2025: Six Countries to Watch in the Middle East and North Africa

Written by Hafssa Fakher, Hannah Colpitts-Elliott, Andrea Aznar, Alicia Kerekes Ispas, Fatin Boualite, Giulia Pinna

2024 has been a tumultuous and challenging year for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The war in Gaza has expanded across Israeli northern borders towards Lebanon, while Qatar – hitherto the most active diplomatic player in the Israel-Hamas negotiations – withdrew at the end of the year, dramatically impacting on truce talks. If the conflict in the Levant has also partly affected Syria, the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the death of the Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi have posed several questions on the future of the countries and their political trajectories. 2024 has also been characterised by a recasted engagement of the European Union (EU) with the region with the signing of strategic and comprehensive partnership agreements with Egypt and Lebanon. 

With the start of 2025, the MENA region is destined to be once again under the world’s spotlight, topping the EU’s external agenda at the beginning of the second mandate of Ursula von der Leyen. The war in Gaza and the protests scattered throughout the region are expected to continue. The erosion of human rights and growing migratory flows are likely to keep fueling authoritarianism in the region, while the new EU approach is likely to continue with new partners on the horizon. Therefore, 2025 already marks a critical juncture in the MENA’s trajectory, but what are the six countries to watch?

Post-Assad Syria: Navigating Daunting Challenges

Written by Hafssa Fakher Elabiari

After 13 years of war, foreign interference and violence, the regime of Bashar al-Assad collapsed, ending the 61-year Ba’athist rule over Syria. Unexpectedly, Assad chose to cede power instead of fighting a war he could not win without the support of Iran and Russia (Van Dam, 2024). This decision largely explains why the opposition, led by the so-called Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was able to seize key cities with little to no military resistance. While Assad’s departure offered a glimmer of hope to the overwhelming majority of Syrians, especially the forcibly displaced, it also brought about multiple challenges.

First, HTS is expected to strive to gain external audiences’ trust. While it is certain that the group has administrative experience, through its governance of Idlib, it is still perceived with caution for its previous links with Al-Qaeda. The HTS’ de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is actively rebranding himself into a moderate political figure, aiming to persuade Western countries to remove HTS from the terror blacklist and lift sanctions on Syria. Al-Sharaa is now emphasising inclusivity, human rights and social justice, bridging Syria with the international community (BBC News Arabic, 2024). So far, this strategy has paid off with Syria’s neighbours – Türkiye, Qatar and Jordan – and the United States, which appears to be softening its stance towards al-Sharaa. However, The European Union (EU) remains cautious and may need more time to build confidence with HTS, but in the meantime, it will continue being a pivotal humanitarian actor (European Commission, 2024).

Secondly, Syria’s poor economic indicators, including its plummeting currency, and the severe lack of social services, largely resulting from years of war and sanctions, signal that HTS and other domestic actors may not have the budgetary capacity to kick off reconstruction without foreign assistance. Türkiye has already jumped in to fill the gap, particularly in the construction sector that overwhelmingly falls under the umbrella of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). (Çevik, 2024). In 2025, this win-win partnership will likely reinvigorate the Turkish economy while facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. However, for long-term recovery, it will be crucial to revive Syria’s vital sectors, namely oil, agriculture, and textile, which could boost the dwindling currency reserves and Syria’s attractiveness for foreign investment.

Finally, Assad’s departure has exposed a security void, exacerbated by territorial divisions. While the military presence of Russia and Iran seems to be waning, the US and its ally, the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF), maintain a strong presence in the east. Similarly, Türkiye supports the Syrian National Army (SNA) and continues to deploy troops in the north to fight the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG). In the coming months, it is unlikely to witness a withdrawal of Turkish troops, given the post-Assad security vacuum and HTS’ limited military power. On the other hand, friction between Washington and Ankara is expected to escalate since the two have fundamentally different stances on the Kurdish issue. Yet, if carried out in collaboration with the interim government, foreign military presence may help stabilise Syria, especially as the security landscape is more volatile than ever due to the proliferation of chemical arsenals, Captagon trafficking, militias, and corrupt security forces. 

Hence, 2025 will be a decisive year in determining if Syria will break from its authoritarian past. For now, it is premature to conclude that Assad’s departure will automatically guarantee accountability, stable governance and the establishment of democratic institutions.

Axis of Challenge: Iran’s Strategy Amid an Uncertain 2025

Written by Fatin Boualite

If 2024 was a turbulent year for the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2025 promises to bring equal, if not greater challenges. The regime is currently facing a complex web of pressing issues, including the recent unexpected change of presidency, an endless and bloody regional war, ongoing strikes to the Axis of Resistance groups across the Middle East, and the looming return of Donald Trump to the US political arena… Iran is poised to face a challenging year ahead.

Domestically, the inflation rate dropped to 31% compared to previous years, reflecting decent economic growth and improved employment outcomes, despite the constant pressure of international sanctions (The World Bank, 2024). However, significant challenges persist, including the need to navigate domestic political rivalries and address economic governance issues, all while balancing the will of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameini. These factors will play a crucial role in shaping the country’s economic recovery—a reality that the newly elected President Masoud Pezeshkian has already begun to confront (Khajehpour, 2024). While there is some hope for marginal improvements in living conditions, as shown by the decreased inflation rate, significant change will require breakthroughs in international negotiations, particularly regarding the nuclear deal, the lifting of sanctions and the revitalisation of the economy.

At regional level, Iran’s strategy remains centred on its support for the “Axis of Resistance,” with its involvement in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq continuing to dominate its approach (Fitton-Brow, 2024). The ongoing war in Gaza and its spillover effect in Lebanon will likely challenge Tehran’s ability to sustain support for allied groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, as it seeks to counter Israeli influence amid the forthcoming return of the Trump administration. Additionally, escalating tensions and the shifted dynamics in Syria have challenged Tehran’s strategic foothold, requiring a sudden reassessment of its tactics to maintain influence and control in the region. The collapse of the Assad government significantly complicates the re-strengthening and re-equipping of the resistance network, particularly Hezbollah. While Iran has expressed its intention to maintain ties with Syria, emphasizing that the new governing group’s stance on Israel would be a key factor, the axis can no longer function as a cohesive network of states and militias stretching from Iran to the Levant. Having lost its anchors in the Levant, its presence in Iraq and Yemen remains but lacks the same strategic weight. For the axis to regain relevance, it would require an adjustment, contingent on the evolving situation in the Levant (Motamedi, 2024). At the same time, Iran will also need to calibrate its actions by leveraging on normalised relations with Gulf states that have seen positive recent developments, especially with Saudi Arabia, aiming to strengthen trade and boost investments (Mustafa A. & Bouzidi Y., 2024). Relations with the Gulf will be pivotal in mitigating international isolation and fostering the country’s economic growth.

Concerning the international dimension, strong relations with Russia and China will likely continue to underpin Iran’s strategy of countering Western isolation. Furthermore, Pezeshkian’s administration’s goal to reopen nuclear negotiations, recognising the economic benefits from such engagement, would be crucial for easing tensions and paving the way for the lifting of sanctions (Citrinowicz, 2024). The interplay between these two strategies —close alignment with the East and tentative outreach to the West—will likely define Iran’s global positioning in the face of mounting geopolitical pressure next year.

Battles on All Fronts: Israel’s Struggles in a Transforming Middle East

Written by Andrea Aznar Macià

Since October 2023, conflicts involving Israel have escalated dramatically. What started with a Hamas attack on October 7th has become an unprecedented Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip which has left more than 50% of their infrastructure destroyed and tens of thousands of Palestinians dead. Almost a year later, tensions with Lebanon escalated into conflict, with Hezbollah fighting and Israel striking intensively its Southern territory, as well as the capital, Beirut. The regional escalation did not stop there, as Iran and Israel engaged in confrontation several times, including Israel conducting airstrikes on Iran’s embassy complex in Damascus in April 2024. The recent fall of Assad in Syria will only further influence Israel’s priorities and actions. 

While numerous peace talks involving multiple external actors have taken place, little to no progress has been made to stabilize the region. The recent ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon vanished as quickly as it was established, with both sides accusing each other of violating its terms the day after it went into effect. In the meantime, the civilian population is paying the price, with over a million people displaced and a humanitarian crisis beyond precedent. 

During this time, many actors have played a part in trying to end the conflicts. The European Union (EU) has supported peace negotiations, as well as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which pledged $100 million in humanitarian aid. However, their actions have faced strong criticism due to their inability to achieve long-term peace and despite their efforts, the situation remains volatile, with ongoing human rights violations persisting in the region. 

It is difficult to predict what 2025 will bring, especially given the substantial changes now underway in the region. Donald Trump’s return to office in January 2025 as President of the United States, might lead to a shift in US foreign policy towards the Middle East. His second administration will, most likely, adopt a more aggressive approach, increasing pressure on Iran, the primary challenge to US interest in the region. Additionally, the recent overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has dramatically altered the regional landscape, creating both opportunities and challenges. Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, celebrated the fall of the regime, calling it an opportunity despite its potential dangers. 

The challenges that Israel faces are not only external. Protests and political division are likely to increase even more, amid widespread discontent over the government’s handling of the wars and economic stagnation. Even the Central Bank of Israel predicts slower economic growth for the year and expects the war with Hamas and Hezbollah to take a heavy toll on the nation’s finances. Next year will definitely be another intense one in Israel with a continuation of war on multiple fronts and an increasingly discontent population that questions its leadership.

Egypt: Authoritarian Resilience and Strategic Alliances in a Geopolitically Tense Landscape

Written by Alicia Kerekes Ispas

After securing a third 6-year term – supposed to be his last constitutionally – with the triumph at the elections in late 2023, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi began the new year with a new round of recurring unmet promises of security, stability and prosperity. Since 2013, al-Sisi’s government has remained characterised by authoritarianism and widespread abuses of civil and political rights (MEE, 2024), while hostage of economic stagnation and regional instability (Al Jazeera, 2024). 

Throughout 2024, Egypt continued to be at the centre of a geopolitically tense region, surrounded by escalating conflicts. To the west, Libya’s enduring political instability saw Egypt’s alignment with Haftar’s eastern-controlled administration, reflecting its political and economic interests. To the south, the Sudanese civil war intensified migratory pressures. Meanwhile, in the context of a tense Horn of Africa, disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia over the control of the Great Renaissance Dam on the Nile, increased. Finally, to the northeast, Egypt faced the political and migratory challenges of Israel’s war on Gaza, and the uncertain future of Syria amidst al Assad’s regime fall. These crises are placing great political, social, and economic pressure on Egypt. Nonetheless, the country has positioned itself as a key actor in these dynamics, by advancing its discourse on diplomacy and peace while pursuing strategic alliances (Hamzawy, 2024). In particular, Egypt is playing a leading diplomatic role in the conflicts in Gaza and Sudan, actively advocating for ceasefires and delivering humanitarian aid (United Nations, 2024; Fayez, 2024).

Egypt’s foreign policy efforts in 2024 clearly highlight the country’s ambitions on the international stage. The year began on a strong note with Egypt being admitted to BRICS, which led to its first participation in the bloc’s summit in October (AW, 2024). Continuing with its bet on multilateralism, Egypt also backed South Africa’s genocide case against Israel in the International Court of Justice (Nashed, 2024), expressed willingness to collaborate with the UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (Egypt Today, 2024), and called for restructuring the African Union’s Peace and Security Council to increase North African seats (El Tawil, 2024). Furthermore, Egypt strengthened bilateral relations with key regional partners, including Kuwait, Qatar, and Somalia. A milestone was the improvement in Egypt-Turkish relations after years of tensions. In an unprecedented move, Erdogan and el-Sisi exchanged presidential visits for the first time in 12 years, culminating in several memorandums of understanding on cooperation in energy, defence, tourism, agriculture and transport, among others (Gumrukcu, 2024). Relations with the UAE were also strengthened: in February, Egypt signed the largest investment deal in its history, involving $35 billion in direct investment from the Gulf country, aimed to develop the Egyptian area of Ras el Hikma (Mohamed, 2024).

The Egyptian government and the European Union have also been committed to enhancing their relations across various sectors. In March 2024, Egypt and the European Commission signed a Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership, accompanied by a €7.4 billion financial and investment support package. The partnership mainly covers macro-financial assistance, investments and trade with minor elements of regional security and migration. This move aligns with the EU’s increasing pragmatic approach to its Southern Neighbourhood, focused on energy, security and, particularly, migration interests. Drawing on the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Tunisia in 2023, the EU-Egypt partnership was received with criticism due to the EU’s trend of supporting authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records (Werr, 2024; Fox, 2024). 

Egypt’s strategic geopolitical position and active role in regional diplomacy make it a crucial country to watch in 2025. As a key actor in conflicts such as Sudan and Gaza, Egypt has sought to position itself as a force for stability in the region, despite its domestic challenges, including its authoritarian dynamics and economic stagnation that keep posing significant concerns. The EU-Egypt Partnership further highlights the importance of keeping an eye on the relations with Cairo, and Egypt’s use of financial support and its potential implications for human rights.

Qatar’s Diplomacy in 2025: Navigating Conflict and Alliances

Written by Giulia Pinna 

In 2024, Qatar has continued to leverage its political capital to solidify its status as a regional mediator and is now strategically positioning itself for a critical role in Middle Eastern diplomacy, navigating complex alliances and conflicts as it heads into 2025. As the pivotal intermediary in Hamas-Israel negotiations Qatar finds itself at the crossroads, balancing its support for Palestine and opposition movements in Syria, with the regional normalisation of relations with Israel and its newly-strengthened relations with the U.S., as a major non-NATO ally. The balancing of this equation will largely define Qatar’s evolving position in 2025. 

Qatar has served as the chief platform for Israel-Hamas negotiations during the Gaza crisis, leveraging its role as host of Hamas’s political office since 2012 (established at the request of the Obama administration) and its history as a mediator in Israeli-Palestinian relations. (Graham-Harrison & Burke, 2024; Aras & Al Ansari, 2024, p. 1463). In November 2023, Qatar brokered a ceasefire in Gaza that secured the release of over 100 hostages, but efforts to reach a second agreement have failed repeatedly. This deadlock has drawn sharp criticism from Israel and the U.S., threatening Qatar’s major non-NATO ally status and its position as mediator (Pinkas, 2024). While previous criticisms only briefly halted negotiations, it remains unclear how long the current pause will persist. Reports of both parties traveling to Turkey suggest a shift toward Turkish mediation, but strained ties between Netanyahu and Erdogan highlight Qatar’s stronger diplomatic leverage and Turkey’s comparatively weaker position (Soylu, 2024). Qatar’s decision seems more a strategic maneuver than a permanent cessation. Arguably driven by concerns over its diminishing effectiveness as a mediator, the current halt may serve to compel parties to return to negotiations. By framing the impasse as a failure of the parties to compromise, Qatar has positioned itself to re-engage should the parties show a willingness to negotiate in good faith. This allows the state to preserve its role while alleviating mounting pressures, so that responsibility for the deadlock lies with the unwillingness of the parties to engage in good faith, not its own mediation efforts. Looking ahead, Qatar’s role as a mediator will hinge on whether both parties are willing to return to the table, keeping its involvement in future negotiations uncertain.

Qatar’s future role is also dependent on shifting leadership dynamics and its ability to navigate complex geopolitical terrain. In the United States, doubt looms over Donald Trump’s potential foreign policy approach. For Qatar, much depends on how he will approach the ongoing war on Gaza, and whether he will echo other Republican politicians in condemning Qatar for hosting Hamas or focus instead on securing a deal early in his term (Wintour, 2024). Although reports seemingly indicate a shift in strategy, including protecting negotiations from public exposure to avoid past failures, the ultimate outcomes remain uncertain as 2025 approaches.

Meanwhile, in Syria, the emergence of Abu Mohammad al-Julani, once leader of the al-Nusra Front, raises important questions about evolving relationships in the region. In a notable shift in their mutual relations, the first Qatari delegation arrived in Syria to discuss reopening its embassy and enhancing humanitarian aid deliveries (Mills, 2024). Qatar’s alleged historical ties to the al-Nusra Front suggest the potential for a renewing relationship with Syria under shifting power structures, positioning Qatar as a pivotal player capable of influencing regional alignments in 2025.

Jordan: A No Longer Silent Partner for the EU

Written by Hannah Colpitts-Elliot

Jordan has been a long-standing, albeit silent and hidden, partner of the EU in the Middle East, based upon the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. The new Pact for the Mediterranean and the new strategic partnerships agreements are likely to place the country under the spotlight in the EU action within the region. 

One crucial area for cooperation between the EU and Jordan, which will only grow in significance in light of the climate crisis, is the green transition. Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world, making it exceedingly vulnerable to climate shocks (World Bank 2024). Guided by the European Green Deal, the EU and Jordan have collaborated on enhancing renewable energy production through solar and wind energy projects, and developing necessary infrastructure such as the national grid (MED-GEM 2024). These efforts support Jordan in implementing its Vision 2025 and the National Green Growth Plan (Ministry of Environment 2017). This focus on green transition will indeed remain a priority for the upcoming EU-Jordan partnership agreement.

In the realm of foreign and security policy, Jordan has also been a pivotal partner for the EU, and plays a key role in promoting regional stability (Delegation of the European Union to Jordan 2023). This includes their role in managing migration, with Jordan hosting the fifth largest population of refugees per capita worldwide, housing  Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Libyans and Yemenis (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2024). While the country may remain comparatively stable in contrast to its neighbours, the picture for those on the margins of Jordanian society, remains bleak. With little prospect of return and pressing economic problems compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and the reverberations of the Gaza genocide, refugees are increasingly vulnerable, with 63% of Syrian refugees living below the poverty line (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2024). This occurs alongside a wider climate of economic precarity nationwide, with high rates of unemployment, particularly affecting the youth (46.1%) and women (30.9%) (World Bank 2024).

Additionally, Jordan’s continued stability has been called into question following the genocide in Gaza. Amman has consistently criticised the actions of the far-right government in Israel led by Netenyahu, fearing they seek the forcible transfer of Palestinians to Jordan. Condemnation has only intensified in the last year and this has placed a significant strain on Jordanian-Israeli relations. This is not least a concern for Jordan because of the country’s sizable Palestinian population of around 3 million (Mabon 2024), who have expressed a pervasive sense of horror and frustration over the genocide as well as a dissatisfaction with the response of the Jordanian government (Ryan 2024). While the former EU High Representative Josep Borrell has praised Jordan’s peacebuilding efforts and the strategic role of Jordan in finding a political solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Dajah 2024), domestically, Jordan has faced criticism for suppressing protest, and arresting peaceful demonstrators (Human Rights Watch 2024). If these protests escalate and human rights abuses persist, Jordan’s status as a stable and secure partner for the EU may be jeopardised, as well as the prospect for a first bilateral comprehensive agreement with Amman. 

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