Introduction

Over the past two decades, Türkiye’s foreign policy has shifted from a traditionally Western-aligned stance to a ‘360-degree’ approach designed to engage different global powers (Tekin and Sevencan, 2024). This approach aims at enhancing Türkiye’s geopolitical security and economic development, as Western traditional dominance is waning in some areas. By diversifying its network of allies, Türkiye is keeping its options open instead of concentrating its network to a single block (Ülgen, Besch, Toygür, 2024), to establish itself as a growing regional power with a balanced and independent foreign policy (Süsler, 2019).

This article will analyse the difficulties of EU-Türkiye relations in light of the recent foreign policy developments that have put Türkiye in an increasingly influential position in Ukraine peace and security guarantee talks, and in the political settlement of the new regime in Syria. Both of these issues are of concern to the EU, which seeks to mitigate political risks in these countries. Consequently, the EU might need to strengthen its military relationship with Türkiye, especially when the EU’s security relationship with the US has deteriorated since the Trump administration (Cook and Casert, 2025). However, the chances of the EU and Türkiye increasing their engagement are slimmer, as Türkiye still disregards the EU’s human rights concerns against refugees and the respect of democratic norms. Thus, this article will assess how the EU can shape its military engagement with Türkiye in a way that upholds its own strategic priorities while managing the complexities of their bilateral relationship.

Türkiye’s position in Syria 

Despite the ongoing tensions between different political and militant groups in Syria, Türkiye has actively pursued energy agreements (Hobhouse, 2025), and collaborated with the HTS-led interim government on future governance including the organization of the national army. The victory of the HTS-led opposition against Assad has allowed Türkiye to expand its influence in the Middle East at the expense of Russia, who was supporting the Assadian regime. This shift has major implications for the EU. With Türkiye as a more aligned partner compared to Russia, the EU could mitigate Islamic extremist threats and the inflow of Syrian refugees. Although the new Syrian interim government is not guaranteed to stabilise Syria yet (Macdonald, 2025), some refugees could start returning back, as seen already from hundreds returning after Assad’s fall (Aydıntaşbaş, 2025). Although Türkiye cannot unilaterally guarantee these outcomes, its cooperation with European interests could be crucial in managing the Syrian situation. Afterall, Türkiye has worked alongside European allies in the decades prior and has mainly worked to protect and expand its regional influence, despite also engaging with direct adversaries of the EU for military trade and security (Güneylioğlu, 2025).

One of the major difficulties of leveraging the EU’s ties with Türkiye lies in ideological divergence. The EU strongly opposes Turkish interventions in the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflicts, the presence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in northern Cyprus, its actions against Kurdish militant and rights organisations, and the treatment of Syrian refugees under Turkish authorities. In 2019, Turkish incursions into Northern Syria led to EU arms export suspensions damaging their security partnership (Weise and Barigazzi, 2019). Additionally, Türkiye’s stance against the Kurdish political autonomy of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and YPG (People’s Defense Units) in the Northeast of the country could further concern the EU’s stance on human rights and democracy for these movements (Nasser, 2024). The EU advocates their equal representation and non-discrimination in a future Syrian government (Council of the EU, 2025), a stance Türkiye is likely to oppose due to its history of opposition with Kurdish groups (Gol, 2025)despite recent progress with the PKK (Genç, 2025). Türkiye continues to view Kurdish resistance movements as a threat to its national security (Center for Preventative Action, 2025).

Türkiye’s stance on Syria has evolved from collaborative to contentious: initially paralleling Europe’s regime-change rhetoric and anti-ISIS fight, and then pursuing unilateral security actions (primarily directed at Kurdish forces) which strained relations with European partners. Currently, due to its military and political presence in the region, Türkiye can be an essential guarantor for European security prospects in Syria. However, Türkiye’s mixed signaling, militarily and economically cooperating also with EU’s key enemies Russia and China, and its democratic backsliding, is likely to strain the EU-Turkish relationship even further.

Türkiye’s position in Ukraine 

In the case of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye’s foreign policy response has not been clearly aligned either strictly in favour of Ukraine or Russia. The reason for this ambiguity is likely the result of a balancing act, aiming to reap the benefits of aligning itself with both sides. On the one hand, Türkiye has stood against NATO and EU policy responses in reducing economic and political ties with Russia. Unlike EU members, Türkiye pointedly refused to join Western sanctions against Russia (Turkish Minute, 2025), and has maintained open economic ties. Afterall, Tükiye possesses a trade deficit with Russia, citing its gas dependence (Siccardi, 2024), among other essential commodities and materials, needed for Türkiye’s industrial development (OEC, 2024). This dependency sometimes frustrated European partners, who worried that Türkiye’s open door may undermine sanction effectiveness. European frustration extends further however with Türkiye also undermining European and NATO security interests. Türkiye delayed NATO expansion by initially vetoing Sweden’s membership, linking approval to Sweden’s stance on Kurdish militants – a move that many Europeans perceived as obstructionist at a critical time for Alliance unity (Silverman, 2024). Ankara eventually relented on Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession, but not before extracting concessions and projecting its independent course. Worse enough, Türkiye also engaged in open trade of Russian military weapons and technology for years, with its arsenal of S-400 Russian missiles (Kenez, 2024). Maintaining this relationship with Russia can seem contradictory to European partners as Türkiye continues to make statements in favour of European security regardless (Blackburn, 2025). 

Yet, it is important to understand that Türkiye most likely sees Russia as part of its broader strategy to increase regional military and political influence, not necessarily to be a Russian ally in a traditional sense. It might engage militarily and economically with Russia, but likely in a transactional manner to support Türkiye’s efforts. For this reason, Türkiye did not shy away from gaining a hand in Syria after Assad’s fall at the expense of Russian military bases (Oxford Analytica, 2025). It has also challenged Russia previously in many other fronts, by becoming a competing partner in Central Asia, and by undermining Russian military activity in North Africa (Riboua, 2025). Turkish foreign policy is inherently pragmatic and often contradictory, as it prioritizes Türkiye’s national interests above alignment with either Russia or Europe, engaging with any actor that serves its objectives. (Süsler, 2019).

For the same reason, Türkiye’s stance in regards to Ukraine has not only been aligned partly with Russia, but also with Ukraine. The probable benefit of Türkiye to engage with Ukraine likely has to do with gaining some upper-hand against Russian interests, and increasing its geopolitical presence in Eastern Europe. As a result, Türkiye has had a leading role in peace and guarantee negotiations with Ukraine since the start of the war (Bourcier, 2025). Most recently, Erdoğan has promoted the idea of a Turkish military presence in Eastern Europe alongside European partners, as part of any peace settlement in Ukraine (Bechev, 2025). This approach is part of a larger objective to turn Anatolia into the hub for diplomatic relations: not only in Eastern Europe, but also in other regions, ranging from the Middle East to Eastern Africa. With Ukraine however, it is poised to take a more committed role to usher in a framework which would help guarantee and enforce the provisions of a ceasefire or peace negotiations (Coşkun, 2025).

Türkiye has surprisingly gone beyond just facilitating peace negotiations, seemingly siding with Ukraine in some cases. As a NATO member, Türkiye officially condemned Moscow’s aggression and affirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Turkish diplomacy actively supported Ukraine in tangible ways that dovetailed with European interests: for example, Ankara supplied Kyiv with Bayraktar TB2 combat drones that proved effective in the war’s early stages (Helou, 2023). Türkiye also invoked the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits to belligerent warships, a move that limited Russia’s ability to reinforce its Black Sea fleet – a decision welcomed by Western allies. 

The reason behind Türkiye maintaining this relationship while also siding with Russia in some cases remains unclear. While it would be wrong to classify Türkiye as purely a Russian ally due to its continued presence in Ukraine, Türkiye is likely to only support Ukraine as it sees it as a potential future strategic leverage for Anatolian geopolitical ambitions. Hence, Türkiye’s troubling engagement with both Ukraine and Russia can make it arduous to even consider the nation as an integral part of the EU’s defence framework (Gumrukcu, 2025). 

Policy Recommendations

To accommodate Turkey’s strategic importance beyond NATO, European security frameworks could involve Türkiye’s inclusion in discussions about the EU’s Strategic Compass and aligning on threat assessments. Practical cooperation on energy security can be enhanced by mutual partnership in securing critical infrastructure and supply routes, such as coordinating naval patrols to protect Eastern Mediterranean gas fields and pipelines. However, in the eyes of the EU, such cooperation is only likely possible if Türkiye reduces its intake of Russia and Iranian energy sources.

Intelligence sharing on terrorism and organized crime should also be bolstered – perhaps reviving and enhancing the EU-Türkiye counter-terrorism dialogue with clear provisions that address both European and Turkish concerns. In 2017, the EU and Türkiye held consultations addressing terrorism as a common threat to both entities (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), likely as a response to growing terrorism concerns in the Near East during the Syrian Civil War. Reigniting such frameworks of security cooperation can be possible if Türkiye feels it has a seat at the table in shaping Europe’s security decisions. While the EU aligning itself in such a manner would contradict its stance on human rights and democracy, it may be compelled to do so to prevent Türkiye from increasing security cooperation with Russia or other European adversaries. Unfortunately, with an increasing trend for the disregard for the rules-based order, and increased geopolitical risks (Eurasia Group, 2025), the EU might be compelled to increase its regional security partners despite Türkiye’s many shortcomings. Türkiye’s military and geographic position can serve to aid European security ambitions in pushing Russia back from Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. 

However, the EU could take an alternative route to isolate Türkiye, and take a more aggressive approach. If Türkiye continues to engage in ways which threaten the EU’s interests, the EU could take a more active stance to punish Türkiye’s actions. When Türkiye disregards democratic values or increases engagement with EU’s enemies, as it did recently against the arrest of Turkish oppositional figures or buying gas and weapons from Russia, it can apply economic pressure against Türkiye (as the EU holds a trade surplus (European Commission, 2024)) by cutting some trade and diverting the lost trade to more reliable partners. Basically, utilising EU’s key leverages against Türkiye to influence its behaviour, using economic power and trade as a weapon (Jaeger et al., 2020). Such aggressive strategies could have the potential to change Türkiye’s behaviour and actually hold Türkiye to account for its actions, albeit with the risk of Türkiye responding to such a policy by increasing its dependency with Russia and China.

Conclusion

Türkiye’s growing strategic significance for European security is a double-edged sword demanding careful management of its evolving relationship with the EU. Ankara’s “360-degree foreign policy” creates a dynamic where Türkiye can both instruct and enhance European security objectives, given its substantial military capabilities and crucial geostrategic position. Security across the Black Sea and Mediterranean is more effective with Türkiye engaged rather than estranged. Failure to integrate Türkiye risks alienating a vital ally, leaving Europe’s flank more vulnerable. Conversely, successfully embedding Türkiye in European security could create a more resilient regional order. However, including Türkiye in European security may be hindered by their increasing ideological differences. The EU and Türkiye do not stand on the same principles and values on not only security issues such as Cyprus, but also ideologically on the value of democracy, and the respect of human rights, making it difficult for the EU to vest trust in such a partner.

Thus, rebuilding immediate trust and diplomatic engagement engaging more diplomatically are likely not realistic in the short term. Türkiye’s continues to take firm stances on human rights and military stances in the Caucus and Cyprus, contradicting EU’s values and principles. There is also the possibility that the EU can lose Türkiye to Russia or China in the coming years. Afterall, Türkiye only cares for what is beneficial for its interests, and when BRICS or another alliance offers the potential to lead the world order, Türkiye can become a thorn in EU’s defence architecture. Türkiye could halt collective NATO action with its veto power, and be detrimental for the EU’s own security if it continues its military campaigns for Azerbaijan against Armenia, and against Kurdish groups.

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