Is Nuclear Disarmament Still a Dream? The Third Meeting of State Parties in Perspective

For decades, nuclear disarmament has been a central yet elusive goal for part of the international community. While global treaties and initiatives have sought to limit and ultimately halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the world’s most powerful states—and the holders of these deadly arsenals—continue to modernise and expand their nuclear capabilities. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the first legally binding international agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons and acknowledge the harm suffered as a result of them, adopted in 2017, marked a significant departure from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) of 1970. However, its effectiveness remains in question, as nuclear-armed states refuse to ratify it or even consider entering into the conversation of denuclearisation.

By seeking to advance towards the end of nuclear weapons, the states that have signed the TPNW have already met twice, and through reports, debates and resolutions, have advanced to get the treaty into shape. The Third Meeting of State Parties (3MSP) to the TPNW, held from March 3-7, 2025, coincides with the 80th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Taking place amid rising geopolitical tensions, this meeting represents a crucial moment for assessing the treaty’s progress and outlining the next steps toward nuclear disarmament. With nuclear threats resurfacing in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Asia-Pacific, we need to analyse how the 3MSP has helped in advancing the vision of a nuclear-free world and which topics were treated relating to gender, security, victims assistance and other aspects covered by the TPNW. 

Background: The 1MSP and 2MSP

The 1MSP and 2MSP The TPNW initiated a move from non-proliferation under the NPT to a total ban on nuclear weapons, recognising their humanitarian and environmental consequences.

To ensure follow-up by ratifying states and encourage others to join, Article 8 of the TPNW envisages regular meetings to review progress and implementation. The First Meeting of States Parties (1MSP) was held in Vienna in June 2022 and led to the Vienna Declaration and the 50-point Vienna Action Plan. The declaration reaffirmed the TPNW’s role in de-legitimizing nuclear weapons and committed to addressing the harm caused by their use and testing (ICAN, 2022). The Action Plan created a road map for norm universalisation, victim assistance, international cooperation, and the establishment of a Scientific Advisory Group.

The Second Meeting of States Parties (2MSP) in New York in late 2023 saw productive debates among states, international agencies, NGOs, and civil society (ICAN, 2023). Key issues included countering the nuclear deterrence narrative and addressing rising global military expenditure, which increased by 6.8% between 2022 and 2023 (SIPRI, 2023). New research and testimonies from affected communities added depth to the discussions.

Understanding the 3MSP: Goals and Expectations

The 3MSP could be seen as a consolidation of the institutional framework that has been built over the past two Meetings of State Parties. According to ICAN (2025), three objectives were expected from the 3MSP. 

1. Host a diplomatic debate covering a high-level segment, risks to humanity, a general debate, and treaty implementation.
2. Convene side events on nuclear justice, science, youth engagement, and more.
3. Adopt a political declaration and practical decisions based on key areas: disarmament verification (Art. 4), victim assistance and environmental remediation (Arts. 6–7), universalisation (Art. 12), gender, and security perspectives.

Reports prepared before the 3MSP served as guidelines for decision-making, reflecting past progress and future challenges (ICAN, 2025)

Key insights from the reports

Reports are the backbone of informed decision-making in international diplomacy, and their significance in the Third Meeting of States Parties (3MSP) cannot be overstated. They serve as both a mirror and a map: reflecting the progress (or lack thereof) in nuclear disarmament while charting the course forward. These reports are made before the 3MSP and have been used as guidelines in order to take the appropriate decisions towards denuclearisation. 

The gender perspective

Victims of nuclear weapons are often overlooked. The NPT talked about weapons but completely forgot about those who died in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ones affected in the long term and those who received indirect effects by being close to nuclear tests.

The gender perspective has been exposed as one of the hidden realities of victims of nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, but also regarding gender parity within delegations and Treaty-related institutional structures (Delegation of Mexico, 2025). On the first issue, it has been mentioned that the consequences of nuclear weapons are not uniform across populations, as women and girls are disproportionately affected by radiation exposure, being twice as likely to develop cancer as men (Delegation of Mexico, 2025). Its impact also persists for three generations, conditioning the reproductive health of women. It has been recommended to develop guidelines addressing these issues (Mexico, 2025). On the second issue, it has been agreed to promote gender parity within all those institutions and delegations, as bombs have a greater effect on women, they need to be present.

• Verification is possible

​​Malaysia and New Zealand stressed that disarmament verification, though challenging, is feasible. They argued that with transparency and collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), verification could demonstrate irreversible disarmament without compromising national security secrets (Malaysia & New Zealand, 2025).

• Steps towards universalisation

One of the best news of the reports has been the African Conference on the universalisation and implementation of the Treaty for African Union. It that was held on 6 September 2024, helping increase the commitment of African states to nonproliferation, ensuring the complementarity and synergy of the TPNW with the Treaty of Pelindaba (Nuclear-Free-Zone in Africa). The conference  led to more advances on universalisation. Moreover, it has been stated that last year Indonesia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Solomon Islands ratified the TPNW, enhancing the States parties to 73 (South Africa, 2025).

• International Trust Fund

One of the main focuses of the 3MSP, however, was the introduction of the proposal of an international trust fund, a proposal made by Kazakhstan and Kiribati, two countries that have been deeply affected by nuclear tests. In particular, from 1957 to 1962, 33 nuclear tests were carried out in Kiribati and 456 in the case of Kazakhstan between 1949-89 (Chiu, 2023). These tests have meant serious health issues (cancer, congenital disabilities, birth defects) for the population, but also effects on the environment and infrastructure (Delegation of Kiribati and Kazakhstan, 2025). Some insist on providing compensation to these communities through an international trust fund that provides humanitarian assistance, support for environmental remediation, and technical, material and financial assistance to states parties. Regarding this, the Kazakhstan delegation explained how they partnered with IAEA for the rehabilitation of areas exposed to nuclear contamination, and with Hiroshima University to assess socio-psychological consequences for the population, giving practical examples of the outcomes that could be provided thanks to this fund (Delegation of Kiribati and Kazakhstan, 2025).

• Complementarity and a step up from TNP to TPNW

Some states argue the NPT is sufficient; however, Ireland and Thailand underlined that the TPNW complements and advances the NPT by emphasising victim assistance and the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons (Delegation of Ireland and Thailand, 2025). Aligning the TPNW more clearly within the framework of international law was proposed as a next step.

• The false security narrative

The general narrative surrounding nuclear arms is that they are essential for national security, that deterrence serves as a ‘guarantor’ of international security, and that they have contributed to stability, predictability, and rationality (Delegation of Austria, 2025). Nevertheless, this is far from accurate, as stated in the report written by the Delegation of Austria. They argue that nuclear deterrence assumes state behaviour to be controllable. The paradigm of ‘mutually assured destruction’ itself is based on the premise that if nuclear attacks were to occur, they would lead to the destruction of human life as we know it today (Delegation of Austria, 2025). It is assumed that under the threat of nuclear retaliation, actors will ultimately act rationally and avoid escalation, creating a security approach built on extreme risks and the fear of mutual annihilation (Delegation of Austria, 2025).

The delegation of Austria stated that rejecting nuclear weapons is not an idealistic aspiration, it is a rational and realist response, whereas the other vision of security is held by assumptions and a positive bias used only to reassure those countries that hold them, leaving the others exposed (Delegation of Austria, 2025).

Decisions and Political Declaration

As stated in the political declaration that has been published at the end of the 3MSP, State Parties recall the impacts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, highlighting the human dimension of nuclear weapons (TPNW, 2025). They warn of the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation in an era of tensions, modernisation. Moreover, the State Parties call for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and discussions between the US and Russia as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is set to expire in less than a year (TPNW, 2025).

The 3MSP has ended with four decisions (TPNW, 2025). First, to extend the intersessional period between the 3MSP and the First Review Conference. Second, the holding of the First Review Conference, between November and December 2026, to review the operation of the TPNW and the progress in achieving its purposes. Third, to work during this intersessional period on the possible guidelines, technical provisions and/or terms of reference of an international trust fund, ensuring compatibility with the provisions of TPNW and the Vienna Action Plan (TPNW, 2025). Finally, to establish an intersessional consultative process to address the mandate of the Scientific Advisory group and its recommendations (TPNW, 2025).

Conclusions: What’s next?

The TPNW gradually is forming a coherent disarmament policy with humanitarian orientation and victim assistance. The suggested trust fund, research, and gender framework testify to a deep and comprehensive policy. However, the international climate still is far from facilitating disarmament. The great powers continue to augment military strength, and the European Union, historically a sponsor of diplomacy, is accumulating military spending.

However, the developments of the 3MSP suggest that committed states, NGOs, and members of civil society are not giving up. As we commemorate 80 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their legacy is now more essential than ever to maintain. The TPNW offers a hopeful path ahead, and we remember that nuclear disarmament is at once an ethical imperative and a realistic one. The paradigm of deterrence rests on insecure presuppositions and has apocalyptic consequences. The world without nuclear weapons may still seem to be afar, but the actions of instances in such forums as the 3MSP advance it into reach.

Bibliograhpy

Delegation of Mexico. (2025). Report of the gender focal point. Reaching Critical Will. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/3msp/documents

Delegation of Malaysia, Delegation of New Zealand. (2025). Report of the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on the implementation of article 4. Reaching Critical Will. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/3msp/documents 

Delegation of South Africa & Uruguay. (2025). Report of the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on universalization. Reaching Critical Will. https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/3msp/documents

Delegation of Kazakhstan & Kiribati. (2025). Report of the Co-Chairs of the informal working group on victim assistance, environmental remediation, and international cooperation and assistance. Reaching Critical Will https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/nuclear-weapon-ban/3msp/documents

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International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. (2022). Vienna declaration and action plan: Overview. https://www.icanw.org/vienna_declaration_action_plan_overview 

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Chiu, K. (2023). Addressing the legacy of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. https://www.wagingpeace.org/addressing-the-legacy-of-nuclear-weapons/