Strategic Saboteur: Hungary’s Entrenched Illiberalism and the Fracturing of EU Cohesion

Executive Summary

The rise of right-wing populism within the European Union (EU), exemplified by Hungary’s authoritarian turn under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, poses a direct threat to the EU’s democratic foundations and strategic cohesion. Since 2010, the Fidesz government has systematically dismantled institutional checks and balances, captured the media, and obstructed EU foreign policy, weakening the EU’s ability to respond to external threats and maintain internal unity.

This brief examines Hungary’s democratic regression as a critical internal challenge to the EU’s credibility and capacity to act as a unified global actor. It argues that the erosion of democratic norms within a member state undermines collective security as seriously as external adversaries. To defend its values and reinforce strategic alignment, the EU must adopt a firmer stance: conditioning financial disbursements on verifiable reforms, bolstering independent media as part of its information security strategy, and restricting key leadership roles in foreign policy to democratically compliant states.

Introduction

The EU’s strength lies not only in its economic power but in its ability to act as a unified, democratic bloc on the world stage. Over the past decade, the EU has grappled with external challenges, including Russian aggression, growing Chinese influence, and global instability. Yet, arguably, the most significant challenge has been internal: the erosion of democratic norms and collective action, driven by the rise of the populist far right across Europe.

Since the 1990s, the increasing salience of exclusionary populism in European political discourse has generated significant concern regarding the stability of liberal democratic norms within EU member states. Exclusionary populism is a form of ‘thin-centred ideology’ that portrays society as divided between two irreconcilable groups: a morally virtuous and unified people, and a corrupt, self-serving elite (Mudde, 2004). In the European context, this ideology is frequently embedded within broader nativist and nationalist discourses, wherein the political community is defined along ethnic or cultural lines. It seeks to prioritise the rights, resources, and political representation of native-born citizens while systematically excluding immigrants, asylum seekers, and ethnic minorities from full membership in the polity (Mudde, 2004).

While right-wing populist parties vary in their rhetoric, they share a core distrust of supranational institutions, such as the EU, and exhibit authoritarian tendencies, actively undermining democratic safeguards. By combining nationalism, anti-immigration sentiment, and media hostility with scepticism toward the EU, these parties weaken EU unity from within and compromise its ability to mobilise collective security.

The dominance of the Fidesz party in Hungary exemplifies a broader trend in Europe, where nationalism and authoritarianism are gaining traction. Hungary has become a case of entrenched illiberalism, where democratic norms have been hollowed out. If left unaddressed, these ideological developments will continue to fragment the EU’s ability to respond to external threats, defend democratic values, and maintain its credibility as a global security actor.

Hungary: Illiberalism in Practice

Since 2010, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has undergone a systematic transformation from a liberal democracy to what Orbán has openly labelled an ‘illiberal state’ (Suuronen, 2025). Orbán’s Fidesz party has leveraged its repeated parliamentary supermajority to engineer constitutional changes, erode democratic institutions, and suppress independent media (Bánkuti et al., 2012). The result is not only the internal degradation of Hungarian democracy but also a growing challenge to the EU’s strategic cohesion and capacity to function as a unified foreign and security policy actor.

International watchdogs have widely documented democratic backsliding in Hungary. In Freedom House’s 2025 report, Hungary received a score of 65 out of 100 for political rights and civil liberties, classified as “partly free,” making it the only EU country not designated “free” by the organisation (Freedom House, 2025). The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute’s 2024 report categorised Hungary as an “electoral autocracy,” finding severe declines in judicial independence, freedom of expression, and electoral fairness (V-Dem, 2025).

At the core of Hungary’s democratic erosion lies institutional capture. Fidesz has used constitutional amendments to marginalise the Constitutional Court, reduce the independence of the judiciary, and undermine the autonomy of regulatory bodies such as the State Audit Office and the Media Council (Bánkuti et al., 2012). The judiciary’s independence score, as measured by the World Justice Project, has dropped consistently since 2013. In 2023, Hungary ranked 73rd globally, behind countries such as Ghana and Tunisia (World Justice Project, 2024).

Electoral reforms have further entrenched Fidesz’s dominance. Gerrymandered districts, disproportionate media access, and the use of state resources for campaigning have made it nearly impossible for the opposition to compete on equal terms. In the 2022 parliamentary elections, Fidesz secured 83% of single-mandate constituencies with just 54% of the national vote, illustrating the system’s structural bias (Scheppele, 2022).

Independent journalism in Hungary is also facing extinction. According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Hungary ranked 72nd out of 180 countries in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index, the third-worst in the EU, behind Greece and Malta (2024). Over 70% of media outlets are now state-owned or affiliated with pro-government foundations (International Press Institute, 2023). Most notably, the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA) was established in 2018 and quickly absorbed the ownership rights of more than 470 media outlets under a single pro-Fidesz umbrella (Brogi et al., 2019). The Media Council, nominally an independent regulator, comprises members nominated by the Fidesz-dominated parliament (Bajomi-Lázár, 2012). Outlets like Népszabadság, once Hungary’s largest independent newspaper, were abruptly shut down under opaque financial circumstances. Others, such as Népszava and Telex.hu, operate under the continuous threat of financial strangulation, licence revocation, or reputational smear campaigns (Wesolowsky, 2020).

Surveillance of journalists has also been weaponised. In 2021, investigative reporting revealed that Hungarian intelligence services used Israeli-made Pegasus spyware to monitor at least five journalists, as well as lawyers, activists, and opposition figures (Koskinen & Sonamat, 2021). The government refused to confirm or deny the use of Pegasus. Still, Hungary remains the only EU member state known to have used the software against domestic targets, prompting condemnation from both the European Parliament and human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International (Panyi, 2023).

This tightly controlled media environment poses direct risks to European security. Disinformation narratives, often aligned with Kremlin talking points, dominate state-controlled media. A 2023 European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) report found that Hungarian state outlets regularly echoed Russian narratives, framing the EU as a hostile actor, undermining NATO’s legitimacy, and portraying Ukrainian refugees as security threats (Ishikawa et al., 2024).

The Consequences of Hungary’s Obstructionism

Hungary has increasingly used its position within the EU to obstruct foreign policy consensus. The Hungarian government has delayed or vetoed the renewal of sanctions packages targeting Russia (Rankin, 2025), objected to declarations on China’s human rights record (Matura, 2022), and opposed increased EU military support to Ukraine. In March 2024, Hungary blocked €500 million in EU disbursements from the European Peace Facility meant for Ukrainian military aid, justifying its opposition by citing concerns over “escalation” (Bilquin, 2025).

Such obstructionism has revealed structural vulnerabilities in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Official Journal of the European Union, 2016), which requires unanimity for most decisions. Hungary has used this procedural leverage to extract concessions, delay urgent action, and weaken the credibility of the EU as a unified global actor.

Orbán’s foreign policy orientation has shifted markedly towards authoritarian regimes. Hungary is the only EU member state to have maintained high-level bilateral relations with Russia throughout the war in Ukraine.  In 2022, it signed a long-term gas deal with Gazprom, bypassing Ukraine and undermining EU efforts to diversify energy sources (Preussen, 2022). In 2023, Orbán reiterated that “Hungary needs Russia” and recently rejected the EU’s plan to phase out Russian gas by the end of 2027 (Reuters, 2025a), contradicting the EU’s strategic goal of energy independence from Moscow.

Additionally, Hungary has deepened economic and educational cooperation with China. It is the only EU member state participating in the construction of a Chinese-funded Fudan University campus on its own territory (Bozsó Ágnes & Zoltán Kovács, 2021). It has also received a €3.8 billion loan to fund the Serbia-Hungary railway project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (Dezenski, 2024). Such partnerships raise concerns about the control over critical infrastructure, data privacy, and the political influence of non-EU actors, particularly China, within European institutions.

NATO Tensions and Defence Ambiguity

Although Hungary has fulfilled, and even exceeded, its formal pledge to meet NATO’s defence spending target of 2% of GDP by increasing spending to 2.11%  in 2024 (NATO, 2024). The country has shown increasing ambivalence toward the alliance’s collective defence posture. In 2022, Hungary refused to allow the transit of Western weapons across its territory to Ukraine, failing to fulfil its obligation to support NATO forces against Russia (Bayer, 2022). These developments broadly represent Hungary’s paradoxical defence policy, with its significant contributions to EU defence occurring alongside explicit pro-Russian engagements and the propagation of misleading narratives (Barigazzi, 2024).

Hungary’s inconsistent participation in EU defence initiatives is equally concerning. It has abstained from or slowed progress in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects and has outspokenly opposed joint EU borrowing as a mechanism to bolster collective defence spending (Kasnyik, 2025). While it has committed to financially contributing to a collective European defence policy (Reuters, 2025b), Hungary’s actions suggest a selective commitment to collective security, especially when EU defence planning is perceived to conflict with its national or bilateral interests.

These divergences erode mutual trust and create friction in EU and NATO decision-making. Given the current lack of clear US support for Europe, allies and other EU member states have increasingly questioned whether Hungary can be relied upon in moments of collective response, especially in emergency or high-intensity conflict scenarios.

Rule-of-Law Sanctions and EU Response

In 2022, the European Commission (EC) triggered the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism against Hungary, citing concerns about corruption and breaches of the rule of law (Csaky, 2025). As a result, €22 billion in cohesion funds and €5.8 billion in pandemic recovery funds were frozen (Scheppele & Morijn, 2024). Despite the establishment of an Integrity Authority (IH) by the European Parliament in October 2022 (European Commission, 2022), the EC has delayed the release of funds to Hungary. The continued freezing of funds is unsurprising in light of the IH’s 2024 report. The assessment highlights that many of its recommendations were either fully or partially ignored, and also underscores that the institution lacks the legal power to effectively fulfil its mandate (Szabó, 2025). 

However, Brussels’ enforcement capacity remains constrained by political fragmentation.  Sanctions against Hungary under the Article 7 procedure—initiated in 2018—have stalled due to the requirement for unanimity in the European Council  (Zsiros, 2025). Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico extended his support to Orbán by refusing to sanction Hungary for upholding its national sovereignty (Zsiros, 2025). Therefore, the lack of unanimity in the European Council continues not only to hinder the imposition of sanctions against Hungary but also presents the EU with a fresh dilemma: the emergence of a similarly illiberal regime in Slovakia.

Democratic Resilience and Future Prospects

Despite Fidesz’s dominance, public dissatisfaction is on the rise. Péter Magyar, a former Orbán ally who is now the opposition leader, has gathered support with a platform centred on transparency and media reform, along with a commitment to restoring ties with the EU. Recent rallies in Budapest drew over 50,000 participants (Than, 2025), indicating that discontent is not merely elite-driven but has significant grassroots traction. Notably, in 2024, the proportion of Hungarians demanding a change of government rose by 10 percentage points over a five-month period (Martin, 2024).

Nevertheless, opposition forces face a deeply skewed electoral environment. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in its report on the 2022 elections, concluded that while voting was generally well administered, the campaign lacked equal opportunity due to “the blurring of the line between state and party” (2022: 22) and “biased news coverage in the public and many private media” (2022: 3).

Looking ahead, the 2026 Hungarian parliamentary elections may offer a critical juncture. However, reversing democratic erosion and restoring foreign policy alignment will require not only a change in government but also comprehensive institutional reforms and sustained EU support.

Policy options and recommendations

Having outlined the key concerns regarding Hungary’s democratic regression and the resulting strain on EU collective security. In addition to presenting the existing legal and political tools – including Article 7, the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism, and foreign policy coordination through the CFSP – this brief proposes three core policy recommendations to help realign Hungary with the EU’s foundational values and strategic commitments. These recommendations derive from the preceding analysis and aim to provide actionable entry points for EU policymakers working at the intersection of security, governance, and democratic resilience.

(1) Conditioning EU funds on time-bound, verifiable reforms tied to financial disbursement.

While the EC has frozen billions of euros in EU funds to compel Hungary to restore institutional independence, the regime’s tokenistic [1] [AS(N2] responses have not addressed systemic issues (Csaky, 2025). In December 2023, the EC released €10.2 billion in previously frozen funds to Hungary (European Commission, 2023), citing the Orbán government’s judicial reforms as a sufficient step toward compliance with the rule-of-law conditions (Scheppele & Morijn, 2024).

However, this decision has raised concerns among EU institutions, legal scholars, and civil society, who argue that the reforms were largely superficial and failed to address systemic threats to judicial independence and the rule of law. By releasing funds without ensuring that substantive and verifiable reform had occurred, the EC risked undermining the integrity of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism and weakening the EU’s capacity to uphold democratic standards.

To restore credibility and deter future manipulation, EU funds should be disbursed to Hungary only upon the fulfilment of independently verified and security-relevant reforms. These should include:

• Structural guarantees for judicial independence, including depoliticised appointments and clear disciplinary procedures;
• Measurable progress toward media pluralism, particularly the dismantling of monopolistic ownership structures and regulatory bodies captured by the Fidesz regime;
• Robust anti-corruption measures, aligned with EU-wide standards and monitored by external, independent bodies.

Verification of compliance should be conducted by independent, cross-national panels composed of legal experts, civil society, and academic specialists with no ties to Hungarian public institutions. These panels would issue public, time-bound compliance reports that inform the staged release of funds.

Such a recalibrated approach to conditionality, grounded in democratic resilience and strategic deterrence, would ensure that EU financial support contributes to building security-relevant institutions rather than reinforcing authoritarian entrenchment. It would also serve as a precedent for future engagement with other member states exhibiting signs of democratic backsliding.

(2) Supporting independent media and civil society as frontline actors in information security.

Threats such as disinformation campaigns and media capture represent core vulnerabilities in the EU’s collective defence. In Hungary, state-controlled narratives have consistently echoed Kremlin and pro-China positions, undermining public support for NATO, Ukraine, and EU sanctions.

To counter this, the EU must elevate its investment in democratic resilience by treating independent media and civil society organisations not as auxiliary actors but as core components of the European information security infrastructure. This shift would involve offering enhanced digital protection for journalists and integrating cross-border media literacy initiatives into the strategic planning of  CFSP and CSDP. Empowering these domestic actors creates a ‘security firewall’ against foreign influence and enables consistent public support for collective EU action, even when national governments, as in Hungary, obstruct or distort the EU’s intent of establishing a unified foreign and security policy.

(3) Embedding democratic alignment into institutional roles that shape defence and foreign policy decision-making.

Hungary’s repeated obstruction of EU foreign policy – including blocking sanctions, delaying aid to Ukraine, and questioning NATO cooperation – highlights the risks of allowing misaligned actors to exercise veto power in core EU functions. To safeguard collective security, democratic compliance must become an operational prerequisite for influence in EU decision-making. This prerequisite can be achieved by integrating a Rule-of-Law and Strategic Reliability Review before any member state assumes institutional leadership roles (such as the Council presidency or leadership of key working groups).

Furthermore, the EU should expand the use of Qualified Majority Voting in targeted areas of CFSP, particularly in response to emerging threats, humanitarian crises, and sanctions policy. Limiting the ability of a single illiberal government to derail the EU’s strategic posture is not only a governance issue but a matter of operational security and global credibility.

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