Military Intervention vs. Nonviolent Strategies in European Peace-making: Pathways to Sustainable Peace.

Abstract

This paper explores the challenges of humanitarian military intervention and the potential of non-violent alternatives within European peace policies. Case studies from Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo highlight the limitations of military responses, including delayed action, civilian harm, and legal ambiguities. Nonviolent methods, such as Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) and Nonviolent Resistance (NVR), demonstrate their effectiveness in protecting civilians and achieving political change, as seen in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Serbia. This paper argues that while military interventions should remain an option for immediate and severe crises, the EU needs to invest in non-violent strategies like UCP and NVR to reduce its reliance on force and promote sustainable peace.

1. Introduction

In today’s world, where conflicts like the war in Ukraine, the escalating humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and the violence in Sudan challenge global stability, the need to explore effective and sustainable pathways to peace has become increasingly pressing. The war in Ukraine not only threatens the rules-based international order, but it also reintroduces large-scale conflict to the European continent, something which many at the beginning of the century thought to be impossible. With this unexpected resurgence of war, and the international community’s responses to other humanitarian crises, such as in Gaza, increasingly under scrutiny, significant concerns have emerged regarding the effectiveness of traditional approaches to peace-making. These crises not only test the resilience of international frameworks but also demand a re-evaluation of how the global community addresses human rights abuses and large-scale violence, particularly in the face of mounting criticism of military solutions.

In academia, the topic of non-violent methods to address human rights abuses  first gained traction during the Cold War and the anti-Apartheid movement, with a second wave occurring in the years following the many controversial military interventions of the 1990s. Scholars like Salla (1996) and Ortega (2001) discussed the pitfalls of violent interventions, criticising the EU and the international community as a whole. Gene Sharp’s ‘The Methods of Nonviolent Actions’ laid an important foundation for these and future discussions and remains frequently cited more than 50 years later. He defined three pillars of non-violent actions: Protest and Persuasion, Economic-Non-Cooperation, and Non-Violent Intervention. The third pillar, in particular, gained increasing focus when the UN implemented the Responsibility to Protect Regime (R2P) in 2001, arguing that the international community had a responsibility to intervene if human rights were at stake in a country. However, R2P specifically emphasized that military intervention should always be the last resort, raising the question on what other alternative measures can be taken. 

Scholars also increasingly started paying attention to the concept of Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) as an alternative to traditional military intervention, especially when missions such as Iraq and Afghanistan had devastating consequences for the countries. Wallace (2017), Raynova (2017), and Julian (2020; 2024) have extensively written about these topics, highlighting how current approaches to  peace-making and conflict response appear insufficient or flawed. Especially against the backdrop of an increasingly volatile geopolitical situation and the growing number of conflict zones worldwide, the question of how to respond to conflict and human rights abuses is more important than ever. 

This paper thus seeks to contribute to this discussion by examining the contrasting approaches of humanitarian military intervention and nonviolent measures, focusing on their application within European frameworks and their implications for the future of European Peace Policies. To do so, the paper is divided into three main parts. The first section explores the historical evolution of humanitarian military intervention, its relationship with the principle of sovereignty, and its codification in international frameworks such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine. By analysing the case studies of Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999), it aims to highlight the successes, failures, and ongoing criticisms of military intervention as a response to humanitarian crises. The second section investigates non-violent approaches, specifically Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) and Nonviolent Resistance (NVR), as alternatives to military solutions. Drawing on examples from Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and Serbia,  this section demonstrates how these methods can protect civilians, mitigate violence, and even facilitate regime change. Lastly, the final section addresses the limitations of existing EU policies in implementing R2P and argues for greater investment in training and capacity-building for UCP and NVR initiatives. By doing so, the paper aims to highlight how strengthening its commitment to non-violent strategies could help the EU to take a leading role in addressing humanitarian crises and contributing to sustainable global peace.

2. Humanitarian Military Intervention 

Humanitarian military intervention has long been a contentious aspect of international relations, particularly in the post-Cold War era, and has frequently been criticised for failing to achieve sustainable peace. This section explores its historical development, focusing on its relationship with the principle of sovereignty and its codification in European and international frameworks. It also analyses key case studies, including Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999), to examine their role in shaping modern policies, such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.

Sovereignty, often regarded as self-evident today, is a relatively modern concept that originated in the Westphalian system of the 17th century (Howes, 2016). Before this, territorial conflicts were primarily motivated by power struggles, but the notion of sovereignty as a right tied to freedom and self-determination, as understood today, did not yet exist (Howes, 2016). The development of sovereignty as a foundational principle of the international order, however, also introduced a tension between the rights of states to govern without interference and the moral imperative to address human suffering across borders (Heraclides and Dialla, 2015).

Today, the principle of sovereignty is primarily focused on protecting states from external interference and is codified in international law through instruments like the 1945 UN Charter and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (Raynova, 2017). Article 2.4 of the UN Charter enshrines the principle of non-intervention, prohibiting states from interfering in the domestic affairs of others. However, exceptions exist under Chapter VII for actions deemed necessary to maintain international peace and security (Raynova, 2017). Concerns about sovereignty being used to shield states from accountability for human rights abuses led to additional measures, such as the Helsinki Final Act, which sought to balance sovereignty with the protection of human rights (Raynova, 2017). 

However, most international charters shaping the modern order contain ambiguous language, and enable states to interpret intervention and interference in ways that align with their strategic interests rather than establishing a consistent legal framework. For example, the Western interpretations of the Helsinki final act distinguish between intervention and interference (Raynova, 2017). In this view, intervention is strictly seen as military actions against a country, whereas interference relates to economic and political influence. Hence, economic sanctions or political interference would not fall under the category of intervention and would not be seen as a threat to a state’s sovereignty. On the other hand, other countries such as Russia and China view any form of interference, military or otherwise, as a violation of their sovereignty (Raynova, 2017). It is therefore no surprise that, in the years following the Helsinki Final Act, many countries struggled to determine whether certain human rights violations warranted military intervention, with this uncertainty and caution contributing to some disastrous outcomes. An example of this is the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Despite early warning signs of escalating tensions and later clear evidence of severe human rights violations, the international community failed to intervene during the genocide against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu populations (Salla, 1996). Only a year later, during the ongoing Bosnian War (1992–1995), the UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, constrained by a limited mandate and overly cautious rules of engagement, were unable to prevent the massacre of over 8,000 Bosnian men and boys in the UN-declared “safe zone” of Srebrenica (Salla, 1996). While Rwanda highlights the devastating consequences of inaction, Srebrenica exemplifies how unclear legal frameworks and inadequate mandates contribute to delays and failures in intervention (ICISS Report, 2001).

The widespread criticism of the delayed actions in Bosnia is often cited as a contributing factor to NATO’s comparatively swift intervention in Kosovo in 1999. This intervention is considered a turning point for humanitarian interventions (Ortega, 2001). On March 24, 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a 78-day aerial bombing campaign targeting Yugoslav military and infrastructure, aimed at halting ethnic cleansing and forcing the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. Contrary to Rwanda and Bosnia, this campaign was not criticised for its lack of intervention or belated decisions, but rather for NATO bypassing the UN Security Council, as Russia and China opposed the operation.  (Gromes, 2019). Although the intervention lacked explicit legal authorisation under the UN Charter, many leaders framed it as a morally justified action. Václav Havel, for instance, described Kosovo as the first war fought for principles and values (ICISS Report, 2001)​. However, the airstrikes inadvertently caused civilian casualties, with estimates ranging from 500 to over 1,000 deaths. One particularly controversial incident involved a NATO pilot mistakenly targeting a convoy of Albanian refugees, assuming it to be an enemy unit.  Initially, NATO officials denied responsibility for the attack but later admitted to the bombing (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2000).  Additionally, critical infrastructure, including bridges, power stations, and even a television station, was targeted, raising ethical concerns about collateral damage and undermining the legitimacy of the action (Ortega, 2001). 

These examples prompted the international community to reevaluate its frameworks for humanitarian military intervention. As a result, in 2001, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine was introduced. R2P is a global norm that establishes the responsibility of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If a state fails in this duty, the international community is expected to intervene through peaceful measures, or, as a last resort, military means (De Franco et al., 2015). However, despite the EU theoretically integrating this norm into its foreign policy, little practical progress has been made over the past two decades (De Franco et al., 2015). For instance, R2P has yet to be fully incorporated into the EU’s External Action Service framework (De Franco et al., 2015). Hence, while R2P was created out of necessity to address unclear international guidelines and remains a potentially useful tool, the EU’s lack of implementation has done little to resolve the issue within its own foreign policy and peacekeeping efforts.

3. Non-Violent Methods 

As the previous section has shown, military intervention to prevent humanitarian atrocities has seen very mixed results in the time since the end of the Cold-War. Both the failure to intervene, as well delayed or premature interventions have been criticised, with civilian casualties being present in all cases. Furthermore, scepticism persists about the long-term effectiveness of these interventions in creating peaceful conditions. Julian (2020) for example argues that military actions to solve conflict often lead to an entrenchment of militarism in the society, hence perpetuating the problem rather than solving it. This inevitably begs the question of whether there is an alternative to military intervention altogether. This section seeks to explore these alternative measures, drawing on the principle of Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) and non-violent resistance (NVR). 

Unarmed Civilian Protection dates back to the 1980s, with organisations like Peace Brigades International (PBI) pioneering these efforts in conflict zones (Julian, 2024). UCP emphasises non-violence and includes trained unarmed  civilians protecting their peers through methods like proactive presence, relationship-building, monitoring, and negotiation (Julian, 2020). Additionally, UCPs often create early warning systems, map safe routes in case of an outbreak of violence, and ensure  civilians have access to humanitarian aid (Julian, 2024). While such a peaceful response to violence might at first seem counterintuitive, case studies have shown that it can be very effective. During the Sri Lankan civil war, UCPs successfully protected civilians from displacement by negotiating with armed forces to avoid the targeting of villages (Bliesemann de Guevara et al., 2023; Wallace, 2017). Likewise, in the Philippines, UCPs have established Early Warning Early Response (EWER) systems to detect and prevent potential outbreaks of violence and have successfully mediated between armed actors to de-escalate tensions and prevent military attacks on civilian areas (Julian, 2020). An advantage of these community-driven methods is that the presence of local civilians equips the groups with more in-depth knowledge of the conflict zones compared to foreign military interventions (Julian, 2020). This not only helps to avoid taking actions that will have unforeseen consequences but also strengthens a sense of community that can later be harboured when the country is entering a post-conflict phase. 

Furthermore, these groups can also provide vital support for journalists and human rights activists by reducing their reliance on a state’s military protection, which can sometimes compromise their neutrality. This concern became evident during the US-led invasion of Iraq, where the Pentagon’s embedded journalism strategy was criticised for potentially influencing reporting and limiting objectivity (Fahmy and Johnson, 2005). The PBI so far have no documented cases of accompanied activists being harmed while under their, or any other UCPs, protection (Julian, 2020). Hence, while UCPs in most cases cannot directly facilitate an end to the overall conflict, they have a proven successful track record of protecting civilians and preventing humanitarian catastrophes through non-violent measures. 

Another method used to address conflict is Non-violent Resistance (NVR), which relies on strategies such as protests, strikes, and civil disobedience to challenge oppressive systems and achieve political change. While it is rarely employed against acute violence, NVR has historically been highly effective in driving regime change and resisting illiberal reforms. In fact, it is statistically more successful than violent uprisings or revolutions, with a higher likelihood of leading to lasting democratic outcomes (Bethke and Pinckney, 2021; Bloch, 2016). A notable example is the Otpor! movement in Serbia, which emerged in response to the authoritarian regime of Slobodan Milošević during the late 1990s. Milošević had consolidated power through a combination of propaganda, state control, and the violent suppression of opposition. Otpor! mobilised over 80,000 participants, employing strategies to unify opposition forces and weaken the regime’s legitimacy (Bloch, 2016). They boosted public morale through creative campaigns, such as mocking government propaganda and distributing subversive symbols like clenched fist logos, which became a rallying point for resistance (Schulte, 2013). In addition to their symbolic actions, Otpor! organised large-scale protests and acts of civil disobedience that paralysed key aspects of the state, such as organising a march on Belgrade or orchestrating a miner’s strike (Schulte, 2013). By maintaining non-violent discipline, they minimised the regime’s ability to justify violent crackdowns, which helped them gain widespread public support. Their large-scale resistance also attracted  international attention, leading to increased logistical and financial backing from Western governments and organisations. This combination of domestic mobilisation and international pressure ultimately forced Milošević to concede defeat in October 2000 after a contested election, demonstrating the power of NVR in achieving political transformation without resorting to violence (Schulte, 2013).

Hence, UCP and NVR showcase how there are alternatives to military intervention, both when it comes to humanitarian crises, as well as propagating regime change. While acute direct violence might still rely on humanitarian military intervention, it is not the only option that should be considered. 

4. Future Directions of European Peace Policies 

As the previous analysis has shown, military interventions and the international legal frameworks in which they operate are flawed. Ambiguity in legal texts creates uncertainty among decision-makers, leading to either delayed actions or interventions without legal backing. In the R2P doctrine, military intervention is rightly labelled as a last resort, only to be used when all other options have failed. However, given how infrequently the doctrine has been implemented so far, it is clear that the EU needs to revisit its policies. To prevent military intervention with all its associated challenges, prevention must be the focus. In this context, the EU should ensure it invests sufficiently in training personnel for UCPs and NVR. Training leaders and civil society in non-violent measures help to increase capacities and build unity among participants (Bloch, 2016). A non-violent movement or organisation can only be successful if it is disciplined and does not let itself be tempted to use violence, something which will inevitably lose them public support. The earlier mentioned Otpor! Movement provides a good example of this principle, demonstrating discipline throughout its campaign. This was partly due to US-supported training sessions focused on leadership development, media strategy, and tactical innovation, all of which helped the movement maintain focus and gain momentum (Schulte, 2013). Additionally, training local leaders in conflict transformation techniques can prepare them to manage disputes constructively, preventing violence against civilians in the process (Moutoussis, 2001). By prioritising non-violent measures and investing in the development of these skills, the EU could thus strengthen its preventive strategies and reduce reliance on military intervention. 

Moreover, the EU would be able to prepare itself better for an outbreak of conflict if it invested more in UCP personnel. The recent calls to increase the presence of UCPs in Gaza illustrate not only their effectiveness but also the pressing need for these methods to be strengthened and expanded (McCarthy, 2024). If a sufficient number of trained personnel is readily available, UCPs can be swiftly deployed into conflict zones to address urgent needs and ensure  humanitarian aid reaches those most affected by violence. This approach is particularly valuable in situations where military intervention is either too complex, politically unfeasible, or likely to exacerbate existing instability. In such cases, UCPs provide a viable alternative, enabling the EU and other international actors to fulfil their responsibility to protect civilians without resorting to force or risking further destabilisation of the region. For instance, as highlighted by the situation in Gaza, UCPs could play a critical role in monitoring ceasefires, de-escalating tensions, and supporting vulnerable communities through direct engagement with local actors and humanitarian organisations (McCarthy, 2024).

By focusing on non-violent methods like UCPs, the EU could avoid the reputational and political costs associated with military intervention while contributing to long-term stability in conflict zones. Strengthening these mechanisms would allow the EU adopt  a proactive stance in addressing crises, meeting its international obligations to protect civilians while maintaining its commitment to non-violence and sustainable conflict resolution. 

5. Conclusion 

This paper has highlighted how humanitarian military intervention is often seen as a necessary response to acute violence, such as the conflicts in Bosnia in 1995 or Kosovo in 1999, but inevitably faces significant challenges. Delayed responses, civilian casualties, and legal ambiguities have all contributed  to an increasing skepticism against military actions to address human rights abuses. Non-violent methods  such as UCP and NVR offer an alternative in some cases, having successfully protected civilians and even facilitated  peaceful regime change. UCP has been effective in protecting civilians and reducing violence in conflict zones, as demonstrated in Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Similarly, NVR, exemplified by the Otpor! Movement in Serbia, highlights how strategic planning and disciplined non-violence can contribute to political change without the destruction often associated with military action. 

However, these approaches depend heavily on training, international support, and the capacity of local actors. Given the EU’s lack of progress in fully implementing policies related to the Responsibility to Protect doctrine and with ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan threatening global stability, the EU must ensure adequate investment in the training of personnel for UCPs and NVR. Greater consideration of these measures could help reduce reliance on military interventions while providing alternative pathways to address crises. Such measures would align with the EU’s broader commitments to non-violence and peacebuilding while offering a more sustainable and less harmful approach to conflict resolution. While military intervention must  remain an option for extreme  cases of acute violence, it should not overshadow the potential of non-violent strategies to achieve sustainable solutions. 

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