The European Union in Space: From exploration and innovation to security and autonomy

Abstract

The EU has invested in space policy and research since the mid-2000s. Focused on promoting industry, innovation, and exploration, it mirrored much of the world’s interests in space. By developing systems such as Galileo, EGNOS, and Copernicus, the EU provided the digital and technological means for its citizens to lead a modern life. Nevertheless, rising cybersecurity and space-based threats, including anti-satellite weapons, raise concerns for EU security, defence, and foreign policy. Since January 2025, the EU Commission, in partnership with actors such as the ESA, ESPI, and EUSPA, has initiated progress in defensive measures in space. European policy-makers thereafter identified the future of European resilience and strength in space to rest on autonomy, cooperation, and asset protection. Concerns, however, remain, as the geopolitical context sours, underpinning outer space as a fundamental European policy priority. 

Introduction

As the war in Ukraine continues and with the transatlantic alliance at stake following President Trump’s recent incumbency, the status quo on European security and foreign policy is becoming increasingly unstable. A modern European citizen’s lifestyle depends on technology partially based in space. This interconnectedness is therefore significant to wider European policymaking, considering its relevance to the region’s societal, economic, and political functions. European resilience, independence, and digitalisation are reliant on space systems. Satellites help in navigation, communication, data collection, and economic ventures, making their safekeeping essential. European space policy has traditionally focused on innovation, research, and industry, largely circumventing the issue of space security and defence. Yet, the past months have seen changes in how policy and the space industry address growing security concerns. With states gradually militarising their space activities and President Trump’s staunch backing of the US Space Force, the sixth American military branch, a European response has been comparatively slow. Considering shifting geopolitics, this article examines how European space policy and its space strategy have developed in the past and have since adapted to today’s growing security and defence concerns.

This article will first explain the relevance of European space policy and then present a brief history of European space politics. It will afterwards discuss the securitisation of European space policy and finally unpack the current affairs challenging the EU space agenda. 

Understanding the Relevance of European Space Strategy

Understanding the relevance of European space policy means recognising the indispensable role of space technologies in modern life. For one, the most recognised use of European satellites is their ability to help millions communicate through modern devices, as well as providing orientation and navigation services in the EU (EU space policy, 2025). European space programs and the systems supported by their satellites can also directly help with planetary sustainability and global development (Paravano et al., 2024). The EU’s Space Agenda 2030 has notably identified space technologies as crucial in this area, where they could foster the shift to clean energies, monitor progress for the sustainable agenda, and supervise rising sea levels. 

The EU acknowledges space technology’s central role in citizens’ everyday lives and, by extension, its impact on EU activities. The space domain boosts job and investment growth in Europe, encouraging a greener and digitised economic model and enhancing the scientific and research industries (EU space policy, 2025). Many EU sectoral policies also rely on features located in space, making European society vulnerable to the prospect of harmful external activities in space that could impact European space infrastructure. In this way, space security is fundamental to EU economic growth, connectivity, and digitisation. 

The private sector is also increasingly harnessing space just as the EU supply chain relies on space-related services and goods (Cellerino, 2023). Some flagship EU space programmes that may be recognisable to the European public include Copernicus, Galileo, and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Services (EGNOS). The Copernicus program encompasses Earth observation (EO), or data collection on Earth’s systems; Galileo provides a global navigation system; and EGNOS permits safety-oriented navigation for EU transportation, either by land, sea, or air. Such applications are fundamental to regional, civil, and economic life and hence to the wider European security priorities (Cellerino, 2023). Recognising this, the EU has focused on addressing space-related industry challenges through research, industrial, and commercial policies.

The Evolution of European Space Strategy

European space policy was first formalised in May 2007 through a joint agreement between the ESA (European Space Agency) and the European Commission (European space policy, 2004). This agreement defined space policy, underlining two pillars for the European space agenda: security and defence, alongside space exploration and access. This first pillar remained vague, yet inspired a future where research and exploration could address security and defence challenges. This agreement had EU states and agencies commit themselves to a future of coordination to reap the benefits of outer space.

Over the last decade, the EU has consistently invested in space research. The forefront European space research and innovation program, Horizon Europe, initiated in 2009, has pushed for development for the 2021-2027 period (The European Commission, 2025). Backed by the European Commission, it has developed critical space technologies to promote European resilience, strength, and independence in space. This has contributed to unprecedented growth in the space technology sector, with the EU determined to make itself competitive on the international scene of space innovation.

In April 2021, the Council of the EU adopted a regulation to develop an EU Space Program until 2027 (Council of the EU, 2021). Securing 14.8 billion euros, the Council acknowledged space activities’ role in sustainable economic growth and security. In a New Space economy, it allowed the EU to remain competitive and encouraged European space sovereignty. Thus, the New Space policy designated the status quo of space exploration and exploitation: the community of new aerospace companies have developed low-cost spaceflight technology, facilitating ease of access to space (Martin, 2015). The EU Space Program streamlined the EU legal framework on space policy, created a space budget, monitored space pollution, standardised a security framework for space, and initiated a formal governance structure for EU space activities (Council of the EU, 2021).

While the last two decades saw tremendous growth in the European space sector, namely through the European Space Program, very little has been done to address growing security and defence concerns in the space domain. Just as the geopolitical landscape has shifted, so has the need to revisit European space security. Adapting to this change calls for a stronger European presence in outer space, emphasising strategy autonomy and defence.

Adaptation Through Strategic Change: Autonomy and Security

Today, space has become a contested theatre of operations, and with increasing global interest in space comes increased risk. For global enablers of earth-based security and defence activities, any disruption to a state’s space-based services could severely impair its response to security threats. Such public services can provide precise positioning, communication, geospatial, imaging, and meteorological information. Being autonomous in space is hence a European priority, where such autonomy does not imply isolation or unilateralism, but rather the ability to set goals and pursue them (Cellerino, 2023). The EU space strategy now aims to build a stronger and more resilient EU.

Only in recent months has EU space policy shifted from primarily scientific and commercial endeavours to a more strategic approach, with a priority on security and defence. Strategic autonomy, developed through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), describes the EU’s tendency to direct its own policies facing global challenges (Cellerino, 2023). Space applications provide core technological capabilities that can be directly applied to European security and defence goals. This is especially due to the dual-use nature of space technologies, where one same technology can serve both civil and military purposes (Slapakova et al., 2022). Consequently, the EU space infrastructure has gradually integrated military capacities and strategically developed sectors to address New Space challenges (Cellerino, 2023). 

After EU authorities recognised space as a strategic domain in the 2022 Strategic Compass, the European Commission and the High Representative co-developed an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (Defence Industry and Space, 2025). The European Council’s Strategic Compass, an action plan enforcing European security and defence policy for 2030, underscores the need for more research on space threats, sustainable practice in space, and protection of European space systems and services (European Council, 2025). With rising great power competition and the changing nature of global threats, the EU decided to take the steps necessary to protect its assets in space, defend its interests, ascertain its autonomy and strategic status, and deter hostile behaviour in space. 

EU member states materialised the Strategic Compass through their commitment to a shared space strategy for security and defence, as put forward by the Commission in early 2023 (Clapp & Evroux, 2023). The European Parliamentary Research Service vocalised that this recognition contributed to an increase in the development and use of space assets for defence and security objectives across the EU. Several projects were also launched through the European Defence Fund and permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) to increase European capabilities and autonomy in space. Recognising space as a strategic domain has also synergised the civil, defence, and space industries, where cooperation and governance are highlighted.

The European Space Policy Institute (ESPI) set out recommendations to EU policy-makers and institutions in late January 2025 (ESPI, 2025). In this issue, they lay out the importance of space in defence and security, as well as the European economy. In this way, the European economy, democratic institutions, and wider international security are all interconnected with these European space systems, necessitating asset protection. The EU Council echoed similar thoughts in May 2024, mentioning the European Space Policy. Indeed, the beginning of this year, 2025, marked a change in how the European Council interprets space activities and spacefaring power (European Council, 2025). It emphasised autonomy of power and action in space for European decision-making and regional security. Looking at party manifestos from the most recent European parliamentary elections, one can note that the European public mirrors the Council’s policy desires (ESPI, 2024). The topic of space and its impact on the region’s security, economy, climate goals, and innovation received increased attention and interest from the public across the political spectrum. Most significantly, the relevance of space to security and defence has been widely and positively recognised by citizens, as well as dispersed in rhetoric across political groups. 

The war in Ukraine paints a backdrop of failure and danger in Europe, with decision-makers aware of their limits. This event has, however, allowed for a conceptual strategic push towards securing and defending space capabilities and peace (ESPI, 2025). With these ESPI recommendations in mind, attempts have been made to address the geopolitical context currently affecting Europe. However, much work remains to be achieved, and this next section will elucidate current endeavours to improve European space strategy and security. 

In Response to the Current Geopolitical Context

Donald Trump’s recent election to the US presidential office redefines potential investments in European space programs (Posaner, 2024). With President Trump’s victory speech citing SpaceX’s accomplishments, he reaffirmed space as a policy priority to the incoming administration. The head of SpaceX, Elon Musk, has been a staunch supporter of the Trump administration, and both personalities have continually expressed a strong interest in space. European policy-makers are currently assessing how to organise their long-term investments in space, and the Trump administration is inseparable from how their decisions will form (Posaner, 2024). Trump’s victory not only redirects European budget plans for space projects but, more widely, provides visibility, prominence, and support for a stronger European space strategy. It reaffirms space as a critical domain for maintaining a strong presence on the global scene. 

Augmenting European space independence is especially important when considering Trump’s foreign policy. In the past weeks, an administrative request saw American satellite company Maxar halt Ukrainian access to its imagery services, Russian troop tracking, and damage assessments (Körömi, 2025). Being a technology that also proved helpful for stopping incoming Russian missile attacks, it proves critical to Ukraine’s resilience and resistance efforts. This initiative follows Trump’s recent decision to halt the supply of American military intelligence information to Ukraine (Körömi, 2025). The cutoff in American intelligence sharing and military aid comes at a time of pressure for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to agree to a peace deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

IRIS² as a mechanism for European autonomy

The EU and the ESA are currently funding and developing IRIS², an internet satellite network meant to rival Musk’s Starlink and provide a European alternative to secure communication services (Posaner, 2024). The next ESA Council will take place in Bremen late this year, with plans to begin discussions on a long-term IRIS² budget. IRIS² is fundamental to securing European sovereignty and connectivity (O’Carroll, 2024). Amid increasing cybersecurity concerns, IRIS² is intended to ensure military and governmental security for European nations. It will be available for commercial use in the 2030s, as a direct competitor to Starlink. IRIS² satellites will enable TV, internet, defence, weather, and border surveillance services to governments and commercial actors. Designed to address long-term issues, the program has been reinforced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and by recent cyberattacks on European states. IRIS² is a testament to European commitment, ambition, and unity (Lipscombe, 2024; Mukherjee & Nostro, 2025). Nonetheless, Elon Musk has also threatened to pull Starlink access from Ukraine (Posaner, 2025). Serving as a critical tool for secure military communications in a war against Russia, the European Commission has initiated discussions on incorporating Govsatcom (the EU’s existing governmental satellite network) for Ukrainian use while waiting for IRIS² development. 

Issues still permeate European goals to create an industrial champion such as IRIS² (Micheletti & Posaner, 2025). Without proper buy-in from governments, European aerospace policies can fail. Such projects can take over a decade to be ready, and in the meantime, European leaders, such as Italian PM Giorgia Meloni, may seek out deals elsewhere, mainly with SpaceX. Such programs also encounter obstacles in terms of regulation (Micheletti & Posaner, 2025). EU executive competition officials discourage deals that leave few competitors in the European market. While the programs may face sufficient commercial telecommunications competitors overseas, little can be likened to commercial or military competition on the continent. Effectively, a project such as IRIS² threatens a monopoly, potentially harming customers and European industry. However, there are still strong claims to enforce a champion space program such as IRIS². Musk’s business expansion into Europe is a concern that could be addressed through IRIS², and it could be the answer to strengthening European presence in the world’s satellite industry

Conclusion

Since the mid-2000s, the EU has invested efforts in understanding and harnessing the potential of space. With the recent exploits of New Space, the European Commission has consistently promoted research and innovation in space. However, this lifestyle interconnectedness with space has pushed states to militarise their space assets, and – with growing cybersecurity concerns – the EU has begun adapting its space agenda. With an emphasis on European resilience and autonomy in its space activities, European space policy underscored the security of its activities and the defence of its physical assets. Through initiatives such as the ESA’s Strategy 2040 and the IRIS² program, the EU has rendered itself competitive and enduring in the space domain.

ESPI is at the forefront in advancing European research on space policy. Further field work is necessary as the international political context increasingly affects digital and economic European life. European space security is still a nascent concept for policy-makers, and with space programs slow to take effect, alternative work can be done on cybersecurity, digital and satellite threat understanding, sustainability, governance, and peacemaking in space. The research this article posits on European space strategy oversees a burgeoning area of policy. Major changes in European space security were only initiated in the past months, and one can expect much more in the years to come. Finally, European policy-makers, space startups, sectoral industries affected by aerospace, and European citizens are all intrinsically involved in policy decisions made on space.

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