the power through its political and financial support to the interim government to encourage them to ensure national transitional justice efforts recognise and address past violations by all perpetrators (Syrian Legal Development Programme, 2025).

Formal political processes for establishing and guaranteeing peace around the world have frequently excluded women and minorities, or only allowed for symbolic inclusion in a way that instrumentalised their representation to prove the inclusivity of processes to the international community (EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby, 2019, p. 9). Gendered and marginalised experiences are complex, and the voices of women and minorities often struggle to be heard when promoting a complicated and nuanced agenda of transformative justice. Given these difficulties, transformative justice often takes place through bottom-up approaches to justice, creating justice at the familial and communal level. Processes can include community accountability and dialogue processes, survivor-centred dialogue, cultural and arts-based methods, and collective work to address root causes (Al- Khateeb, 2025; The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, 2025; Walters and Koontz, 2025). For example, as Dr Feras Alkabani explains, the arts are essential to healing processes, as “cultural practices, such as theatre, art and literature, play a vital role in acknowledging these marginalised experiences of many cultural groups/individuals and can therefore facilitate the healing process” (Al-Khateeb, 2025, p. 6). Transformative justice efforts could expand on the grassroots structures already established during the civil war, in which Syrian civil society organisations, often led by women and members of marginalised groups, worked in perilous conditions to create a sustainable peace and to try and provide education, employment and health services (Al-Muhammad, 2025). To support ground-up justice efforts, the EU should “provide sustainable, flexible, long-term funding to Syrian civil society organizations including women-led organizations and their core operations” (Syrian Legal Development Programme, 2025).  

Essential to the structural elements of transformative justice is the reform and restructuring of institutions and laws, such as the constitution and transitional Assembly mentioned earlier. The institutions of the previous Assad government perpetuated corruption, crime and violence, and it is essential to reconstruct these institutions from the very foundations to prevent the reemergence of the authoritarian structures. Whereas the al-Sharaa government has arbitrarily dismissed the vast majority of the workers in these institutions, it would be beneficial to establish neutral and independent committees to implement a holistic vetting process to keep offenders from public office (Boty, 2025).

There also needs to be an examination and reform of much of the legislation that creates the conditions under which violence and discrimination become not only possible but legal. In particular, as highlighted before, the interim constitution provides the language to guarantee women’s rights, yet these rights are undermined by the Syrian Law of Personal Status  regulating family matters and under which women are at an unequal position compared to men (Sadeghi, 2026). To ensure that women’s and minority rights are meaningfully implemented, laws that undermine or contradict the rights guaranteed in the constitution and in international legislation must be overturned.

Another key element of justice is reparations. Reparations can come in multiple forms, at the individual, collective or regional level. They can include individual payments, they can also include “pensions, educational and training opportunities, access to health services, land, housing, property, and psychological rehabilitation” (Boty, 2025), as well as official apologies and symbolic measures. Furthermore, with such extensive damage committed during the war, the reality for many Syrians is that their homes, businesses, and communities do not exist in the way they did before. Therefore, reconstruction is an essential part of rebuilding Syria. Yet this also presents an opportunity to rethink how the communities are structured, in particular taking account of equitable and green development, prioritising affordable and safe housing, as well as providing important services for the communities, such as access to medical and health services, including reproductive health, shelters for those who have suffered domestic violence, and accessibility (Al-Muhammad, 2025). The EU should support the reconstruction effort, prioritising investing in Syrian labour and experts, supporting small businesses and cooperatives, using sustainable, locally sourced materials, and ultimately ensuring decision-making remains in Syrian hands (Syrian Legal Development Programme, 2025).

Conclusion and Way Forward

The fall of the Assad government in December 2024 represents a historic opening for the Syrian people. At the same time, the early trajectory of the transitional government gives pause for concern. So far it has consolidated power in the hands of al-Sharaa, excluded women and minorities from meaningful participation in constitutional and parliamentary processes, and narrowed transitional justice mechanisms to address only a portion of the crimes committed. These decisions risk reproducing the very hierarchies and structures of exclusion of the Assad era, as opposed to forging an inclusive and equitable Syria.

This article argues that this moment demands not reconstruction, but transformation. A return to pre-war ‘normalcy’ is not a viable goal for the majority of Syrians, for whom peacetime was already characterised by structural discrimination, patriarchal violence, and ethnic and religious marginalisation. The most credible pathway to a durable and inclusive peace requires a transformative justice framework. This framework must centre the experiences of women, minorities, and other marginalised communities; address the full continuum of violence from the foundations of Assad-era authoritarian governance through to violations committed under the transitional government itself; and pursue structural reform of laws and institutions.  

In the immediate term, several concrete reforms are urgently needed. The Transitional Justice Commission must be expanded in scope: its mandate must be extended to encompass crimes committed by all parties to the conflict, including violations carried out under the transitional government itself. The process of drafting a permanent constitution must be conducted with far greater transparency and public participation than the interim declaration afforded, and must be accompanied by reform of personal status law and other legislation that historically undermines the rights the constitution purports to guarantee. Institutional reform must be based on an independent and principled vetting process, while representation quotas for women and minorities in elected bodies and public institutions should be introduced as a baseline for inclusion.

Over the medium and longer term, truth-seeking, reparations and reconstruction must be understood as transformative acts. Rebuilding efforts must prioritise community-led development that addresses historic inequalities. Above all, Syrian civil society, the organisations, educators, artists, and community leaders, many of them women, who sustained Syrian communities through years of war, must be at the centre of peacebuilding processes rather than at their margins. While building an equitable, just and inclusive Syria is not a simple task, it is a political necessity.

The EU’s role in supporting transformative justice in Syria should be exactly that: supportive. Syria’s justice processes need to be Syrian-led and Syrian-owned. That said, the EU still has an additional part to play, using its political and financial leverage over the al-Sharaa government to push it toward genuinely transformative governance, rather than allowing the same societal and governance structures that produced fifty years of authoritarian rule to simply be rebuilt. The Council has reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to a peaceful and inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition, framing this explicitly around respect for human rights and the rule of law (Council of the European Union, 2025). Beyond influencing the government, the EU can also play a significant role by financing and supporting Syrian civil society, local reconstruction efforts, and truth and accountability processes. This is already reflected in the dedication of more than €424 million for Syria, including a €175 million package to support Syria’s socio-economic recovery and institution-building, as well as to promote transitional justice, accountability and human rights (Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, 2026).

Policy Recommendations to the EU

• Leverage political and financial support to shape transitional justice. The EU should encourage the transitional government to ensure national transitional justice efforts recognise and address past violations by all perpetrators, not just the former regime.
• Fund Syrian civil society directly and sustainably. The EU should provide long- term and flexible funding to Syrian civil society organisations, including women-led  groups, covering not only project-specific activities but also their core operational costs.
• Centre Syrian ownership and local capacity in reconstruction. The EU should support the reconstruction effort by prioritising labour and expertise, supporting small businesses and cooperatives, using sustainable and locally sourced materials, and ensuring decision-making throughout the reconstruction process remains in Syrian hands.

References

Al-Khateeb, K. (2025, February). Perspectives on transitional justice in Syria: Voices from academia, civil society, and the arts (Workshop Report). Essex Human Rights Centre. https://repository.essex.ac.uk/40283/1/Perspectives%20on%20Transitional%20Justice%20in %20Syria- %20Voices%20from%20Academia%2C%20Civil%20Society%2C%20and%20the%20Arts %202025.pdf

Al-Muhammad, A. (2025, April 30). Coming Home: Women’s Leadership in Syria’s Transformative Transition. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. https://www.wilpf.org/coming-home-womens-leadership-in-syrias-transformative-transition/

Alsaba, K., & Kapilashrami, A. (2016). Understanding women’s experience of violence and the political economy of gender in conflict: the case of Syria. Reproductive Health Matters, 24(47), 5-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rhm.2016.05.002

Amnesty International. (2014, April 9). War crimes in the Syrian Conflict. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/knowledge-hub/all-resources/war-crimes-syria/

Autin, A. (2025, May 19). Syria’s Transitional Justice Commission; A Missed Opportunity for Victim-Led Justice. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/05/19/syrias- transitional-justice-commission-missed-opportunity-victim-led-justice

Boesten, J. and Wilding, P. (2015). Transformative Gender Justice: Setting an Agenda. Women’s Studies International Forum, 51, 75-80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2014.11.001

Boty, M. (2025, June 28). Gender-Sensitive Transitional Justice in Syria…A Conversation with Lama Kannout. Syria Untold. https://syriauntold.com/2025/06/28/gender-sensitive- transitional-justice-in-syria-a-conversation-with-lama-kannout/

Center for Preventive Action. (2026, February 18). Conflict in Syria. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-syria  

Council of the European Union. (2025, June 23). Council Conclusions on Syria, 10688/25, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10688-2025-INIT/en/pdf 

Crosson, D.M. (2026, May 11). A Milestone on the Road to Stronger EU-Syria Ties. International Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/europe/europe-syria/milestone- road-stronger-eu-syria-ties

Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf. (2026, January 9). EU opens new chapter in its relations with Syria. https://north-africa-middle-east- gulf.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-opens-new-chapter-its-relations-syria-2026-01-09_en

EuroMed Feminist Initiative & Syrian Feminist Lobby. (2019, February). Gender-sensitive transitional justice process in Syria [Report of the International Conference]. https://www.efi-ife.org/en/pdf/report-gender-sensitive-transitional-justice-process-in-syria.

Human Rights Watch. (2020). Syria: Events of 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world- report/2020/country-chapters/syria

Karam, P. (2025, November 21). Prospects for Syria’s Democratization Under Ahmed al- Sharaa. Arab Center Washington DC. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/prospects-for-syrias- democratization-under-ahmed-al-sharaa/

OCHA. (2026). Syria Humanitarian Fund. https://www.unocha.org/syria-humanitarian-fund Accessed August 17, 2026.

OHCHR. (2021, March 1). Arbitrary Imprisonment and Detention – Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Syrian Arab Republic. https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr- bodies/hrc/iici-syria/detention-report

Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic [@SyPresidency]. (2025, May 17). Presidential Decree No. (20). X. https://x.com/SyPresidency/status/1923841446387359791

Sadeghi, F. (2026). Imagining the Future of Politics in Syria through the Constitution: Gender Exclusion and Transformative Pathways. London. Institute for Global Prosperity, UCL. https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10220206/1/IGP_Political%20Life%20in%20Syria_Pape r_v4.pdf

Salhani, J. (2025, October 5). Everything you need to know about Syria’s first post-Assad elections. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/5/everything-you-need-to- know-about-syrias-first-post-assad-elections

Sjoberg, L. (2014). Gender, War, and Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press.  

Syrian Arab Republic. (2025, March 13). Constitutional Declaration of the Syrian Arab Republic. Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025.03.13%20- %20Constitutional%20declaration%20(English).pdf

Syrian Legal Development Programme. (2025, March 17). Recommendations on Syria to the EU-Commission and Member States. https://sldp.ngo/en/blog/2371

The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation. (2025, July 2). Rebuild Syria Justly – Back Women’s Movement. https://kvinnatillkvinna.org/2025/07/02/rebuild-syria-justly-back-womens- movements/

UNHCR. (2026, February). Operational Update – Syrian Arab Republic. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/121850

Walters, G., & Koontz, K. (2025, December 1). How Syria’s Grassroots Civil Peace Committees Can help Prevent Intercommunal Conflict. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-syrias-grassroots-civil-peace- committees-can-help-prevent-intercommunal-conflict/

AI Declaration

AI was used in this article to edit possible mistakes, focusing on errors in grammar, spelling and clarity, with each suggestion reviewed individually.