Spain’s Military Aid to Ukraine: A Middle Power’s Support under Structural Dependence and Reluctant Rearmament

Since 2022, Spain has backed Ukraine with a steadily expanding, yet deliberately bounded package of military support. This article situates Madrid’s aid within Spain’s broader foreign policy posture: a capable but dependency-prone “middle power” that has long externalised hard security and underinvested in defence, and that is now accelerating outlays to meet alliance demands. Drawing on official statements, the European Union’s training mission records, open source shipment data, and Spanish language analytical works, this article maps Spain’s contribution across three vectors: logistics and training, ground-based air defence (Patriot/HAWK missiles), and selected heavy equipment (Leopard 2A4, M-113s, protected vehicles, and ammunition). It argues that while Spain’s aggregate volumes remain modest relative to European totals, Madrid has delivered high leverage effects, above all, through the Toledo Training Coordination Centre (TTCC) under EUNAM-Ukraine and intermittent air defence replenishment. The May 2024 bilateral security agreement (1 billion euros for 2024) and a 2025 spending sprint toward the 2% of GDP benchmark mark a turning point, but do not resolve structural gaps such as thin stocks, modernisation delays, and industrial bottlenecks. The conclusion proposes a capability-driven support model (layered air defence, 155 mm production, sustainment/repair capacity, and NCO/officer education) that aligns Spain’s resources with alliance needs while reducing strategic dependence. 

Introduction 

Madrid’s assistance to Kyiv has grown in waves, from early non-lethal kits to armour, interceptors, and a dense training architecture that has become Spain’s comparative advantage. Yet Spain’s support is best read not through headline numbers but through the lens of its structural position. Spanish foreign policy has long projected reliability inside EU-NATO frameworks while avoiding the costs of strategic autonomy (del Amo, 2025). Furthermore, a weak strategic culture and episodic budget cycles have entrenched dependence on alliances for high-end deterrence and defence technology. The war in Ukraine has disrupted this equilibrium. It raises the bar for credibility inside the alliance and forces Spain to reconcile ambitions, inventories, and industrial capacity (del Amo, 2025). 

This article proceeds in five steps. First, it outlines the structural constraints shaping Spain’s external action. Second, it inventories the concrete elements of Spain’s assistance to Ukraine (equipment, air defence, logistics, and especially training). Third, it examines the recent defence spending pivot and the 2025 debate around capability targets. Fourth, it unpacks capability gaps and industrial bottlenecks that condition Madrid’s policy. Finally, it distills implications and policy options. The argument is that Spain’s most credible path to influence lies not in pursuing volume for its own sake, but in developing high-impact niches that Europe genuinely lacks (provided these efforts are supported by stable funding and a solid industrial base).

Spain’s Foreign Policy in a Post Liberal Order: Dependence as a Structural Feature 

Spanish external action has been shaped by an era in which security was largely outsourced and norms substituted for capabilities. The erosion of liberal order, renewed great power rivalry, and the conditionality of US security guarantees have exposed the limits of this model. There is a recurring triad (limited strategic culture, institutional fragmentation, and apolitical social debate allergic to hard power investments) that has narrowed autonomy and muted Spain’s voice even when assets (geography, economy, EU membership) should confer leverage (del Amo, 2025). 

The result is a dependable yet subordinate profile of integration. Reliable, but lacking genuine initiative or a distinct strategic vision. This matters for Ukraine policy because contributions are filtered through domestic ceilings (stocks, funding continuity, industrial scale) and the EU first reflects that, while valuable, can blur Spanish priorities on the alliance’s southern and eastern flanks. If the post-liberal environment rewards capabilities over declarations, Spain must translate incremental budgets into deployable power or risk remaining peripheral. 

What Spain Has Delivered: A Profile Heavy on Training, Logistics, and Air Defence

Equipment, Logistics, and Ammunition 

Spain’s deliveries have mixed national drawdowns with industry-sourced items, moving from early protective gear to armour, interceptor, and ammunition. Leopard 2A4 transfers, M-113 APCs, protected logistics vehicles, and specialised kits (counter UAS, remote weapon stations). Ammunition has been central, with tens of thousands of 155mm rounds, plus 120mm and small arms stocks (Ruiz Isac, 2025). While Spain is among the more discreet donors, the broad pattern is visible: episodic armour donations, regular ammo flows, and add-ons that help Ukraine absorb and sustain equipment (spares, tools, training packages). In aggregate, Spain’s share of total military aid remains a lower mid contribution by European standards, but composition matters and points to Madrid’s preference for enabling functions rather than volume alone (Lopez et al., 2025). 

Air defence has been the political signal. In May-June 2024, Spain sent additional Patriot missiles, and in September 2024, Madrid announced the dispatch of a complete HAWK battery (six launchers already staged in Poland) responding to Ukraine’s urgent interceptor needs (Militarnyi, 2024). These inputs diversify Kyiv’s layered defence and reduce burn on premium Patriot stocks, even if Spanish inventories are themselves finite (Domingo, 2024). 

On 27 May 2024, Spain and Ukraine signed a bilateral security agreement. The accord specifies 1 billion euros in military support for 2024, embedding deliveries within a broader cooperation envelope such as training, intelligence, demining, and reconstruction (Government of Spain & Government of Ukraine, 2024). This commitment aligned Spain with Europe’s turn toward multi-year, industry-backed support and signalled a step change from ad hoc shipments to planned capability. 

Training as Spain’s Comparative Advantage: The Toledo Model

If logistics is the backbone, training is Spain’s signature. Under EUNAM-Ukraine, Madrid established the Toledo Training Cooperation Centre (TTCC) to coordinate a dual track. First, permanent basic soldiering in Toledo/Cadiz, and second, rotating specialised modules across at least 17 provinces formed by engineers, C-IED, de-mining, including underwater, urban combat and geospatial (Ruiz Isac, 2025). 

By September 2025, Madrid announced more than 8.000 trained under EUNAM-Ukraine. The scale is notable for a single member state and reflects a sustained instructor pipeline and infrastructure in Toledo (Government of Spain, 2025). Beyond numbers, Spain has emphasised NCO/officer courses (e.g. platoon leaders in Girona), engineers, and GBAD operators. All these are multipliers that matter in an attritional war (EMAD, 2024). 

The “Toledo Model” is also adaptable. Curricula have been progressively aligned with battlefield learning (night fighting, trench warfare, urban breaching, drone employment, and sustained tasks) while preserving a legal/ethical foundation (IHL modules led by Spain’s military legal and medical corps). This mix (skills plus institution building) explains why training has delivered outsize effects relative to Spain’s overall aid share (Ruiz Isac, 2025). 

The Budget Pivot: From 1.3% to about 2%

Spain’s defence effort started from the bottom of NATO’s table. In 2025, the government unveiled a 10 billion uplift to accelerate reaching 2% framed as a response to alliance capability targets and the lessons of Ukraine (Jones, 2025). In June 2025, Madrid sought (and claimed) an understanding with NATO to meet Spain’s assigned capability outputs at around 2% of GDP rather than a floated 5% guideline (Cantero, 2025). The aim is to square capability delivery with a welfare state narrative at home. 

For Ukraine policy, this matters in two ways. First, a faster glidepath to 2% creates fiscal room for predictable, multi-year packages. Second, Spain’s political positioning within EU defence industrial initiatives depends on credible national procurement and backfill, particularly where Europe now leads on industry-sourced deliveries. 

Capability Realism: Stocks, Obsolescence, and Industrial Bottlenecks 

Spanish forces are professional and interoperable, but the instrument was optimised for small expeditionary missions, not high-intensity conflict. For example, chronic shortages of ammunition and spares have left inventories thin (from rifle ammo to scarce deep strike munitions), and maintenance backlogs that reduce availability. Donations to Ukraine draw on these limited stocks and must be coupled with back orders to avoid hollowing out (Sanchez Mela, 2024). Also, legacy systems persist across services, with land modernisation (e.g.,: VCR 8×8 Dragon) seeing delays and overruns, while artillery and some armoured fleets remain dated and complicating readiness, reducing headroom for sustained donations (del Amo, 2025). Plus, the very act of donating Patriot missiles and HAWK batteries reveals how thin national inventories are.

Incentives & Bottlenecks

Spain’s approach is underpinned by three logics:  

First, alliance management and signalling. The May 2024 security agreement created a predictable envelope and showcased Spain’s willingness to align with EU-NATO burden sharing (shielding Madrid from “free rider” narratives). The politics of training (high visibility at low stock cost) and GBAD (high salience, manageable cadente) fit Spain’s profile (Government of Spain & Government of Ukraine, 2024). 

Second, industrial policy and technological upgrading. Moving from dations to production is the only sustainable route. Spain’s defence industry can anchor munitions, GBAD components, and specialised electronics, but scale and workforce are major constraints. Multi-year orders tied to European co-financing would reduce unit costs and create exportable volume for Ukraine backfill (del Amo, 2025). 

Third, budgetary trade-offs and social license. Politically, Madrid frames 2% as capability-driven and welfare compatible, but that narrative will be tested by inflation in military inputs, long lead times, and the visibility of gaps (GBAD layers, ammunition plants, maintenance). Without milestones and regional co-benefits (jobs, skills), tolerance could erode (Latona et al, 2025). 

Conclusion 

Spain’s aid to Ukraine is an X-ray of its foreign policy model, which is pragmatic, coalition-minded, and most effective when it invests in enabling functions rather than in raw tonnage. The TTCC, the logistics pipeline, and intermittent GBAD deliveries have produced real battlefield value. The May 2024 agreement institutionalised that effort, while the 2025 budget pivot provides the fiscal base to sustain it.  But structural dependence will only recede if Madrid converts euros into capabilities that matter for both Ukraine and NATO. In other words, layered air defence 155mm production counter UAS/EW, sustainment/repair capacity, and human capital (NCO/officer education). Prestige programs, absent a coherent mission design, will not translate into influence. Targeted capacity, predictable funding, and industrial backfill will. 

If Spain consolidates its “Toledo advantage”, shifts from one-off donations to production-backed packages, and clarifies doctrine around GBAD and land force sustainment, it can align its potential with performance and move from a peripheral role to a consequential middle power in Europe’s security architecture, all while remaining within a politically defensible 2% envelope. Ukraine is the test, and the window is now. 

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