Attracting Talent, Losing It Fast: How Citizenship and Bureaucracy Discourage International Students to Stay in Italy

Abstract

Recent policy shifts in Italy, such as the narrowing of jus sanguinis eligibility and the rejection of proposals to ease naturalisation requirements, highlight a growing convergence between exclusionary migration and citizenship agendas. While the target of these policy shifts in the political discourse refers to unskilled migrants, it is not clear what is the effect of these policies on high-skilled migration. This article examines the impact of Italian citizenship policy on the post-graduation migration decisions of international students in Italy. Italy presents a paradox: while it actively attracts foreign students through state-sponsored scholarships, it maintains restrictive and bureaucratically burdensome pathways to citizenship and long-term residence. 

Through qualitative interviews with two international graduates, the study explores the effect of having citizenship rights by descent on foreign graduates’ decisions to stay in or leave Italy after graduation. The results indicate that systemic barriers, especially burdensome bureaucracy and misaligned labour market structures, undermine Italy’s capacity to retain the very talent it seeks to attract.     

Introduction 

Recent debates on citizenship policy in Europe cannot be fully understood without considering the broader context of sustained and large-scale immigration (Kraler, 2006). In migration contexts, citizenship serves as a fundamental mechanism for distinguishing between members and non-members, based on their differing legal and social relationships with specific nation-states (Bauböck, 2006). However, citizenship and migration regimes should not be conceptualized as monolithic or internally consistent systems. In practice, states frequently adopt inclusive policies in certain domains while simultaneously maintaining exclusionary approaches in others (Kraler, 2006).

Historically, Italy has demonstrated a relatively permissive approach to citizenship through descent (jus sanguinis), while maintaining restrictive migration policies, particularly through the enforcement of strict immigration quotas (Zincone, 2010). This discrepancy in policy approaches has recently attracted increased political attention. In contemporary political discourse, attitudes towards citizenship and migration have become increasingly aligned, particularly with regard to two significant policy developments: one seeking to restrict access to citizenship by descent, and the other proposing—but ultimately failing to enact—a reduction in the residency requirement for naturalisation. Under the current restrictive naturalisation regime, individuals applying for Italian citizenship through residency must demonstrate ten years of taxable income, with minimum annual income thresholds set at €8,263.31 for applicants without children and €11,362.05 plus an additional €516 per child for applicants with dependents. In addition, applicants must pass a certified Italian language examination and provide a clean criminal record from every country in which they have resided. Until May 2025, individuals seeking Italian citizenship through ancestry were not subject to the same requirements. Specifically, they were not required to pass a language exam or demonstrate income levels. Eligibility under jus sanguinis extended to anyone with an Italian ancestor who lived after 17 March 1861, the date marking the unification of Italy (Nadeau, 2025). 

In May 2025, however, the Italian Parliament approved an amendment aimed at narrowing eligibility for citizenship by descent. The right-wing government justified the reform as a means to “strengthen the connection between Italy and its citizens abroad,” prevent the “abuse” and “commercialisation” of Italian passports, and allocate administrative resources more efficiently to address the backlog of pending applications. The revised law now requires that applicants have at least one parent or grandparent who was an Italian citizen by birth (Moench, 2025). Conversely, an opposition party proposed a national referendum intended to ease the process of acquiring citizenship through residency. Proponents of the referendum argued that reducing the residency requirement would enhance the socio-economic and civic integration of foreign-origin individuals who were born, raised, and have long contributed to Italy. The proposed reform was projected to benefit approximately 1.4 million people (Ministero del Lavoro, 2025), enabling them to represent Italy in international sports competitions, vote in elections, and access public sector employment opportunities on an equal footing with native-born citizens.

Nevertheless, far-right political parties – which constitute the parliamentary majority – strongly opposed the referendum and called for a public boycott. These parties claimed that the reform would encourage “illegitimate practices” and asserted that “being Italian must be a privilege before it is a right” (Fratelli d’Italia, 2015). 

The central distinction between opposing perspectives on migration policy in Italy lies in the typology of migrants each side envisions. Italian migration policy has historically centred on the recruitment of low-skilled labour, a trend clearly evidenced by the sectoral distribution of employment quotas. In 2024, a total of 61,250 quotas were allocated for non-seasonal subordinate workers, while 680 quotas were designated for self-employed individuals. In contrast, 82,550 quotas were assigned to seasonal labourers. Employment opportunities for subordinate workers are primarily available in the following sectors: road haulage and passenger transport, tourism and hospitality, mechanical engineering, telecommunications, the food industry, shipbuilding, fishing, personal services (such as hairdressing, plumbing, and electrical work), and both family and socio-medical assistance (Ministero del Lavoro, 2023). This sectoral targeting is reflected in the composition of the foreign workforce in Italy, with 61% of foreign-employed residents engaged in low-skilled occupations. Consequently, Italy ranks as the second-lowest country in Europe in terms of the proportion of working-age foreign residents holding a university or postgraduate degree (Melis, 2025). 

This reality stands in stark contrast to recent governmental initiatives aimed at attracting highly skilled international talent. Each academic year, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation provides scholarships to foreign students and Italian citizens residing abroad. These grants are intended to support Italy’s economic system globally and promote the Italian language and culture, under Law 288/55 and its amendments. The scholarships fund study, research, and training programmes at public or accredited  higher education institutions in Italy. According to Assolombarda’s annual report, international student enrolment  in undergraduate and postgraduate programmes at universities across the Lombardy region has increased consistently. During the 2022–2023 academic year, 20,917 international students were enrolled at universities across the region , representing 6.7% of the total student population (Assolombarda). Milan, in particular, stands out as a major hub for tertiary education, hosting one of the largest student populations globally. As reported in the 2021 MHEO report, 211,759 students were enrolled in Milanese universities that year. These figures suggest that the Italian government has been successful in attracting international talent to its higher education institutions. However, rather than questioning the state’s capacity to attract foreign students, this trend highlights a more pressing concern regarding the nation’s ability to retain such talent within its labour market.

The predominance of foreign human capital in low-skilled employment sectors reveals a structural disconnect between Italy’s investment in international higher education and its citizenship and migration policies. This incongruity prompts critical examination of the mechanisms that undermine the country’s ability to realise  a return on these investments. Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the following research question: How do Italian citizenship policies influence international students’ decisions to remain in or leave the country after completing their tertiary education?

Theoretical Background

While prior research has extensively examined labour migration in Italy, to date, no studies have explicitly focused on the retention of international students as a distinct migrant population. This oversight is likely due to the relatively recent growth of this group and the general neglect of their specific needs and experiences within government policy frameworks (Zincone, 2010). This paper aims to address this gap by analysing  the unintended consequences of Italian citizenship and migration policies on the mobility trajectories of international students.

Human capital theory remains  a dominant framework in the study of skilled migration. However, most comparative studies of international student mobility have primarily assessed governmental performance in attracting and retaining foreign students without critically engaging with the specific strategic objectives behind such recruitment (Verbik & Lasanowski, 2007). Existing research indicates that hosting international students has a significant positive impact on future migration outcomes, fostering qualifications, social integration, and personal networks, irrespective of the pre-existing immigration context (Dreher & Poutvaara, 2005).

Within the OECD and particularly across the European Union, policies concerning international students have increasingly converged through initiatives such as Erasmus. Nevertheless, substantial divergence remains in terms of national regulations, administrative procedures, and implementation practices (Cornelius & Tsuda, 2004). National governments continue to maintain distinct policy frameworks (Chaloff & Lemaître, 2009), often privileging certain migrant categories or countries of origin—even among highly skilled applicants. Accordingly, this study moves beyond narrow interpretations of migration as merely a tool for human capital accumulation and economic productivity, situating the analysis within the broader political and economic contexts that shape Italy’s approach to managing skilled migration.

Scholarly literature on international student mobility increasingly conceptualises  migration as circular rather than linear. Under this framework, the destination country is not necessarily the terminus of a migratory journey, but one potential phase within a broader trajectory. Following their studies, international students may return to their country of origin, remain in the host country, or migrate onward to a third country. These varied decisions carry significant implications for labour markets in both sending and receiving countries (Li et al., 1996).

Return

Transnationalism constitutes an attempt to formulate a theoretical and conceptual framework aimed at understanding the strong social and economic links between migrants in host and origin countries (Cassarino, 2004). Scholars of transnationalism  have theorised that migrants move back and forth between their country of residence and the country of their ancestors, maintaining ties thanks to globalisation and eventually generating dual identities and attachments (Carling and Pettersen, 2014). Portes (2001, p. 190) also highlights  the role of governments in intensifying contact with their diasporas and involving them in various forms of national life. 

International students are unlikely to be able to fund their education and migration overseas on their own. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this decision is partly taken with the involvement of the family.  The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) conceptualises return as the logical outcome of a calculated strategy defined at the level of the migrant’s household and resulting from the successful achievement of goals (Cassarino, 2004). Within this framework, the international student’s movement can be considered a household investment in human capital, as the student will return home after completing their studies abroad with a comparative advantage in terms of professional opportunities.

Onward migration

Onward migration refers to the movement of a migrant from a first country of destination to other countries. It has been conceptualised as  “stepwise migration”, based on the idea that migrants plan in advance the several steps that they will take during their migratory journey, or as “continuing mobility”, entailing that onward migratory movements result from the continued evaluation of opportunities rather than from premeditated planning  (Toma and Castagnone, 2015). 

Given the principle of free movement of the European Union, onward migration within the EU has been less studied. Nevertheless, Italy has seen a significant increase in the percentage of migrants intending to relocate to  other European countries (Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2016, p. 4). Tintori (2011) has identified the right of free movement within the EU area as a factor influencing the (re-)acquisition of Italian citizenship by non-EU citizens of Italian descent. 

Stay 

According to the literature, the decision to stay is more likely when the attachment to the host country prevails over ties to the home country. This attachment can take different forms: economic, political, family, sociocultural, and psychological (Barbiano di Belgiojoso, 2016). Citizenship can influence the decision to stay by simplifying bureaucratic procedures, ensuring newly-arrived students’ economic and political rights, and by giving them an inclusive national self-understanding (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship status formally reduces the gap between the new and the original citizens by creating parity between them, one of the main goals of the integration process (Vink et al., 2013). 

While EU students benefit from freedom of movement within the Schengen Area and are exempt from many residency constraints, non-EU students are subject to stringent administrative procedures. They must apply for a residence permit within eight days of arriving in Italy, providing documentation such as proof of enrolment , accommodation, sufficient financial resources, and valid health insurance. As of January 2024, the annual cost of national health insurance for non-EU students increased by 470%, rising from €149.77 to €700.00 (Matrangolo, 2024). Additionally, students are required to obtain a tax code and attend biometric appointments at the local police headquarters. Residence permits must be renewed annually. Upon graduation, students may apply for a job-seeking permit valid for up to 12 months.

Following the enactment of the so-called Decreto Cutro (Decree Law No. 23 of 20 March 2023, converted into Law No. 50 on 5 May 2023), graduates are no longer required to apply through the annual Decreto Flussi (flow decree) quota system to convert their status. However, the conversion to a work permit still requires a formal job offer from an Italian employer, specifying the conditions of employment, including a minimum of 20 working hours per week. Although this reform has removed some of the previous constraints related to sector-specific quotas, significant barriers to long-term settlement remain, particularly for non-EU international students.

In sum, this paper interrogates the extent to which Italian citizenship and migration policies influence international students’ post-graduation decisions—whether to stay, return, or migrate onward—and the implications of these decisions for Italy’s broader strategy on skilled migration and human capital development. 

Expectations

In the Italian political discourse, foreign workers are predominantly viewed as a source of manual labour rather than as contributors of high-skilled human capital. As a result, migration and citizenship policies are typically designed with other migrant categories in mind. Nevertheless, these policies are expected to exert spillover effects on international students as well. This study investigates the institutional factors that shape the aspirations of non-EU international students to stay in Italy, move towards another country or return to their country of origin. In line with the literature, it is expected that students with greater economic opportunities in their home country to return. Conversely, those holding Italian citizenship are expected to be more likely to stay or move towards another European country, the first being more likely if they feel more attached to the Italian identity.

Methodology

The data analysed in this paper were collected from two semi-structured interviews. This qualitative research approach centres on individual stories to make sense of international students’ experiences, emphasising the subjective meaning and contextual richness of personal narratives.  The semi-structured format combines a predetermined set of guiding questions with the flexibility to probe emergent themes, allowing for dynamic interaction between interviewer and interviewee (Al Balushi, 2016). This adaptability facilitates deeper exploration of salient topics as they arise, thereby capturing nuanced insights into participants’ values, intentions, and experiential realities (Choy, 2014). This method is particularly well-suited to understand the role that Italian citizenship and institutional procedures play on non-EU students’ decisions to stay in Italy. The interview guide, based on the literature review, included topics such as migration to Italy, living experiences, citizenship, and future intentions.

Participants

This study focused on international students pursuing tertiary education in Italy. Two participants were selected through personal networks: one obtained Italian citizenship by descent prior to the law shift; the other does not hold Italian citizenship. Participants’ demographics are displayed in Table 1. 

Table 1

Participant Demographics and Interview Details

	Participant 1	Participant 2
Age	21	27
Gender	Female	Female
Italian citizenship	Yes	No
Country of birth	Venezuela	Brazil
Time living in Italy	3 years	3 years
Length of interview	38 minutes	25 minutes
Interviewer	2	1

Procedure

To ensure ethical participation, all participants received an informed consent form via email which they were required  to sign before the interview was conducted. Before recording, the interviewer confirmed participants still agreed to the terms of the form and invited any questions. After the interviews, participants were again given the opportunity to ask for clarification or express concerns. All interviews were conducted online via Microsoft Teams, with both parties in quiet rooms to ensure the participants could speak freely without being disturbed. The interviews were conducted with the support of Myrthe van Kuilenburg.  

Results 

Studying in Italy

The interview started with questions related to the reasons why the interviewees decided to study in Italy. Participant 1 connected this choice to her roots, “So part of me was always like, I do really want to eventually someday move abroad. I do want to see what the rest of the world lives like […] My grandfathers are both Italian, so it would have been really cool to like, learn the language again, and just kind of like immerse myself in my family’s culture on some level”. For Participant 1, the reasons that guided her choice of coming to Italy were related to her desire to study abroad and the opportunity to learn the language of her grandparents. Participant 2, on the other hand, explained, “I decided to come to Italy because I think it’s very similar to Brazil. It wouldn’t be so much of a break to my ideas and of how the world functions. And it was good too. It was going to be good for a first experience”. For Participant 2, therefore, there seems to be a connection with the country regardless of her family history.

When asked to talk about their arrival and stay in the country, both participants mentioned the institutional procedures. Participant 1, referring to moving to Italy, “I think the hardest part was getting all the documents for the university itself. Because there were a lot of things that had to be translated. […] eventually I kind of learned to deal a bit with the bureaucracy myself and had to chase a few other things”. 

Participant 2 shared, “Like people Italian people, it wasn’t difficult for me because I speak Italian and I was studying in Italian as well, so I made very nice friendships that I that I really love and I I think it wasn’t so difficult [to integrate]. […] Well, I think about the bureaucratic side this side is so horrible that it’s making me want to get out of Italy because like, it’s really impossible to deal with this. But I think like I feel very integrated in the Italian society like I am here and I see that many of the rights that I could, that could make my life easier they don’t, and I don’t think it’s it’s fair, you know?”

Citizenship status

The participants were also asked to relate their experience with their citizenship status. Participant 1 stated “If I hadn’t had the Italian citizenship, I feel like living here would have been so chaotic. No, I talked to so many of my friends who were like, yeah, so there’s this thing called the Permesso di Soggiorno, which is, like, you’re, like, it’s basically a permit to stay here if you’re not, like, a European. It takes you, like, months to apply for. It takes so long for them to accept. And then I have so many friends that had to, like, return to their home countries because their Permesso would, like, expire. […] I definitely would probably be either not even attending school here.” 

While Participant 1 mentioned experiences of people close to her, Participant 2 described the procedure she had to go through to study in Italy as an international student, “Like, it’s not that people were essentially bad people who work in the Questuras, in the police office, like the fact that we have to renew our residency permit in the police office is already a statement. […] They treat people very bad. I saw like people being treated bad because they didn’t know how to speak Italian.” Referring to the workers who renew residence permits, “They don’t have the knowledge of the law […] I think they just don’t know how to do it. And they’re not prepared to work there, you know.” Referring to the fact of not having citizenship rights, “It’s something that it’s really a barrier for my stay because. Like I have a scholarship, so technically the Italian Government pays for my education and it’s really an investment […] even though they’re investing on us, they don’t want us to stay.”

Future intentions

After Participant 1 expressed her desire to live in Spain, she was asked whether she would have been able to stay or move within Europe without Italian citizenship. Her answer was “Absolutely not […] it would be so difficult like it literally sucks to be non-European and move within Europe like it is so difficult and there are so many rules like I would struggle so much more”. She added, “Spain right now has not the best economy either [as well as Italy] but I do find it is slightly easier to live in and I do get offered a lot better things than I do in Italy which is unfortunate. I mean like I guess in the sense of attachment to Italy like I do very much like Italy, but there would have to be like a very specific reason that I stayed in Italy or like returned to Italy, so like for example a specific person or like a specific job I got offered”.

Participant 2 highlighted how the bureaucracy in Italy is such a high barrier that even if she desires to stay in Italy, she would probably move to Germany: “Well, it’s definitely the bureaucracy. (…) I already did an exchange in Germany. So I had to do a residency permit there as well and the difference is that in Germany, if you call people to ask questions they answer the questions. In Italy they scream at you and say that they can’t answer, (…) it’s not a human relationship in the conversations”. When asked if her aspirations would differ if she had dual Italian citizenship, she replied, “If I had a citizenship, (…)  I would stay in Italy because (…) I finished university, I am already doing a [law] practice in a very nice law firm and I have contact[s]. I also did an internship in Google and I would really love to (…) keep working in these places because I find people super nice and the environment is super nice.”

Discussion

Recently, the Economist released the 2024 “Footloose Index”, estimating the net change in a country’s graduate population if highly mobile graduates were free to migrate without restrictions. Between 2010–2012 and 2021–2023, Italy’s projected net gain of graduates increased sixfold, reaching approximately three million. However, as The Economist notes, restrictive immigration policies represent a significant “wasted opportunity” for the country.

Both participants in this study selected Italy as their destination primarily for  its cultural appeal. For Participant 1, who holds Italian citizenship by descent, the decision was closely tied to her heritage, as well as her desire to explore European culture and improve her Italian language skills. In contrast, Participant 2’s decision was driven by an Italian government scholarship aimed at attracting international students, thus framing her migration as part of a state-led investment strategy.  The scholarship appears to have facilitated a connection to the country, particularly as her academic programme required her to study in Italian and complete internships in Italy. 

However, despite these integrative mechanisms, both participants highlighted the significant role of citizenship status in shaping their experiences with institutional procedures. Notably, they underscored that bureaucratic challenges extended beyond mere paperwork; issues of processing times, staff competence, and the perceived unwelcoming attitudes of officials led to feelings of exclusion. Participant 2’s characterisation of Italian bureaucratic interactions as lacking “humanity” points to a deeper systemic issue, suggesting that policy reforms must address not only regulatory frameworks but also administrative practices and staff training. This finding aligns with economic observations suggesting that countries with ageing populations and slow productivity growth, such as Italy, would benefit from recognising the value of skilled migrants.

Another salient theme emerging from the interviews concerns future migration intentions. 

Finally, both participants stressed the importance of job opportunities in their decision-making processes. Italy’s labour market appears insufficiently attractive for highly skilled individuals, particularly young graduates. According to a report by Fondazione Nord Est (2024), approximately 550,000 Italians aged 18 to 34 emigrated between 2011 and 2023 in search of better prospects, placing Italy among the European countries most affected by “brain drain.” Furthermore, Mercer Total Remuneration Survey (2024) ranks Italy among the EU’s lowest in terms of graduate compensation levels. As reported by Il Sole 24 Ore, Italy ranks near the bottom in terms of foreign graduate retention within the EU (Melis, 2025). Additionally, Forbes (2024) estimates that Italy’s cumulative human capital loss due to brain drain between 2011 and 2024 amounts to approximately €134 billion. While Participant 2 succeeded in securing an attractive job offer in Italy, her experience illustrates how excessive bureaucracy can outweigh even positive labour market outcomes, ultimately prompting her to consider relocation to another European country with more efficient administrative systems. 

Taken together, these findings emphasise the urgent need for Italy to recognise the economic and social costs of its current migration and integration systems. While the country is capable of attracting international talent through cultural appeal and scholarship programmes, its inability to retain such individuals represents a clear policy failure. If Italy aims to fully benefit from the potential of international graduates, comprehensive reforms are needed, addressing not only immigration policies but also administrative procedures, labour market conditions, and societal attitudes towards migrants.

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