Selective Solidarity: The Desecuritisation of Migration in the EU’s Response to the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis

Executive Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in the largest and fastest displacement of civilians in Europe since the Second World War. Within weeks, millions fled the conflict, with Poland alone hosting over 1.5 million refugees, the highest number among EU member states. As a frontline state with deep historical, cultural, and political ties to Ukraine, and a 535-kilometre border, Poland played a pivotal role in shaping both the humanitarian and strategic dimensions of Europe’s response (Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022).

This policy brief examines the EU’s differentiated treatment of migrants as a critical internal challenge to its credibility and cohesion as a global actor. It argues that the selective application of protection mechanisms, such as the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), based on geopolitical interests and cultural similarities, undermines the EU’s normative commitment to human rights, the rule of law, and equality among all displaced persons. To protect its internal solidarity and strategic coherence, the EU must move beyond ad hoc responses to migration crises and adopt a consistent policy approach that extends legal protection to all.

Introduction

During earlier migration crises, most notably the 2015 European migrant crisis, which saw an influx of refugees from the Middle East, the responses of EU member states were often fractured, resulting in overwhelmed asylum systems, public backlash, and the securitisation of migration, with refugees depicted as threats to national security and cultural identity.

Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian refugee crisis appeared to pose similar risks, particularly given its scale, rapid pace, and the existing strains on public infrastructure in Eastern Europe. However, Poland’s response proved markedly different. Instead of portraying Ukrainians as security threats, the Polish government and society highlighted cultural proximity, shared historical memory, and solidarity amidst Russian aggression (Intereconomics, 2022).

This narrative was reinforced at the European level through the activation of the TPD, a rarely used legal mechanism that granted displaced Ukrainians immediate rights to residency, healthcare, education, and employment across the EU. In Poland, the TPD facilitated a swift and coordinated response, easing pressure on the national asylum system and enabling smoother integration into labour and education systems for refugees (EIB, 2023; The Conversation, 2024).

Crucially, the use of TPD preempted securitisation by providing a legal and policy framework that enabled host countries to accommodate refugees without raising political tensions or causing administrative overload. While concerns about long-term integration persist, especially as many refugees move from temporary to potentially permanent residence, the initial response demonstrates how early legal clarity and shared EU responsibility can lessen both social strain and political fragmentation caused by migrants (Léonard & Kaunert, 2023; Zaun, 2025).

At the same time, the contrast between the reception of Ukrainian refugees and the securitised treatment of non-European migrants in Poland highlights a selective approach to solidarity, driven by perceived cultural affinity and geopolitical interests. Consequently, the reception towards Ukrainian refugees reveals both the potential and limitations of current EU migration policy, underscoring how temporary protection can serve as a stabilising mechanism in moments of crisis, while also exposing persistent inconsistencies in how Europe defines and addresses displacement.

Contextual Background

In response to Russia’s war on Ukraine, on March 4th, 2022, the EU implemented the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) (2001/55/EC). The TPD “provides immediate and collective protection to a large group of displaced persons who arrive in the EU and who are not in a position to return to their country of origin” (Council of the EU, 2025). The directive was initially conceived as an emergency response to EU members’ inability to deal with large numbers of people fleeing the war in the former Yugoslavia.

Unable to provide protection quickly under the existing system, Austria created the possibility of a “temporary stay” for Bosnian migrants, which represented the early version of the TPD (ICMPD, 2022). In its current form, the TPD has never been activated until the Ukrainian conflict. This is primarily due to the complex process required to activate it, which requires the EU Commission to send a proposal to the Council, which must agree on it with an over 65% (ICMPD, 2022).

The TPD represents a unique response to forced displacement within the EU, where belonging to a designated group is sufficient to obtain refugee protection, thereby avoiding the need for an individual-based asylum application. As such, the directive allows Ukrainian refugees a series of rights which are generally the result of lengthy processes of asylum applications and appeals (ICMPD, 2022). These rights include access to (self)employment, healthcare and emergency medical services, education for minors under the same conditions as nationals, vocational training, family reunification, freedom of movement within the EU, the right to a residence permit and related documents, as well as the freedom to choose the Member State in which to submit an application.

The efficiency of the directive and the speed at which Ukrainian refugees are granted these rights represent the largest discrepancy between this refugee flow and others (e.g. from Afghanistan following the Taliban takeover or from Syria following the civil war). This sharp contrast in treatment underscores a broader pattern of differentiated responses within the EU, wherein refugees are granted protections not only based on need but also perceived cultural compatibility with European values and identity (Mickelsson, 2024). As such, Ukrainian refugees benefited from rapid access to rights and services under the TPD, while those fleeing conflicts in the Middle East have often encountered barriers to similar asylum protections, prolonged detention, and securitised narratives portraying them as threats to national cohesion or public safety. 

The implementation of the TPD for Ukrainians de-securitised their presence by normalising their access to the labour market, social services, and residency, while other groups remain under suspicion or bureaucratic exclusion (Mickelsson, 2024). This selective solidarity highlights the EU’s tendency to lend protection based on racialised and geopolitical considerations rather than consistent legal principles. As such, the Ukrainian case not only demonstrates the benefits of a coordinated and integrated response to forced displacement but also exposes the structural deficiencies that shape Europe’s uneven reception of migrants.

Case Study: Poland

Poland has traditionally been among the countries most opposed to admitting refugees. Yet, with the 2022 influx of Ukrainian refugees, the country took a surprising opposing position (Jacoby, 2022). Currently, Poland hosts the second-largest number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe, with almost one million residing there (UNHCR, 2025). This shift can be explained by several factors, including cultural and religious affinities, a shared sense of existential threat from Russia, low perceived security risks, and geographical proximity (Drazanova, 2022). 

Although migration in Poland has historically been highly securitised, the current context presents an interesting case for examining how the TPD may contribute to the de-securitisation of the conflict and its associated forced migration. A central way of understanding this is by looking at how the TPD has produced forced migration as a vector of development in both Poland and Ukraine.

Forced Migration and Development

Academic research on the migration-development nexus has primarily concentrated on labour migration, in part because its impacts are more easily observed – economically, through remittances (Gamlen, 2014); politically through diaspora engagement (Krawatzek & Müller-Funk, 2020), and from a human development perspective, as migration can represent an expression of individual freedom (de Haas, 2021). This diverse literature also demonstrates the complex ways in which migration contributes to development, beyond mere economic determinism. However, forced migrants and their impact on development (either in origin or destination) have generally been absent from the debate (Koppenberg, 2012).

This policy brief examines how an open and effective forced migration policy, such as the Temporary Protection Directive, can enable forced migrants to contribute to the development of both their countries of origin and their host countries. Beyond the evident humanitarian and developmental objective of enabling refugees to rebuild purposeful lives, this proposal assesses how the TPD creates the framework enabling forced mobility to act as a driver of development in both origin and destination countries by fostering diaspora engagement and economic participation. Furthermore, it explains how such an approach had the effect of de-securitising the tense political situation where millions of asylum seekers entered Europe in a short time period, particularly in a comparative perspective to the 2015 refugee crisis.

1. Development Through Labour Market Participation

A straightforward way to assess the developmental potential of migration is through labour market integration. To this end, the influx of Ukrainian refugees has been an important element in addressing the EU’s labour shortages. In the case of Poland, this was primarily done to facilitate the swift integration of refugees into the labour market, without the lengthy hurdles for status recognition that other migrant groups face. Following the UNHCR (2025), Ukrainian refugees contributed 2.7% to Poland’s GDP, and the economy achieved higher levels of productivity and specialisation. Furthermore, there has been no recorded decline in the wages of Polish workers, nor have there been higher rates of unemployment.

This effect was made possible by the ability of Ukrainian migrants to find work as soon as they arrived in Poland as TPD beneficiaries. The quick integration in the labour market is also especially visible in Poland, which has prioritised participation over integration, unlike countries such as Germany (EWL, 2022). While this has led to higher rates of employment, it has also resulted in a lower level of skill-job matches (UNHCR, 2025). Nonetheless, what the Polish situation has shown us is that a quick and flexible framework of asylum rights allocation has the potential to contribute positively to the labour shortages present throughout Europe.

More importantly, it has demonstrated that when migrants are integrated in a way that contributes positively to the socioeconomic well-being of the host country, without threatening employment opportunities or social stability, migration becomes de-securitised (Polko, 2025), as in the case of Ukrainian migrants in Poland. The opportunity offered to Ukrainian migrants to access labour markets seamlessly and with broad societal support was driven by the perception of Ukrainians as a community possessing a shared European identity and, in particular, a common historical context with Poland, underpinned by ties to the old Soviet regime. They were portrayed as victims of a war that threatened European values, meaning that their reception was not treated as a security risk but rather as an act of solidarity amid Russia’s attack on Europe.

However, beyond symbolic or identity-based factors, a critical aspect in ensuring that migration contributes most sustainably to the labour market is stability, which, given the temporary nature of the TPD, is lacking (PICUM, 2025). In the context of a growing number of Ukrainian refugees seeking asylum in Europe, the EU has not come up with a sustainable solution regarding the situation of the TPD beneficiaries after the conflict. 

The need for such a long-term action plan was highlighted by multiple entities (ECRE). Some countries have therefore implemented their own plans post-conflict. In the case of Poland, this entails the possibility of transitioning towards residency status, valid for three years, for those living uninterrupted in Poland for a minimum of one year. Such phasing-out plans are considered beneficial for a wide variety of actors, including employers or the local community, as well as promoting integration and social engagement.

Despite the beneficial effect of the TPD on labour markets, a few more aspects ought to be considered to improve the current and future challenges from forced mobility. First, it is unclear how many refugees want to stay. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to engage them in lengthy processes of skill accreditation. In these cases, finding work quickly and using their skills to the fullest extent possible is advisable. Second, there are those who do intend to stay.

The Ukrainian refugee population is predominantly composed of highly educated individuals. These bring skills relevant to the countries of origin, particularly in fields such as social services, education or tech (Hooper & Desiderio, 2022). While a significant number (around 40%) of the refugee population cannot work due to childcare responsibilities or being underage, the crisis has highlighted the importance of supporting employers and civil society in utilising the newly arrived labour power (Hooper & Desiderio, 2022). While professional skill accreditation remains lengthy, efforts can be made to clarify the process for the refugees themselves.

     2. Diaspora contributions to development

By now, it is well established that migrants continue to make significant contributions to their countries of origin even after departure (Newland, 2022). Furthermore, supporting diaspora engagement in the destination can go hand-in-hand with developmental and strategic goals of the host country (Newland, 2022). The case of Ukraine is no exception: the refugee population plays a vital role in the ongoing war effort (IOM, 2022) and is expected to contribute substantially to post-war reconstruction (UNHCR, 2024). This is done in both financial and non-financial ways.

Financially, although economic remittances have decreased due to the mass migration, in 2024, they still added up to over 9 billion dollars, which, in the context of a war-torn economy, provides a critical influx to the economy (UNN, 2025). At the same time, long-standing diaspora networks have stepped in to contribute in alternative ways. As the MPI (2024) documents, the Ukrainian diaspora has supported numerous initiatives, from funding wartime logistics to combating disinformation campaigns propagated by Russian media. In addition, the diaspora is already engaged in post-war recovery efforts, particularly by backing social enterprises and cross-border business partnerships between Ukrainian and international actors.

A key determinant of how effectively the diaspora can act as an agent of change lies in the extent to which forced migrants are integrated into the economic and social fabric of their host countries. As previously mentioned, the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) has played a pivotal role in this regard, particularly in Poland. The flexibility and accessibility of the TPD framework have enabled rapid labour market integration for Ukrainian migrants. In 2024, it is estimated that over 75% of Ukrainian migrants were working or searching for work (Dudek et al., 2024). This swift access to employment has had tangible outcomes: around 40% of Ukrainian migrants reported sending financial remittances, while about 50% sent non-financial forms of support (Dudek et al., 2024).

Crucially, the pre-existing migrant networks, developed since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, have provided a ready-made structure into which newly arrived migrants could integrate and contribute, further enhancing the resilience and outreach of the diaspora. These pre-existing networks have also ensured that migration from Ukraine is de-securitised, enabling migrants to participate meaningfully in both host and origin societies through swift labour market entrance, remittance support to families, and contributions to the Ukrainian war effort and long-term reconstruction through investment and knowledge transfer. Such developments would not have been possible under a securitised migration regime, where legal barriers, social marginalisation, and restricted movement would likely suppress such contributions.

Another key developmental feature of the TPD is its provision for return mobility: in July and August 2024, more people travelled back to Ukraine than left, signalling a growing trend of “pendular” mobility (back and forth movements of forcibly displaced) (ECRE, 2023). This fluid circulation between host and home countries not only strengthens transnational ties but also creates significant opportunities for economic engagement, investment, and the transfer of skills and knowledge. Policies that enable such mobility are instrumental in encouraging diaspora involvement in national recovery efforts.
In addition to the TPD, several destination countries have introduced complementary measures to further enhance diaspora engagement. For instance, Ireland has allowed Ukrainian remote workers to pay taxes exclusively in Ukraine, a targeted initiative aimed at reinforcing both the war effort and long-term reconstruction (ICMPD, 2023). Together, these policies reflect a broader shift toward empowering displaced populations not just as recipients of aid, but as active agents in the recovery and development of their country of origin.

Conclusion

The Ukrainian refugee crisis demonstrates how legal clarity, collective EU action, and identity-based solidarity, when mobilised together, can de-securitise forced migration to facilitate both humanitarian protection and developmental outcomes. Yet, the evident contrast with securitised responses towards non-European migrants highlights the underlying structural biases in EU migration policy.

With the TPD approaching its temporal limit, despite multiple extensions, the EU now faces the challenge of devising a long-term solution that provides stability for refugees without compromising the socio-economic benefits already achieved. Replicating the flexibility and rights-based approach of the TPD in future migration emergencies, regardless of the country of origin, will be vital to reducing the risks of fragmentation and bolstering both social cohesion and EU resilience in times of crisis.

Bibliography

Almeida, L. (2025, March 4). Three years since the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive: from emergency to longer-term solutions – PICUM. PICUM. https://picum.org/blog/three-years-since-the-activation-of-the-temporary-protection-directive-from-emergency-to-longer-term-solutions/

Bryzek, S. (2022, October 24). Ukrainian Refugees: Job Market Challenges in Germany vs. Poland. EWL Group. https://ewlgroup.de/deutsche-welle-ukrainian-refugees-on-the-job-market-more-difficult-in-germany-than-in-poland/

Council of the EU. (2024). Ukrainian refugees: EU member states welcome the proposal to extend temporary protection. Consilium. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/06/13/ukrainian-refugees-eu-member-states-welcome-the-proposal-to-extend-temporary-protection/

De Haas, H. (2021). A theory of migration: the aspirations-capabilities framework. Comparative migration studies, 9(1), 8.

Duszczyk, M., & Kaczmarczyk, P. (2022). The War in Ukraine and Migration to Poland: Outlook and Challenges. Intereconomics, 2022(3), 164–170. https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2022/number/3/article/the-war-in-ukraine-and-migration-to-poland-outlook-and-challenges.html

Drazanova, L. (2022, March 23). Why are Ukrainian refugees welcomed in Central and Eastern Europe? – Migration Policy Centre. Migration Policy Centre. https://migrationpolicycentre.eu/why-are-ukrainian-refugees-welcomed-in-central-and-eastern-europe/

ECRE. (2023). MOVEMENT TO AND FROM UKRAINE UNDER THE TEMPORARY PROTECTION DIRECTIVE. ECRE. https://ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Policy-Note-43-movement-to-and-from-Ukraine-January-2023.pdf

European Council. (2001, August 7). Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof. European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:32001L0055

Fusiek, D. (2022, November 28). A solidarity package helps Poland integrate Ukrainian refugees. European Investment Bank. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees

Golebiowska, K., Pachocka, M., & Kubiciel-Lodzińska, S. (2024, February 27). Poland has opened its arms to nearly 1 million Ukrainian refugees, but will they be able to stay for the long term? The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/poland-has-opened-its-arms-to-nearly-1-million-ukrainian-refugees-but-will-they-be-able-to-stay-for-the-long-term-219481

Hooper, K., & Desiderio, M. V. (2022, September 29). Why the European Labor Market Integration of Displaced Ukrainians Is Defying Expectations. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/european-labor-market-integration-displaced-ukrainians

ICMPD. (2025). Phasing out temporary protection: Shaping EU policies through national experiences – ICMPD. ICMPD. https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2025/phasing-out-temporary-protection-shaping-eu-policies-through-national-experiences

ICMPD. (2022). The war in Ukraine and the renaissance of temporary protection – why this might be the only way to go – ICMPD. ICMPD. https://www.icmpd.org/blog/2022/the-war-in-ukraine-and-the-renaissance-of-temporary-protection-why-this-might-be-the-only-way-to-go

Jacoby, T. (2022, November 1). Living in Limbo: Displaced Ukrainians in Poland. Migrationpolicy.org. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/living-limbo-displaced-ukrainians-poland

Krawatzek, F., & Müller-Funk, L. (2020). Two centuries of flows between ‘here’and ‘there’: Political remittances and their transformative potential. Journal of ethnic and migration studies, 46(6), 1003-1024.

Koppenberg, S. (2012). Where do forced migrants stand in the migration and development debate. Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 2(1), 77-90.

Mickelsson, T. B. (2024). Ukrainian Refugees’ Differentiated Treatment: A Critical and Systematic Review. Global Networks, 25(1). https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12502

NBP. (2024). The living and economic situation of migrants from Ukraine in Poland in 2024. NBP. https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Sytuacja-uchodzcow-z-Ukrainy-2024-ANG-DS.pdf

Newland, K. (2022). Destination-Country Policies to Foster Diaspora Engagement in Development. Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-diaspora-policies-2022_final.pdf

Orenstein, M. A. (2025). Securitisation of EU policy: how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is changing Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2497350

Polko, P. (2025). Just and unjust securitization of migration: a comparative analysis of migration to Poland from MENA countries and Ukraine. Frontiers in Political Science, 7. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2025.1464288

Rosina, M. (2023). Migration and soft power: the EU’s visa and refugee policy response to the war in Ukraine. Policy Studies, 45(3-4), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2288237

Shramko, J. (2025, February 21). Remittances to Ukraine reached $9.6 billion over the year: from which countries the most were sent. Ukrainian National News (UNN); UNN. https://unn.ua/en/news/remittances-to-ukraine-reached-dollar96-billion-over-the-year-from-which-countries-the-most-were-sent

UNHCR. (2025a). Poland: Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland — 2nd edition (June 2025). UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/116621

UNHCR. (2025). Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation. Data.unhcr.org. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine/location/10781

UNHCR. (2025c). Ukraine Population Movements Factsheet 2. UNHCR Operational Data Portal (ODP). https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/114591

UNHCR. (2024). UNHCR welcomes the extension of Temporary Protection for refugees from Ukraine | UNHCR Europe. UNHCR Europe. https://www.unhcr.org/europe/news/press-releases/unhcr-welcomes-extension-temporary-protection-refugees-ukraine
Vaitovich, V. (2024). Op-ed: The EU is stretching the limits of the Temporary Protection Directive beyond 2025, but is it enough? | European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). ECRE. https://ecre.org/op-ed-the-eu-is-stretching-the-limits-of-the-temporary-protection-directive-beyond-2025-but-is-it-enough/.