The geopolitical role of the Sahel: the influence of the EU and other Great Powers in the Malian crisis

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of the Malian crisis between 2010 and 2020, with a focus on the role of France and the European Union in addressing the security challenges in the Sahel. The conflict in Mali began in 2010 and quickly escalated due to the involvement of jihadist groups and the fragility of state institutions. France intervened militarily through Operation Serval and later Operation Barkhane, aiming to halt extremist advances and restore territorial integrity. In parallel, the European Union launched several civilian and military missions within the framework of its integrated Sahel Strategy. Despite these efforts, security conditions deteriorated, anti-Western sentiment increased, and geopolitical alignments shifted, most notably with the growing influence of Russia in Mali. The article analyses how these interventions shaped regional security governance and highlights the limitations of external strategies in producing sustainable peace.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the 2010s, the Sahel region has emerged as a focal point of international security concerns, with Mali at the epicentre of a deepening crisis marked by insurgency, political instability, and foreign military interventions. What began as a nationalist uprising led by Tuareg separatists in northern Mali, quickly escalated into a complex and multi-layered conflict involving jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, regional insurgents, and transnational criminal networks. Economic and strategic resources that European partners have primarily committed to improve the region’s security do not appear to be mitigating the severity of the crisis; instead, the roots of instability seem to be becoming deeper and broader over time (Magri, 2022).

Europe is particularly concerned about the Sahel and North Africa primarily due to the hazards posed by transnational organized crime and terrorism, as well as the unlawful and irregular movement of migrants and refugees. Indeed, the security issue in the African continent is extremely relevant for European geopolitics, and resolving it is mandatory to improve cooperation between Europe and Africa. A further pressing concern for Europe is the growing influence of China and Russia in Africa, affecting both economic  interests and security. Europe feels compelled to counter the Chinese and Russian presence in Africa, and it recognises that such an effort would necessitate a commitment to avoiding instability and a power vacuum (Pinto, 2024).

France’s loss of control over the region, its fallout with Mali, the rise of the Wagner group until 2022, and a renewed understanding between Russia and nations historically within the European sphere of influence, all highlight the need to shift alliances in the region. This theme is particularly noticeable at a time when Africa is perceived as a region that must be balanced between anti-Western and Western camps, pitted against one another, with echoes of the Cold War (Casola, 2022).

This article examines the evolution of the Malian conflict between 2010 and 2020, with a focus on France’s military strategy, the EU’s role in stabilisation, and the long-term implications of interventions by other great powers, such as Russia, for Mali’s sovereignty and regional security governance.

The crisis in Mali and the French intervention (2010-2020)

The violence in the Sahel region, which began to spread in the 2010s, was mainly concentrated in Mali. In January 2012, Tuareg rebels allied with terrorist groups to take over northern Mali. Frustrated by the state’s poor response to the situation, in March of the same year, parts of the Malian military overthrew the government in Bamako (Ndah et al., 2025). The war began as a nationalist uprising led by the Tuareg-based armed movement (MNLA), which was affiliated with jihadi organisations connected to al-Qa’ida. The 2011 fall of the Libyan government and the following exodus of Tuareg rebels to Mali had hastened the onset of a crisis firmly anchored in pre-existing fragility dynamics. These included a dysfunctional neo-patrimonial governance system, the marginalization of local communities in rural areas far from the capital, the social entrenchment of Salafi-jihadi actors (primarily from North Africa and driven southward by the military regime in Algiers’ brutal crackdown), and the growth of networks for the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and people (Casola, 2022). 

In January 2012, between 70 and 153 Malian troops were murdered at Aguelhok, in the Kidal region. Following the March 2012 coup, up to 1600 troops deserted the Malian army to join the MNLA, carrying their weapons and equipment with them. Within three weeks after the coup, the MNLA had seized control of all of northern Mali from the Malian army and in April 2012, they declared the establishment of the Independent State of Azawad. As a result, Malian interim President Traoré requested French assistance (Wing, 2016).

Operation Serval started in northern Mali in 2013 in response to French President Hollande’s decision to halt the jihadist advance towards the town of Sévaré and support Malian institutions’ efforts to restore the state’s territorial integrity and expel the jihadist presence (Casola, 2022). In addition to safeguarding Malian people and assisting in the execution of earlier peace agreements and international resolutions, the French forces succeeded in their determined attempts to stop terrorist operations targeting Bamako. The military involvement also enabled the Malian government to reclaim nominal control  over its territory. In 2014, while the terrorist campaigns persisted, another French operation, named Operation Barkhane, spread across other Sahel nations and took over the role of the French-led coalition of forces. Soldiers from various European countries and African military forces participated in both of these missions (Kurt, 2025).

France sought to transfer responsibility for supervising the reconciliation and restoration of Mali’s state and military to the UN and potentially African partner groups. This strategy, however, never materialised. Instead, several regional and global efforts were initiated to combat violent extremism, stabilise Mali and the broader Sahel, and enhance local capacities. Regrettably, these efforts did not improve the security environment, which, on the contrary, deteriorated (Ndah et al. 2025). The objective of Operation Barkhane was to assist Mali in eliminating remaining threats in its northern and western regions while simultaneously preventing the establishment of terrorist and jihadist organisations across the entire Sahel region. In its extensive counterinsurgency campaign, France adopted a regional strategy rather than a national one. Targeting a single nation is futile due to the porous borders of Sahelian states, which allow clandestine groups to operate simultaneously in multiple countries (Falsanisi, 2021). In 2022, France announced the end of Operation Barkhane, withdrawing over 2,000 troops from Mali and planning to depart over 1,500 soldiers from Niger in 2023. Given the escalating anti-French sentiment in the Sahel, the rejection of French military alliances also attracted several criticisms (Ndah et al. 2025).

The role of the European Union in the intervention in Mali

Over the last few decades, European states have participated in the securitisation of the Sahel region, primarily through the EU. The Sahel quickly gained significant prominence in the European Union External Action Service (EEAS), which encouraged greater direct activities in the area. The first considerable action was the publication of the Sahel Strategy in 2011, marking the EU’s first integrated, geographically-focused strategy (Falsanisi, 2021). The Sahel Strategy, whose full name was “Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel”, revolved around four key themes: the integrated pursuit of security and development in the Sahel region; the necessity of a stronger regional collaboration for the pursuit of such goals; the need for all Sahelian states to benefit from capacity-building areas of core government activity; and the EU’s important role in both fostering economic development and helping achieve a more secure environment in the region (European External Action Service, 2011). Mali benefited from the EU’s long-standing endeavour to adopt an integrated strategy, which resulted in significant aid from the EU. 

The EEAS’s contributions significantly influenced the EU’s initial moves in the Sahel, leading to a second phase, known as the Sahel Regional Action Plan, approved by the EU Council in 2015 (Falsanisi, 2021). However, the EU as a whole has suffered from a decline in France’s influence. Brussels struggled to disassociate itself from the colonial background of some of its member nations in an atmosphere of intense anti-colonial sentiment. Non-EU  actors operating in the region, including those from the US and the UK, have also been affected by anti-Western sentiments. Indeed, in 2022, the United Kingdom declared its intention to remove its peacekeeping troops from Mali (Meyer et al., 2025).

The Europeanization of the intervention introduced a new perspective on European military coordination, enhancing  the ability of European states to collaborate against foreign threats. The operation highlighted a more European approach and demonstrated France’s competence in coordinating an international coalition within an UN-defined framework (Agoni, 2025). However, the EU’s protracted efforts in the Sahel region have been largely unsuccessful, with little to no noticeable progress. With its mandate extended until January 31, 2025, the EU’s civilian capacity-building mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) is the only one of the four EU missions stationed in the Sahel until 2023 that continues to operate within a delicate and uncertain political and diplomatic context (Meyer et al., 2025). France’s strategies centred on Africanizing the conflict, aiming to highlight local participation in the operation and decision-making framework through partnerships such as ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel, thereby neutralizing any narrative of neo-colonialism. On the other hand, France also sought to Europeanize the conflict to further counter new accusations of neo-colonialism and to share costs and risks with other EU members. However, this objective had become untenable, as France had recognized its impracticability during Operation Serval. Consequently, France increasingly assumed the primary military role of the mission, with the EU only providing support (Agoni, 2025).

The recent changes in the Malian geopolitical alliances in recent years

Besides the EU and the Western European countries, a relevant element for the analysis is the influence of other Great Powers in Mali and the Sahel region, such as Russia. Indeed, in the last decades, the Russian collaboration with Africa has expanded significantly. With an emphasis on bilateral commerce, the Russian Minister Medvedev established a special envoy, whose budget increased from $9.9 billion in 2013 to nearly $24 billion in 2024 (Abbasadova, 2024). The Kremlin presented the prospect of forging economic pacts, including those involving natural resources or grain exports, and expanding military cooperation through the supply of weapons and training, with several African countries, including Mali. Following the initial round of sanctions in 2014, Moscow’s aspirations and actions broadened, expanding to the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Angola, and Sudan. On the one hand, this expansion was due to renewed security cooperation through bilateral defence agreements, strategic partnerships, and the deployment of private military companies; on the other hand, it was due to media influence. 

In recent years, Russia has concluded agreements with 20 nations, the most significant of which were with Mali in June 2019, and the Republic of the Congo in May 2019. The majority of these agreements addressed security and defence, including the establishment of permanent military bases, the training of regular and irregular governmental forces, joint exercises, the delivery of military equipment or the maintenance of equipment already in use, the training of officers in Moscow, and the fight against maritime piracy and terrorism (Lasconjarias, 2025).

On the military front, reports of private Russian instructors in Mali have emerged in recent years. The privately-held Wagner Group, a Russian mercenary organisation, has operated in several war zones and gained notoriety for its role in the Central African Republic. Although Russian officials have consistently denied direct links, the group was widely believed to maintain close ties with the Russian government during those years. Wagner has provided a customised response to Mali’s request for security assistance, employing the same strategy used in Sudan and the CAR. Wagner specifically has employed  a three-pronged method in its tactics. Firstly, it  has engaged in information warfare and pro-government misinformation tactics, such as counter-protest tactics and deceptive polls. Secondly, it has received compensation for its work through concessions in the mining sector, which includes the extraction of precious metals. Thirdly, Wagner has integrated with the military and established  close contact with the Russian army, often through counter-insurgency operations, personal security assurances for governing authorities, training, and advice. 

Russia’s foreign policy elite has been involved in this process, particularly due to the military’s connection with a new client nation (Ndiaye and Dieye, 2022). These elements demonstrate not only the interest of non-Western Great Powers in the Sahel region, for reasons related to geopolitics, economics and security considerations, but also the shifting alliance interests of the Malian governments, as well as the governments across the entire Sahel region.

Conclusion

The Malian crisis of the 2010s exemplifies the challenges of foreign-led interventions in fragile states, where complex local grievances intersect with transnational threats and competing geopolitical interests. While France’s military engagement through Operation Serval and Operation Barkhane initially succeeded in halting the advance of jihadist groups and reasserting nominal state authority, the long-term effectiveness of these missions was limited. The persistence of violence, the spread of extremism across the Sahel, and the rise of anti-French sentiment indicate that security gains were not matched by sustainable political or social progress.

Despite early ambitions to coordinate European responses through the EU’s integrated Sahel Strategy and its civilian and military missions, the Union largely played a supporting role to France’s leadership. The attempt to Europeanize the intervention fell short in the face of local perceptions of neo-colonialism and institutional limitations. Moreover, the inability to transition security responsibilities to Malian or regional actors left a vacuum increasingly filled by non-Western powers. Russia’s growing presence in Mali, exemplified by its partnerships and the reported activities of private military companies such as Wagner, reflects a new phase of geopolitical competition in the Sahel, shaped by distrust of traditional Western actors.

As the EU reassesses its strategic footprint in the region and France withdraws its troops, the future of international engagement in Mali remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that long-term stability in the Sahel will depend not only on military capacity but also on addressing governance deficits, rebuilding trust in public institutions, and ensuring that external partnerships genuinely reflect the aspirations and agency of local populations. For future engagement, the EU should recognize as soon as possible the changing circumstances in the Sahel and reconsider its strategy.  Europe should adopt a new approach based on “day-after” measures if it wishes to remain engaged in the region and restore confidence in the EU as a trustworthy partner (Meyer et al., 2025).

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