The ’Ndrangheta’s Infiltration and Threat to European Institutions

Over the past few decades, Italian organised crime groups (OCGs) have significantly evolved, transitioning from traditional, territorially-bound organisations into transnational networks trafficking in numerous criminal activities. They now pose a systemic threat to democratic institutions and internal security across Europe. 

Among Italian OCGs, the ’Ndrangheta is one of the wealthiest and most internationally active groups in the world. Renowned for its low profile and strategic modus operandi, it has succeeded in expanding beyond Italian borders, infiltrating political and economic systems through corruption. Nowadays, it plays a destabilising role in several European countries, exploiting legal loopholes and institutional weaknesses. 

This article examines the dynamics that have enabled the ’Ndrangheta’s expansion in Europe, with a particular emphasis on its involvement in Slovakia. Through a case study, official reports, and academic literature, it analyses the socio-political factors that have facilitated its infiltration and explores potential strategies to counter and contain its influence. 

Anatomy of the ‘Ndrangheta: Structure and Strategy 

The ‘Ndrangheta originated in Calabria in the 19th century and began building its economic power in the late 1970s through ransoms obtained from numerous kidnappings (IHEDN, 2023), enabling many clans to enter and consolidate their role in cocaine trafficking during the 1980s. Cocaine trafficking still represents the ‘Ndrangheta’s main source of profit (Sergi, 2020).

For a long time, it was underestimated as just a rural organization in Southern Italy. However, over the last 30 years, it has evolved into one of the hegemonic OCGs in Europe, expanding both its territorial presence and field of activity. According to Interpol (2025), the ‘Ndrangheta operates in more than 84 countries, with annual revenues estimated at approximately 40 to 60 billion euros  (IHEDN, 2023). 

Its strength lies in its decentralized structure, composed of different clans called ’ndrine, centred around family connections. These clans operate with a high level of autonomy, which can protect other  ‘ndrine if one of them is compromised by law enforcement, but can also facilitate the expansion of their network by developing new ties (Lazarus et al., 2023). These family cells and their ability to operate across borders for transnational criminality are among the main challenges for law enforcement (Sergi, 2020).

Additionally, clans can manipulate elections far from the territories they control, installing their affiliates or loyal men in administrative positions (Europol, 2013). This can lead to the creation – or consolidation – of distrust in public institutions, widening the gap between citizens and the state. 

Indeed, the ‘Ndrangheta controls territories through an organic relationship with political structures. It acts as a para-state, coexisting alongside the legitimate state and infiltrating local institutions to misappropriate public funds. Just like a parasite, it cannot survive without the existence of the state, as it thrives on the functioning parts of the community (Europol, 2013).

Beyond Italian borders: the need to conquer new territories  

A defining characteristic of the ‘Ndrangheta is its drive to “colonise” new territories (Dalla Chiesa, 2021), replicating the same organisational structures and pursuing a long-term strategy of progressive infiltration. 

Its expansion initially started from the immigration of Calabrian people abroad, creating the conditions for the clans’ capacity to penetrate and develop their local networks and relationships. In fact, the ‘Ndrangheta’s conquest strategy starts from below, through the recruitment of representatives in the new territory. Recruits do not necessarily have to be affiliated with the clan but just need to come from the same home region, to feel a superior loyalty toward their fellow countrymen  (Dalla Chiesa, 2021).

In new areas of control, clans initiate illegal (e.g., drug trafficking) or legal activities (e.g., running a restaurant or a pizzeria) to turn them into a tool of territorial control. The  ‘Ndrangheta “has many cells, stretching internationally, and each of these cells has a task: infiltrating,  investing, growing in power,” explained Giuseppe Lombardo, Reggio Calabria’s top anti-mafia prosecutor (Holcová et al., 2019). 

After launching these activities, clans begin to extort work from local businesses, using intimidation when deemed necessary. They gradually erode market rules, achieving total control over the territory until society suddenly realizes that it has already changed its own identity. At this point, corruption emerges to obtain licenses, hamper investigations, and misappropriate funds. For example, in 2023, Eurojust reported that a ‘Ndrangheta network was able “to influence public procurement procedures in Italy, which resulted in the misappropriation of at least 3 million euros in European Union funds” (Eurojust 2023b). Then, the perpetrators allegedly reinvested the illicit profits in various businesses and conducted transnational financial fraud schemes through dark-web trading platforms managed by German hackers.

Aside from its presence in Latin America for cocaine trafficking routes, the ‘Ndrangheta holds a central role in operating massive money laundering networks across Central and Eastern Europe by also coordinating various OCGs. In fact, it can now be considered the strongest Italian OCG in Germany (Grieshaber & Winfield, 2023). A large and continuous migration flow from Calabria has created the conditions to establish a firm presence since the 1970s, aggravated by the fall of the Berlin Wall, which created new investment opportunities for the ’ndrine in the territory previously known as East Germany.

An additional factor that enabled its expansion in Germany, as in many other parts of Europe, was the denial of its presence by politicians and the public. Many countries still lack social awareness regarding the ongoing process of mafia infiltration into various industries and institutions across Europe (Dalla Chiesa,  2021).

Case Study: The ‘Ndrangheta’s Infiltration and Political Ties in Slovakia

In 2018, journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Marina Kušnírová, were killed by a professional hitman inside their house. The 27-year-old journalist was investigating the infiltration of the ‘Ndrangheta into Slovakia and the connections between the SMER-SD party and Antonino Vadalà, who had already been accused of having ties with the organisation in Italy. Following public accusations of either complicity or negligence in Kuciak’s death, then-Prime Minister Robert Fico and three other ministers resigned a month later. The ’Ndrangheta penetrated Slovakia when it gained independence in 1993, joining other established Balkan OCGs, such as Albanian and Yugoslav clans, which were primarily involved in prostitution, gambling, and drug trafficking. In the 1990s, a strong nexus between crime and political corruption had already been created, becoming increasingly difficult to disrupt over time. A notorious emblem of this connection was the friendly relationship between Babi Sadiki, a heroin trafficking boss, and Slovak Supreme Court Judge Štefan Harabin, who later became Minister of Justice (Holcová et al., 2019). This entrenched system of corruption was exactly the aforementioned hospitable environment that allowed the ’Ndrangheta to establish itself, mainly through the creation of agricultural companies aimed at obtaining European funds for rural development. 

Kuciak was investigating how the Vadalà, Rodà, Catroppa, and Cinnate families established ties with the SMER-SD party and obtained European funds for agriculture and renewable energy, highlighting how agriculture represented their new source of income in Slovakia. “Just between 2015 and 2016,  the companies around these families managed to get more than 8 million euros in direct payments from the Agricultural Payments Agency, and hundreds of thousands of euros more from project subsidies,” Kuciak wrote in his draft before being killed, exposing both the ‘Ndrangheta’s new interests and the corruption within political institutions (Kuciak, 2018).

Robert Fico won the election again in 2023 and, during his current term as Prime Minister, introduced a criminal code reform that reduced penalties for different crimes, including corruption and fraud. It also abolished the special prosecutor’s office, which addressed the crimes of corruption and organised crime. The European Commission, in its 2024 Rule of Law Report, expressed serious concerns about the erosion of judicial independence and anti-corruption mechanisms in Slovakia (European  Commission, 2024). These changes could significantly undermine the country’s ability to counter organised crime groups effectively and weaken the effectiveness of joint European investigations and actions against them.

Challenges and Responses to OGCs’ Expansion 

Two of the most complex issues related to the attempts to eradicate the ‘Ndrangheta in Europe stem from the lack of effective recognition of their sophisticated schemes and the lack of codification of the crime of “mafia-type association” in most European countries other than Italy. Historically, OCGs have always been involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking, but they have changed their areas of interest and modus operandi over time. Although they have not entirely abandoned these fields, they now also profit from financial crimes, taking advantage of the lucrative opportunities offered, for example, by tax loopholes within the European Union.

In November 2024, the “Moby Dick” investigation, led by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, exposed how a vast network of OCGs used schemes involving Value Added Tax (an indirect tax levied on the consumption of goods and services across EU states) to illicitly divert significant sums from national treasuries. This generated ripple effects that compromised the economic stability of member states and led to public finance losses exceeding 520 million euros (European Public Prosecutor’s  Office, 2024). This operation was crucial for understanding how OCGs exploit the European tax system, but it also highlighted all the weaknesses in the European judicial and law enforcement systems.  

Several structural reforms are of paramount importance in responding effectively to the transnational expansion of the ‘Ndrangheta and other OCGs within the EU. Firstly, the involvement of Europol, Interpol, and Eurojust is essential to provide strategic and operational support to investigations and to coordinate large-scale operations against OCGs, as it would be impossible to achieve meaningful results without stronger cooperation and the sharing of information among member states. It is also true that, when corruption between OCGs and public institutions is already entrenched, there is widespread distrust among law enforcement agencies in sharing sensitive data (Holcová et al., 2019). For this very reason, it would be highly beneficial to introduce more effective anti-corruption regulations at the European level. 

Secondly, the only effective legal tools to combat organised crime are largely limited to Italy, which includes a specific offence of mafia-type association in its penal code, distinct from the general offence of criminal association. Consequently, in order to properly address OCGs, it is crucial to reform and harmonise all European countries’ national legal systems. Even though Article 416-bis of the Italian penal code could still be modified to reflect the evolution of mafia associations and to ensure a clearer and more uniform interpretation, it can serve as an inspiration for other penal codes in Europe.

Without a specific offence, OCGs can expand their influence and grow their wealth while facing negligible legal risks. Without a more coordinated response and stronger alignment of national criminal laws, pushing back against the infiltration of OCGs into European institutions will be impossible.

Conclusion 

As shown throughout this article, the ’ndrine have already established a firm presence throughout Europe. Through their criminal activities and cooperation with other OCGs, they represent a real threat to both democracy, due to corruption and infiltration in public institutions, and the economic stability of EU member states. Organised crime is a transnational threat and, as such, it cannot be regarded as a mere national problem. Collaboration between law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities is the only instrument the European Union possesses to effectively combat OCGs.

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