EU externalisation policies: the need for an intersectional approach 
Accommodation of Anti-Immigration Discourse Among Centre Parties 
The geopolitical role of the Sahel: the influence of the EU and other Great Powers in the Malian crisis 
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Written by: Lisa Motzig, Working Group on Migration
Edited by: Camilla de Martino
Executive summary
Since 2015, the European Union has increasingly resorted to externalisation policies to outsource EU border management to non-EU stakeholders. However, both scientific and civil society actors have shown that these policies significantly heighten the risk of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence for migrant women and other minority groups despite the EU’s repeated commitments to combat sexual violence. To address this paradox, this policy brief argues that EU externalisation policies should be examined using an intersectional approach: it is only through this lens that the inconsistencies of EU externalisation policies can be fully understood and policy alternatives should be considered. To that end, three policy recommendations addressing root causes from an intersectional perspective are provided to the European Commission and EU member states. Intersectionality, in fact, is not simply a theory. It is a concrete tool for the European Union to uphold the effective human rights of migrant women and other vulnerable populations, while truly delivering on the von der Leyen Commission’s commitment to achieving a Union of Equality.
Introduction
The European Union has pledged to fight Sexual and Gender-Based violence (SGBV) both within and outside its borders. EU external policy reflects this commitment in the EU Anti-trafficking directive revised in 2024, the EU Gender Action Plan III 2021-2025, and the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2019-2024. These texts explicitly refer to EU member states’ responsibility to ‘protect victims [of sexual violence or trafficking] regardless of their country of origin’, ‘with a particular focus on women and children’ (Council of the EU, 2025). In fact, SGBV primarily affects migrant women and girls. In the case of human trafficking, 64% of victims identified in the EU in 2023 were third-country nationals (Felkai Janssen, Nestorova, & Kaya, 2025). At the same time, the European Union has increasingly pushed for an externalisation of EU migration policies since the 2015 surge in migrant arrivals, as illustrated by the European Agenda on Migration (2015), the European Council Conclusions of 9 February 2023 (para. 23), and the new Pact on Migration and Asylum (2024) (Jones, Lanneau, & Maccanico, 2022). While there is no consensual definition of externalisation policies, the term generally refers to policies aiming to prevent the irregular border crossings of asylum-seekers and migrants by outsourcing border security and asylum processing to non-EU actors and third countries (Amnesty International, 2017; Jones, Lanneau, & Maccanico, 2022). This includes bilateral or multilateral cooperation with origin or transit countries, capacity-building activities or funding provided to non-EU actors for managing EU borders outside of EU territory (Niemann & Zaun, 2023; Mesnard, Savatic, Senne, & Thiollet, 2024).
This creates a paradox: while the EU calls for an end to SGBV and human trafficking, it simultaneously encourages externalisation policies which have been proved to put vulnerable populations at higher risks of violence (Freedman, 2016; Bosworth, Fili, & Pickering, 2018). In short, current EU policies fail to protect individuals situated at the intersection of migration and other vulnerabilities based on gender, sexual orientation or race (Amnesty International, 2017; Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). This policy brief will therefore argue that the inconsistencies of EU externalisation policies can only be fully understood through an intersectional lens, and that intersectionality should be at the core of any policy alternatives. Intersectionality is understood as a key concept to examine the interconnected systems of social categorisation and oppression, such as gender, race and class (Crenshaw, 1991). Thus, the paper will focus on the EU’s externalisation of border control and the management of irregular migration with Southern Mediterranean countries, which represent a ‘focal point where the control of mobility between the Global South and the Global North is prominently displayed’ (Cappiali & Pacciardi, 2024, p. 306). An overview of current externalisation policies will precede the problem description; the brief will then present a set of policy recommendations.
An overview of EU externalisation policies in Southern Mediterranean countries
Listing EU externalisation policies is a challenging endeavour. While the 2016 EU-Turkey deal is a well-studied example, the EU and its member states have also engaged in an intricate web of more or less formal agreements, Mobility Partnerships, bilateral or regional frameworks, funding mechanisms and aid programmes, all aimed at externalising border control to third countries (Martini & Megerisi, 2023, Niemann & Zaun, 2023). This section will review the main externalisation developments between the EU or its member states and three crucial Southern Mediterranean countries – Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia – until 2025. It should be noted that EU externalisation policies are not limited to North Africa but also extend to other regions such as the Western Balkans or Sub-Saharan Africa.
EU externalisation policies in Libya
Italy and Libya have long collaborated to prevent migrants from taking the Central Mediterranean route. A first deal was signed in 2008, followed by others in 2012 and 2017. The 2017 memorandum (also called the Minniti deal) drastically reduced migration flows from Libya to Italy and is still ongoing (de Bellis, 2017; Martini & Megerisi, 2023). Additionally, in 2013 the EU Integrated Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was launched in Libya to improve border control (Niemann & Zaun, 2023). This cooperation was strengthened after 2015 and again in 2017, providing additional training and boats to the Libyan coastguard.
EU externalisation policies in Morocco
Morocco has been considered by the EU as a key partner in guarding EU borders since Spain joined the Schengen area in the 1990s. The EU has gradually increased funding to Morocco and now seeks to expand the role of the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in the North African country to prevent migrant crossings through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. A joint committee comprising Frontex agents and Moroccan officials has been created, and a formal agreement is currently under discussion to allow the EU agency to assist with border control, surveillance and deportations directly on non-EU territory (Jones, Lanneau, & Maccanico, 2022).
EU externalisation policies in Tunisia
Tunisia has become the primary country of departure for migrants taking the Central Mediterranean route (Frontex, 2023). The EU signed a mobility partnership with Tunisia in 2014. In recent years, EU member states, including Italy, Germany and France, also signed bilateral agreements with Tunisia to combat migrant smuggling and outsource border management (Martini & Megerisi, 2023; Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2025). Finally in 2023, the European Commission signed a €1 billion Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisian President Kais Saied, providing financial aid to the Tunisian coastguard to uphold human rights while fighting criminal networks of migrant smugglers and human traffickers.
EU externalisation policies from an intersectional perspective
Beyond considering the effectiveness of EU externalisation policies (see Arhin-Sam & Lambert, 2023; Wolff, 2024), this section will adopt an intersectional approach to highlight how these policies rely on questionable assumptions, undemocratic means and harmful consequences.
A gendered and racialised paradigm underpinning EU externalisation policies
Adopting an intersectional approach first means interrogating the power dynamics and assumptions underpinning knowledge production. Frontex’s risk analysis reports play an essential role in building and sustaining a certain vision of migration flows and border management which shapes externalisation policies. In fact, a comprehensive analysis of these reports reveals how migration is generally framed as a security crisis that should be contained and that continuously requires larger investments. Stachowitsch & Sachseder (2019) argue that Frontex’s conceptualisations of risks and solutions are informed by gendered and racialised framings: while non-EU migrant men are often considered as a threat and characterised as savage or dangerous, non-EU migrant women are rather portrayed as helpless beings in need of protection by the EU. In this narrative, which pervades EU external policies, the EU and its sphere of influence appear as a ‘safe haven’ for vulnerable populations, with insecurities largely coming from outside its scope (Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). This Eurocentric vision is based on neocolonial assumptions that create a hierarchy between states and individuals who deserve to move freely or not: here, African states can only become safer and more developed with the help of European states, and migrant women are only endangered by foreign smugglers. Other forms of violence stemming directly from EU policies or EU border guards are thus hardly conceivable in this paradigm (Stachowitsch & Sachseder, 2019).
Frontex’s risk analysis reports inform institutions initiating and implementing migration policies. Consequently, EU externalisation policies are directly shaped by these gendered, racialised and securitised understandings of migration flows, which clearly identify the threats (migrant smugglers), the victims (migrant women and children), the saviours (the EU), and ultimately justify the solutions: increased border control and security in collaboration with third countries (Stachowitsch & Sachseder, 2019; Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). Therefore, it is necessary to question the knowledge produced by an agency whose interests lie at the heart of externalisation policies’ implementation. In other words, what credibility can be given to Frontex’s risk analysis reports when the border agency’s own survival depends on an assessment of high risks? The gendered, racialised and securitised narrative promoted in Frontex’s risk analysis reports thus appears as a sense-making practice justifying the role of the agency itself (Stachowitsch & Sachseder, 2019). Applying an intersectional lens to EU externalisation policies reveals how these policies shape and are shaped by specific understandings of masculinity and femininity, whiteness and blackness, (under)development and (in)security (Cappiali & Pacciardi, 2025).
The undemocratic means of EU externalisation policies
The means through which EU externalisation policies are developed and implemented are largely undemocratic and non-transparent, making the monitoring of human rights and populations’ specific needs more difficult (Santos Vara, García Andrade, & Molnár, 2023). Most EU externalisation agreements with third countries are negotiated and implemented through informal, administrative or technical procedures which do not include transparent debates in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU, as would occur under the ordinary legislative procedure (Santos Vara, García Andrade, & Molnár, 2023). For instance, the Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Tunisia is an informal, non-binding ‘political agreement’ whose legal basis remains unclear. The European Parliament and several member states expressed their disapproval that ‘the proper steps of the adoption procedure had not been followed’ in this unilateral initiative of the Commission (Andrade & Frasca, 2024).
EU externalisation policies are characterised not only by informality but also by a lack of transparency (Martini & Megerisi, 2023). Many of these agreements are negotiated behind closed doors and the texts on which they rely are often not fully accessible to the public. In 2023, MEP Cornelia Ernst asked the Commission why the agendas and minutes of meetings between Frontex and Morocco were not available. Commissioner Johansson responded that the joint committee was entirely under the responsibility of Frontex and outside the scope of the Commission (European Parliament, 2023). Moreover, the Minniti deal, signed without ratification by the Italian Parliament, was negotiated in secret between the Italian minister, Libyan officials and tribal leaders which effectively control the southern Libyan border (Plaut, 2017).
Several NGOs, researchers and civil society actors have repeatedly condemned these practices, which do not clearly define the legal responsibilities of EU member states and actors in these extraterritorial operations (Amnesty International, 2017; Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). EU agencies such as Frontex have increasingly broader mandates and resources to implement these policies beyond EU borders, often with limited accountability (Santos Vara, García Andrade, & Molnár, 2023; Niemann & Zaun, 2023). Therefore, without a clear definition of responsibilities and effective monitoring mechanisms, it becomes extremely difficult to hold authorities accountable, despite the numerous accounts of human rights violations, described in the next section (Martini & Megerisi, 2023).
The harmful consequences of EU externalisation policies for vulnerable populations
Many accounts have evidenced how EU externalisation policies further endanger already vulnerable populations situated at the intersection of several dynamics of oppression. In particular, the human rights of racialised migrant women are frequently violated through these policies implemented outside EU territory (Cappiali & Pacciardi, 2025; Santos Vara, García Andrade, & Molnár, 2023; Gerard & Pickering, 2014). With the increasing pressure put on Southern Mediterranean countries to stop irregular migration, racial profiling has become common at the Spanish-Moroccan border, leading to discrimination and unequal treatment based on gender, race, or nationality. Border guards often rely on gender and race to determine who can cross the border: for instance, women perceived as Arab are more likely to be allowed through, whereas Black women perceived as Sub-Saharan African are more likely to be criminalised (Bosworth, Fili, & Pickering, 2018; Tyszler, 2019; Girmay, 2024). In the case of Tunisia, the European Parliament and various international and civil society organisations have expressed concerns over the respect of migrants’ fundamental rights and dignity in a context of generalised hate speech encouraged by the executive power (Stanicek, 2023; Raach & Bartels, 2023).
Moreover, the sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) of migrants, especially migrant women, are directly endangered in detention centres and camps located at EU borders (Girmay, 2024; Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). In Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla, migrant women are detained in facilities with very limited access to cooking facilities, sanitation and menstrual products (Freedman, 2016; Tyszler, 2019). They usually also lack access to legal or medical assistance. Beyond the increased risks to their physical health in these conditions, their mental health is often overlooked although migrant women are more prone to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and continuous psychological distress.
Finally, physical and sexual violence have increased in the context of EU externalisation policies. Libyan camps have become a notorious example of inhumane conditions of incarceration of migrants, including women and children, often described by those who survived them as ‘hell’ (de Bellis, 2017). Human rights violations documented by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), NGOs and researchers include human trafficking, sexual slavery, forced labour, SGBV including rape and reproductive violence (forced pregnancy, non-protected sex), torture, beatings, mutilation, and murder (Martini & Megerisi, 2023; Girmay, 2024). These acts seem to be perpetrated not only by other migrants and smugglers, but also by border guards (Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). In March 2023, the UN Human Rights Council called on the EU and its member states to stop cooperating with the Libyan coastguard in light of these abuses, but to no avail (Martini & Megerisi, 2023). Similar human rights violations have been reported in the Spanish enclave of Melilla and in Morocco, where migrant women are also exposed to sexual violence and sexual extortion, while Black male migrants are often subject to physical violence (Tyszler, 2019; Cappiali & Pacciardi, 2025).
Relevance & policy recommendations
The problems described above infringe the values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, namely respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These problems also constitute a breach of law. In fact, the EU and its member states committed to protecting human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 2, Art. 7), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Art. 2), the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 5), and the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (Art. 83). Therefore, the EU and its member states should be held accountable for these violations occurring outside of EU territory, since they are a direct result of EU externalisation policies. In this sense, academic and civil society actors have long underlined the need to consider intersectional vulnerabilities in externalisation policies, as migration affects individuals differently depending on their gender, race, class, or sexual orientation.
As EU member states are currently transposing the Anti-trafficking Directive and the new Pact on Migration and Asylum into national laws, intersectionality should be a central concern both for implementation at the national level and for monitoring and future policymaking by the European Commission.
- The European Commission should ensure democratic accountability and scrutiny
First, the European Commission should encourage the adoption of legally binding treaties (rather than informal deals) based on human rights law and intersectional standards. Involving the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in externalisation agreements will ensure a transparent and democratic process, enhance the policies’ legitimacy and provide guarantees against human rights violations by clearly defining the responsibilities of stakeholders. The role of Frontex should notably be more strictly defined (Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021). Moreover, the Commission should implement transparent and independent mechanisms to monitor human rights violations and ensure the accountability of all parties in the implementation of externalisation policies outside of EU territory (Amnesty International, 2017; Santos Vara, García Andrade, & Molnár, 2023; European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2025).
- The European Commission and EU member states should reconsider the knowledge production underpinning migration policies
The European Commission should not rely solely on Frontex’s risk analysis reports but also on other sources provided by researchers, international organisations and civil society organisations. These actors, along with migrants themselves, should be included in the knowledge production and in policy-making processes, as already underlined in the Anti-trafficking Directive (Freedman, 2016; Cappiali & Pacciardi, 2025). Research units within the Commission and EU member states should, when possible, gather disaggregated data by taking into account gender, sexual orientation, disability and race, to better address migrants’ diverse needs and vulnerabilities (Felkai Janssen, Nestorova, & Kaya, 2025). Providing EU institutions and member states with varied expertise and perspectives is a first step towards a more intersectional and inclusive approach.
Finally, the European Commission should question externalisation policies altogether and favour legal and safe pathways of migration, especially for populations subject to intersectional oppressions (Martini & Megerisi, 2023; Girmay, 2024). If externalising EU border control means cooperating with countries where there is evidence of systematic human rights violations and insecurities based on gender, race and other categorisations, then the EU should prioritise human rights and stop these partnerships (Amnesty International, 2017). This concern is relevant – to a diverse extent – to the three North African countries examined in this policy brief.
- The European Commission should disseminate intersectional knowledge by training border management stakeholders
Periodical training sessions on intersectionality should be delivered to all border management stakeholders, from European civil servants at DG HOME and in national ministries to border guards and Frontex agents (Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021; Girmay, 2024). This recommendation is in line with the revised directive laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (Art. 28), the Asylum Regulation (Art. 13), as well as the revised anti-trafficking directive. These training sessions should address the increased risks of violence faced by specific populations – women, children, racialised individuals – due to externalisation policies. Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) should also be mentioned. Since Frontex holds an increasingly central role in EU border management – but also in the reproduction of violent power dynamics – the agency should be the primary focus for implementing these trainings, encompassing all hierarchical levels. To assess the results of these trainings, agents should be periodically monitored and evaluated, thus ensuring accountability for inappropriate practices (Gyan-Addo, Standke-Erdmann, & Stachowitsch, 2021).
Combined, these three recommendations will be a significant step in addressing the root causes of issues related to EU externalisation policies and in establishing intersectionality as a core principle in European policymaking.
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