Written by Lorenzo Avesani, Junior Fellow at Geopolitica.info

Lorenzo Avesani placed 2nd in this year’s European Policy Prize 2025. The theme of this year’s competition was

‘Europe and Threats to Globalization’.

Abstract: The victory of the right-wing coalition led by “Brothers of Italy” (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) has intensified debates over Italy’s role within the European Union (EU) regarding migration policy. The current Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, has prioritized tackling illegal migration and her policies have renewed a divisive debate among the Member States. This report examines the current situation and finds actionable solutions to strengthen EU internal cohesion on migration.

Keywords: Italy; European Union; far-right; migration; security

  1. Introduction

Migration represents one of the toughest challenges to European internal coherence. The 2015-2016 migration crisis, as well as the perceived lack of solidarity and inability to cope with it, opened the doors to “an imagined transnational nationalism, old fashioned, ethnocultural nationalism, renamed populism (…) based on the protection of territorial boundaries and national identity” (Kastoryano, 2018). Migration, as part of the global polycrisis, has unsettled EU public opinion and risks triggering political paralysis if European governments fail to provide solutions that restore a sense of control and maintain internal cohesion.

The rise of the Italian far-right, namely The League (Lega) and FdI, reflects this situation. The two political groups that are currently ruling the country together with the centre-right party “Forza Italia” grow in the political turmoil caused by the electoral decline of the mainstream parties since 2012 (Donà, 2022). However, FdI is a more interesting case study not only for the current strong political consensus but also, unlike The League, it adapted to the various stage of Italian politics by staying always at the opposition and becoming a “moderate” sovereigntist party that seeks to transform the EU from the inside (Scopelliti & Bruno, 2022). The victory of the right-wing coalition led by FdI in September 2022 has raised concerns about Italy’s position in the European Union. Tackling illegal migration, a priority of the current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has become relevant again in European policy-making.

The report aims to find shared feasible policies to face the migration challenge and avoid nationalist initiatives by the Italian government. The structure of the policy report is divided into five parts. First, I introduce migration very quickly as an overall European phenomenon. Second, I explain how the rise of the Italian far-right is linked to migration. Third, I assess Meloni’s migration policies by describing how they threaten EU security and design possible scenarios. Fourth, I define three possible policies: enacting the protection of migrants in the Asylum Procedures Regulation scheme, establishing a European agency on repatriations and launching a Irini+ military naval mission. Finally, I conclude by pointing out which policies suit the current situation. 

  1. Italian far-right and illegal migration: the perfect duo

Migration played a crucial role in consolidating the far-right in Italy. The fragmented and superficial legislative approach adopted by the Italian governments during the 1990s and 2000s and the asymmetric nature of the Schengen and Dublin agreements made Italy a focal point of the 2015-2016 migration crisis. These elements shaped the so-called “pressapochismo”, namely a securitarian polarization of migration caused by short-term and emergency responses, which failed to address the issue with the necessary attention, making the problem chronic (Ceccorulli, 2021b). Neither the Minniti-Orlando decree launched in 2017 by Paolo Gentiloni’s centre-left wing government, nor the Security decrees launched in 2018 by populist “yellow-green” Giuseppe Conte’s cabinet handled the issue effectively.

In the post-Covid period, migration flows have grown again. In 2023, they peaked with a total number of around 380 thousand people, of which 49.5% passed from the Central Mediterranean route (Frontex, 2024, January 5). The 2022 electoral victory of FdI and its coalition was wedged by anti-immigrant rhetoric in a context deteriorated by the economic negative contingency caused by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. 

  1. Meloni’s gamble on illegal migration and possible scenarios 

From the beginning, Meloni has always committed to reducing the tensions by acting more collaboratively with the EU institutions but without hiding the areas of disagreement. Migration was the pivot for her relations-building strategy with the EU Commission (Fasola & Lucarelli, 2024). Meloni acted as an agenda-setter to shape European migration policies in accordance with Italian interests. She backed the 2023 EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which aimed to reduce the number of irregular migrants. Further, Italy’s most significant result was the establishment of the “modello Albania“. Launched in October 2024, the Italian-Albanian MoU established two enclaves in Albanian territory (Gjadёr and Shengjin) as migrant hubs without transferring jurisdictional responsibility to Tirana (Varvelli & Ziccardi, 2025, January 9).

Despite being praised by the Italian government and the EU Commission, the externalising logic of  Meloni’s policies, which has already been seen in past agreements with Libya and Turkey, is ineffective and dangerous for European security for mainly three reasons. First, the externalisation of migrants creates an implicit power exchange. Non-EU countries use migrants as a “bargaining chip” to achieve individual gains at the expense of the Member States (Martini & Megerisi, 2023). Second, the Italian law courts in Rome and Bologna contest the conformity of the Italian-Albanian MoU to European and international law. Indeed, the crucial weakness is the definition of a safe third country because only asylum seekers from this category benefit from the accelerated procedure for the examination of applications for international protection (De Petris, 2024). Third, this approach challenges the paradigm of the EU as a global and liberal actor two-fold: preventing a common and comprehensive solution and tarnishing its normative self-representation as a promoter of human rights (Ceccorulli, 2021a).

The intensity of migration fluxes conditions the definition of future scenarios. Overall, migration to the EU will grow between 21 and 44% by 2030 (Acostamadiedo et al., 2020). In this status quo, the most possible scenario is that Rome and Brussels will continue to cooperate business as usual, namely the former will continue to influence the EU migration policy whereas the latter has a wait-and-see attitude towards the Italian initiatives. Indeed, the 2024-2029 Political Guideline prioritized the development of strategic relations with non-EU countries to tackle illegal migration.

In the worst-case scenario, caused by a new serious migration wave, the securitization process will cause the proliferation of illiberal practices among the EU member states. Italy could lead this trend due to its good relations with other far-right leaders (De Benedetti, 2024, April 18). This would result in the fragmentation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum and Schengen Area.

Instead, the best-case scenario is the possibility for the EU Commission to use migration as a chapter for a long-term strategic divide et impera against the European far-right parties. By normalizing Meloni’s stances on migration, more extreme leaders would be isolated as she would soften her policies. The only possible risk could be the inability to frame an effective policy on migration (Balfour, 2024, June 3).

  1. Introduction to the policies

This section introduces three options to strengthen EU internal cohesion on migration and manage the fluxes without falling into illiberal positions. They would also find a convergence between Rome and Brussels. Indeed, isolating Meloni is neither possible nor desirable for the EU’s interests because of Italy’s political weight. 

4.1.  Enacting the protection of people in the Asylum Procedures Regulation scheme

The first proposal is to integrate the protection of asylum-seekers as a fundamental principle in all EU-Third State agreements under the new Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR) 2024/1348. The new regulation, set to replace the Directive 2013/22 by June 2026, will harmonize asylum procedures among Member States, ensure efficient processing at external borders and establish clear rights and obligations for asylum-seekers. The EU and Member States should also be obliged to include a clause regarding the regulation of secure migration pathways.

The advantages are mainly two. Firstly, enforcing the APR with this clause aligns with Italy’s externalization policy while overcoming legal shortcomings of the current Italian-Albanian MoU such as the inability to ensure effective and timely access to asylum procedures (Carrera, Campesi & Colombi, 2023). Secondly, the harmonization of asylum procedures would provide clear criteria for designating “safe third countries” since arts. 59-63 of the Regulation frame. So, the APR jurisdiction would influence and coordinate national and European initiatives.

Challenges come from the discrepancies between national and European definitions of “safe third countries” could undermine the functioning of asylum procedures. Indeed, in the Italian case, the Interministerial Decree N. 105/2024 and the Law Decree 158/2024 are inconsistent with EU law as the EU Court of Justice’s current rule is based on individual conditions rather than general country status. This could cause tensions between Rome and Brussels. 

4.2. EU Agency on repatriations

Since Italy has continuously stressed the importance of repatriations to curb illegal migration, the second proposal is to establish an EU Agency on repatriation, which would work with Frontex and define common procedures. The option is based on existing elements. EU Mediterranean countries share a common problem related to bureaucratic slowness. Since October 2022, Italy has issued almost fifty-four thousand orders to leave for non-EU citizens but only 7355 have been delivered (Eurostat, 2024). Furthermore, three different EU legislations shaped the basis to define shared rules, standards and procedures: Directive 2008/115, Recommendation 2017/2238, and the 2023 Policy Document. The last one explicitly supported the creation of an “Return Coordinator Agency” (European Commission, 2023 January 23). 

Advantages include increasing the EU-level coordination and reducing national bureaucratic inefficiencies that delay repatriation. This outcome would benefit Italy and other border states by expediting returns through centralized management. Indeed, the legal and policy consistency coming from this Agency would strengthen Member State cooperation.

Challenges include the risk of overlapping the tasks with Frontex. This situation makes the process administratively challenging, if it is unchecked. Then, the institution of this Agency would require a long negotiation within the European Council especially with countries that prefer intergovernmental approaches.

4.3. Irini+

The third proposed policy is to expand the current EU naval mission Irini into Irini+ by incorporating coercive elements such as the possibility for the European ships to board and seize the traffickers’ boats. Indeed, the ongoing Irini mission, launched in 2020 to replace Operation Sophia, aims to block arms deliveries from and to Libya according to UN Resolution 2016/2292. Irini, unlike Sophia, does not set specific measures for tackling smugglers’ networks but only monitors them. On the contrary, Sophia could deploy the EU Common Foreign Security Policy for maritime security threats (Riddervold, 2018).

There are mainly two advantages. First, this mission would reinforce the EU’s role as an international security actor by addressing gaps in Libyan coast guard training and avoiding the weaponization of migration for political and economic gains. In addition, the naval mission would inhibit the pull factor for illegal migration caused by excluding search-and-rescue (SAR) obligations. When Sophia was active (2016-2020), Italian far-right parties contested the mission because SAR obligations aligned with the International Law of the Sea’s principle of the “safe port”, which obliged Italy to host migrants in its territory (Loguercio, 2022, September 1). The lack of SAR obligations makes Irini+ more appealing than Sophia. 

Challenges are internationally legal and diplomatic. Launching a parallel humanitarian mission could reignite EU disputes over migrant relocation, especially with Italy. Then, Irini+ could also raise diplomatic issues because the EU should receive a new mandate from the United Nations, which is far from guaranteed. This point is crucial if Irini+ would operate in Libyan waters. A more coercive and bolder EU action could generate tensions with other actors, primarily Turkey and Russia. 

  1. Conclusion 

The report has analysed migration as a critical challenge for the European internal cohesion, which contributed to the rise of the far-right. Italy serves as a key case study in assessing how the EU can handle relations with a sovereigntist government while maintaining a unified approach.

The first and second are the most feasible proposals because they represent the most possible future efforts of the approach to migration adopted by the current Commission. Indeed, the latest Political Guidelines stress how the EU should approach migration tightly without falling into militaristic solutions. By proposing these three options, my policy brief wants to stimulate the debate on finding possible solutions to strengthen internal cohesion on migration without leaving it to nationalist parties.

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