The future of EU-NATO relations: the role of Northern Europe after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Abstract

This article examines the possible changes in EU-NATO relationships due to recent transformations in the security policies of Nordic European Member states. By joining NATO, Sweden and Finland are moving away from non-alignment and strengthening the European component of the Atlantic alliance. In addition, removing Denmark’s EU defence opt-out strengthens the planning of a European collective defence. These changes are likely to influence future relations between the EU and NATO, with a closer collaboration for security and defence in the European area and a more precise division of tasks between the two organizations.

Introduction

Since its foundation in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the leading organization in maintaining security and defence in the Euro-Atlantic area for half a century. However, in the 1990s, NATO ceased to be the exclusive multilateral security actor in Europe following the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union. During this time, the responsibilities and activities of these organizations began to overlap more frequently due to their expanding mandates and initiatives (Ewers-Peters, 2024).

As will be assessed in this article, since the founding of NATO at the beginning of the Cold War, the Nordic region has seen a change in security approaches, with governments reevaluating their national security attitudes. The ongoing Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the need for and importance of NATO and CSDP, which are the two main elements of European security. The crisis has revitalised NATO member states’ commitment and investments in the alliance: lethal equipment has been provided for the first time through the CSDP, and the European Peace Facility has increased the budget for security within the EU (Migliorati, 2024).

As a result of increasing European tensions, Nordic nations have been prompted to make revolutionary decisions regarding their security policies. Denmark has abolished its opt-out from the CSDP, while Finland and Sweden have abandoned their long-standing non-alignment attitude to join NATO. These changes may influence future relations between the EU and NATO, bringing stricter collaboration and a more organised division of activities between the two organizations in the European area.

The case of Sweden: from neutrality to the NATO membership

Throughout its history, Sweden has always maintained a neutral security approach. During the Cold War, this attitude was established by adopting a policy of neutrality in war and nonalignment in periods of peace. However, throughout the late 20th century, Sweden worked in close military collaboration with NATO nations despite its neutrality and its exclusion from formal membership (Thorhallsson and Stude Vidal, 2024). Before the 2022 Ukrainian conflict and the subsequent Swedish NATO membership, the European and Atlantic frameworks influenced Swedish modern defence. Sweden actively participated in several NATO-directed operational actions and in the EU’s CSDP, despite its formal non-alignment. These included the major 2001 NATO-led campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as well as the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Libya in 2011, which was led by NATO troops (Bjereld and Möller, 2016).

The Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its annexation of Crimea was one of the reasons for Sweden’s strong alignment with Western-oriented security policy. As a response to the invasion, Sweden took part in EU-wide sanctions against Russia. The CFSP framework was used to support the EU’s reaction to the attack, and some European member states, including Sweden, started to push for more coordinated and organized defence programmes (Thorhallsson and Stude Vidal, 2024). This is demonstrated also by the declaration of Minister Billström, who highlighted the role of Sweden as a leading member state within the EU in toughening sanctions to Russia (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024). 

In addition, after the total invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Swedish government highlighted the importance of the EU for Swedish security, explicitly pointing to the mutual defence provision stated in Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This article permits the EU to guarantee Sweden’s security by requiring all parties in the Union to do everything in their power to support and aid EU victims of armed attacks (Treaty on the European Union, 2007). However, policymakers in Sweden considered that the EU’s general lack of military and security, especially concerning the absence of collective defence structures, limits the Union’s ability to be relied upon during military crises. According to the Swedish government, military protection and deterrence were envisioned as possible mainly within NATO (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022) and therefore it is likely these are two of Sweden’s main motivations for joining.

A recent speech by the former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tobias Billström (2024), confirmed that the decision to join NATO was prompted by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine as it intensified the threat of Russia to Sweden’s security and autonomy. He described a letter from the Russian Secretary of State, Lavrov, which stated that Sweden and Finland should accept their place in a Russian sphere of influence and that they would never be permitted to join NATO. This highlighted Russia’s aggressive intentions to deny each state the autonomy to choose its own security strategy (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024).

In May 2022, three months after the invasion, the former Swedish Prime Minister, Magdalena Andersson, announced the decision to apply for NATO membership. It is uncertain if Sweden is ready to host any permanent NATO troops, despite some Swedish policymakers arguing that having as many Allies as possible on Swedish territory during a crisis would enhance deterrence (Lawrence, Jermalavičius and Hyllander, 2024).

Shifting security attitudes in Finland and the application to NATO

The position of Finland in relation to security and defence during the Cold War was distinct from the other Nordic countries and Western European states. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, signed between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1948, stated that Finland must fight if attacked by Germany or its allies, was not allowed to join any coalitions directed against the Soviet Union and had to consider West Germany a threat (Kansikas, 2019). This influenced Finnish relations with Western Europe during the Cold War, by binding the Finnish state to the Soviet area of influence.

In order to protect their national sovereignty, Finnish policymakers maintained a good relationship with the Soviet Union and avoided joining any military alliance. However, this approach did not prevent Finland from establishing cooperation in several sectors, including defence, with other Western nations after the fall of the USSR, especially with Sweden. The relationship with Sweden prompted Finland to adopt a policy of “military non-alignment”, instead of the previous one of total neutrality. In 1990, Finland also submitted an application to join the European Union, following the Swedish request for membership (Fittante, 2023).

Finland’s justification for joining the EU was not just economic but primarily motivated by the potential for a political union. Furthermore, being intimately associated with a Western international organization was seen as a defence against Russian influence (Gebhard, 2017). Later, the closer relations on security and defence with other Western states led Finland to try to strengthen its ties with NATO by joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997 (Forsberg, 2017).

As in the case of Sweden, the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea caused a significant shift in Finnish defence and security strategy, especially in the policy’s foreign component. Finland started to shift toward territorial defence and deterrence, strengthening its defence alliances and forming new ones. Before the invasion, defence cooperation was primarily concerned with crisis management, whereas later, Finnish objectives were reshaped, with territorial and national defence capabilities becoming increasingly relevant in collaborative efforts (Pesu, 2020). 

After the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Finnish political leadership considered stepping up non-treaty-based military cooperation with some of its closest allies, including Sweden and the US. Whilst Finnish security was the priority, there were concerns that a NATO membership would have carried the risk of causing an escalation in Europe (Niinisto, 2024).

However, the shortcomings of being left out of NATO were too significant to be counterbalanced by its membership in the CSDP. Because of its precarious geopolitical location, the North-Atlantic Treaty is crucial for the nation’s territorial security, as CSDP is considered still insufficient to provide adequate protection (Migliorati, 2024). With its April 2023 entrance, Finland strengthened NATO’s European pillar and added another point of convergence between the EU and NATO, consolidating further the cooperation between the two organizations (Ratti, 2023).

Denmark and the new approach towards European security after the abolition of the defence opt-out

Denmark’s approach to security and defence during the Cold War was mainly focused on maintaining modest defence spending and low participation in NATO activities. However, since the early 1990s, Denmark’s military engagement has increased, as its attitude to defence has changed. Despite strengthening its relationship with NATO, Denmark did not show a great interest in creating a unified defence strategy inside the EU at the end of the Cold War (Migliorati, 2024).

In addition, the unsuccessful vote to ratify the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which would have made it a member of the EU, prompted Danish elites to negotiate the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement. The Edinburgh agreement established opt-outs from three EU policy areas: the Economic and Monetary Union, Justice and Home Affairs and the Common Security and Defence Policy. Whilst the operational CSDP missions of the EU are divided into two categories: civilian and military operations, Denmark’s defence opt out was limited only to military-related CSDP missions. This was because of the assumption that it would implement decisions and actions with defence consequences. Nevertheless, Denmark decided to participate in almost every civilian CSDP mission. 

The defence opt-out caused problems in Denmark’s cooperation with NATO because of the interchangeability of EU missions under the CSDP with those of the Atlantic ones. On many occasions, the military forces of EU member states, under the CSDP, assumed command of a mission previously overseen by the Atlantic organization. As a consequence, Denmark, a contributor to the NATO operation, was forced to leave the mission because the military aspect of the operation would have breached the opt-out due to its defence consequences (Butler, 2020).

The success of the 2022 referendum over the defence limitations represents the first time a Danish Prime Minister has successfully removed an EU opt-out. Two failed referenda, in September 2000 and December 2015, tried to abolish the opt-outs from the Economic and Monetary Union and Justice and Home Affairs. The defence opt-out contributed to a significant change in the Nordic security environment, which can now have greater influence over European defence matters, especially when combined with Finland and Sweden’s historic choices to apply for NATO membership (Dutta, 2024).

The Government of Denmark also mentions the future of the relationship between the EU and NATO, in the report entitled “Danish security and defence towards 2035” (2022), stating that the EU and NATO’s respective roles may intensify due to the developments following the Ukraine crisis. The report adds that the EU substantially contributes to European and international security in numerous ways, even as NATO guarantees Russia’s military deterrence. In addition, according to the Danish government, the EU Commission’s strong participation in the European defence component has significant implications for developing an effective European defence sector (The Government of Denmark, 2022).

Conclusions

To conclude, the inclusion of Finland and Sweden in NATO is likely to enhance the alliance’s political power. This will accelerate the development of a growing division of labour between the EU and NATO, given also the new role that Denmark will play within the CSDP. According to this possible new division of labour, the EU would play a more significant role in capability development, countering hybrid threats, and crisis management, while NATO would be in charge mostly of collective defence (Lawrence, Jermalavičius and Hyllander, 2024). However, given the complementarity between NATO and CSDP, it seems that Sweden and Finland were aiming for more integration into the European security and defence system, after the Atlantic membership and their significant changes in their security policies.

The decision to apply for NATO membership by Sweden and Finland also shows that the Atlantic Treaty will continue to be the leading supplier of European security in the event of a severe crisis if the EU does not demonstrate more leadership in security and defence (Migliorati, 2024). The Ukraine war has shown the dangers of Europe depending too much on the strength of the Atlantic Treaty, and it demonstrated that the European Union lacked the institutional ability to independently develop defence resources without external support. Therefore, the possibility of increasing European security cooperation is likely to remain deep-rooted within the EU-NATO collaboration in the following years (Ratti, 2023). 

The new circumstances will change the strategic balance in the Northern area and significantly improve NATO defence. There is uncertainty over  whether the shift in the balance of power due to the new EU-NATO relations will cause tensions because of the heightened relevance of the European Union to security matters  and the strong position of NATO in Europe, or whether it will provide increased stability (Tamnes, 2024). However, several declarations made by representatives of the two organizations demonstrate a will to reinforce and deepen the cooperation in order to ensure a more efficient defence of European territory.

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