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Written by Garcia Perez Vico
Co-author with Thomas Pelletier

1. Introduction

The European Union launched the Global Gateway in December 2021 as a global infrastructure strategy designed to strengthen the EU’s role in international development and provide an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched nearly a decade earlier in 2013.. In this sense, the EU entered the field comparatively late, particularly in relation to Beijing. The initiative was presented as a major effort to promote sustainable growth and infrastructure development worldwide while reinforcing international partnerships. With an announced investment capacity of €300 billion, the Global Gateway was meant to mobilize resources across sectors such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure, and climate projects (Ricart & Otero-Iglesias, 2022).

Despite its ambitious narrative, the initiative has faced significant criticism since its inception. One common critique concerns the relatively modest scale of funding compared to competing initiatives. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, for example, mobilized over $1 trillion within its first decade, while the Global Gateway’s €300 billion target has raised doubts about the EU’s ability to compete effectively in global infrastructure investment (Nedopil, 2024).

However, the most important criticism relates not only to the volume of funding but also to the financial structure of the initiative itself. The Global Gateway is legally embedded in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE), the EU’s principal development finance tool (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024). At the same time, the initiative relies heavily on mechanisms such as guarantees, blended finance, and concessional loans (Brynildsen, 2011), and operates through the Team Europe approach that combines resources from EU institutions, Member States, development banks, and the private sector. 

These financing mechanisms have raised concerns about whether the Global Gateway genuinely serves development objectives or primarily promotes European economic and commercial interests. Critics argue that the reliance on private-sector involvement and financial instruments could increase debt burdens for already indebted partner countries while prioritizing projects aligned with EU economic interests (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024).

This policy brief abstract examines the financial structure of the Global Gateway and highlights the contradictions between its official development narrative and its operational logic. It argues that the initiative functions largely as a vehicle for advancing trade and strategic interests rather than a genuine development finance tool. Based on this assessment, the brief proposes policy recommendations aimed at improving the coherence, transparency, and effectiveness of the initiative.

2. Policy Problem

The main policy problem addressed in this research concerns the contradiction between the Global Gateway’s official development objectives and the financial mechanisms through which the initiative operates.

The Global Gateway was incorporated within the NDICI-GE framework, whose primary objective is the reduction and eventual eradication of poverty while contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2021). The financial arm associated with this instrument, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), is also intended to support sustainable development outcomes. However, several findings challenge the idea that the Global Gateway functions as a genuine development policy.

First, evidence suggests that large European corporations significantly benefit from 60 percent  of the Global Gateway projects financed through development funds. Studies indicate that companies such as Siemens or SUEZ profit from these funds, raising questions about whether development financing is primarily supporting European commercial interests rather than partner countries’ development needs (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024). The European Court of Auditors has also raised concerns regarding whether sufficient attention is given to the least developed countries, which are often considered riskier investment environments and therefore attract fewer profit-oriented companies (Europea Court of Auditors, 2024).

Second, the initiative raises concerns related to potential debt imposition and unequal economic relationships between the EU and partner countries. Reports highlight risks including corporate land appropriation, declining skilled jobs in the Global South, and broader structural patterns that may reinforce perceptions of neo-colonial dynamics (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024). In such cases, infrastructure projects may advance the strategic and economic interests of European actors while providing uncertain benefits to local populations.

Third, the sectoral distribution of Global Gateway projects indicates a limited focus on core development sectors. Data from 2023-2024 shows that only 16 percent of projects supported sectors such as health, education, and research. In contrast, 49 percent of projects focused on climate and energy, 22 percent on transport, and 13 percent on digital infrastructure (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024, p.10). While these sectors are important for economic development, the limited investment in foundational social sectors raises concerns about whether the initiative aligns with the NDICI-GE regulation’s development mandate.

Fourth, the composition of financial instruments within the Global Gateway further complicates its development narrative. Out of the €300 billion announced investment capacity, only €18 billion are grants, while the majority of financing relies on guarantees and loans (Geramsimcikova & Sial, 2024, p.4). This means that beneficiary countries may face additional debt obligations despite many of them already experiencing high levels of debt distress. As a result, the initiative risks exacerbating financial vulnerabilities rather than supporting sustainable development.

A further structural issue lies in the increasing role of export credit mechanisms within the initiative. Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), which exist in all EU Member States, are designed to support national companies in accessing foreign markets by providing loans and guarantees for international projects (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2023). Their primary function is therefore to promote national commercial interests rather than development objectives. Critics have argued that ECAs should have no role within development finance because their accountability, transparency, and due diligence mechanisms remain insufficient in areas such as human rights and environmental protection (Gerasimcikova, Troost, & Casati, 2024).

Additionally, the Global Gateway’s financial structure raises concerns regarding the EU’s commitments to Official Development Assistance (ODA). The EU has pledged that at least 93% of NDICI-GE funds should qualify as ODA (European Commission, 2021). However, if instruments such as export credit guarantees and blended finance mechanisms are counted within this framework, it risks crowding out genuine development funding and blurring the distinction between development cooperation and commercial policy.

Finally, the initiative has faced difficulties in mobilizing investments. “While the European Commission reports that over €306 billion has been mobilised since 2021 (European Commission, 2026), only around €8 billion in investment operations had been signed by the end of 2023 (European Court of Auditors, 2024). While more recent signed figures may be higher, the distinction between mobilised and contracted investments raises important questions about how progress is being measured and communicated. The slow rollout of Global Gateway instruments, as illustrated by the delayed delivery of the first EFSD+ guarantee in Latin America and the Caribbean in December 2024 (Press and information team of the Delegation to Ecuador, 2024), reflects structural inefficiencies and reinforces the argument that the Global Gateway’s current framing as a development policy does not correspond to its actual functioning.

3. Policy Research 

This research critically examines the financial architecture of the Global Gateway to assess whether the initiative fulfils its declared development objectives or operates primarily as an instrument of trade and strategic competition.

The analysis focuses on several key elements: the legal framework of the initiative within the NDICI-GE, the composition of its financial instruments, the role of export credit agencies, and the distribution of investments across sectors. By evaluating these components, the research identifies structural contradictions between the EU’s development narrative and the initiative’s operational design. By evaluating these components, the research identifies structural contradictions between the EU’s development narrative and the initiative’s operational design, suggesting that the two are difficult to reconcile within the current framework. 

The findings suggest that the Global Gateway’s financial model prioritizes private-sector participation and financial instruments that support European companies abroad. While such mechanisms can facilitate investment, they do not necessarily prioritize poverty reduction or sustainable development outcomes. Instead, they align more closely with trade promotion and strategic economic objectives.

Furthermore, the analysis highlights the growing role of export credit mechanisms in the EU’s external financing architecture. Export credit agencies play a significant role in supporting infrastructure projects abroad, yet their activities are primarily driven by national commercial interests rather than development objectives. The fragmented structure of these agencies across Member States also creates inconsistencies in financial guarantees and reduces the EU’s overall competitiveness in international markets.

Building on these findings, the research argues that the initiative should be formally redefined to better reflect its actual objectives and operational logic, contributing to the ongoing debate about the role of the Global Gateway in the EU’s external policy framework. 

4. Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings presented above, several policy recommendations are proposed to improve the coherence and effectiveness of the Global Gateway’s financial structure.

  1. Officially reframe the Global Gateway as a trade policy rather than a development policy. This would involve decoupling the Global Gateway from the NDICI-GE framework and relocating its financial structure under a regulation designed for export-credit type financing. Such a shift would also prevent non-developmental funds from being counted as ODA and allow genuine development funds to remain within ODA commitments.
  2. Create an EU export credit facility dedicated to the Global Gateway. Building on existing feasibility studies and policy initiatives, the EU and its Member States should explore establishing a common export credit facility. This facility could complement national export credit schemes and improve the competitiveness of European companies in international infrastructure markets. It should also ensure high standards regarding environmental protection, human rights, and transparency. A comparable approach can be observed in China’s international infrastructure financing, where institutions such as China Export-Import Bank provide large-scale credit lines that support the international expansion of Chinese firms under the Belt and Road Initiative (The Export-Import Bank of China, 2024).
  3. Establish a specific unit within DG Trade to oversee the initiative. A dedicated unit within DG Trade could coordinate export credit mechanisms, risk-sharing arrangements, and strategic financing for Global Gateway projects. This unit would also ensure that the principles of subsidiarity and additionality are respected while improving coordination between EU institutions and Member States. Furthermore, the establishment of a centralised EU advisory mechanism providing technical support, capacity-building, and policy guidance to ECAs and European exporters participating in Global Gateway projects could mitigate existing fragmentation and coordination challenges, while facilitating the harmonisation of best practices and strengthening strategic coherence across the EU. 
  4. Strengthen coordination between DG INTPA and DG Trade. Improved institutional coordination is necessary to ensure coherent implementation and communication of the Global Gateway strategy. Before transferring full supervision to DG Trade, both Directorates-General should align their roles and responsibilities to guarantee consistency between policy objectives and financial instruments.
  5. Promote mutual and industrial partnerships with partner countries. The initiative should ensure that infrastructure projects generate tangible benefits for local populations. This includes creating sustainable jobs, improving living conditions, and strengthening local productive capacities and value chains. Greater involvement of national and local authorities as well as civil society organizations would also enhance legitimacy and prevent implementation challenges.
  6. Increase participation of SMEs and local enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises from both EU Member States and partner countries should have improved access to Global Gateway projects. Their participation could be facilitated through procurement processes, access to export credit mechanisms, and technical assistance to meet international standards.
  7. Revise Export Credit Regulation 1233/2011. The current regulatory framework should be updated to reflect the EU’s evolving policy priorities, particularly regarding climate commitments and human rights (Gerasimcikova, Troost, & Casati, 2024). Stronger transparency and reporting requirements should be introduced, including the creation of a centralized EU database tracking all export credit activities related to Global Gateway projects (Raza, Schlögl, & Pfaffenbichler, 2023).

5. Conclusion

The Global Gateway represents an important attempt by the EU to strengthen its global economic and strategic position. However, the initiative’s financial structure reveals significant inconsistencies between its development narrative and its operational logic.

By acknowledging the initiative’s trade-oriented character and adapting its institutional and financial framework accordingly, the EU could enhance both the credibility and effectiveness of the Global Gateway. At the same time, it must ensure that economic competitiveness does not undermine its broader commitment to sustainable development, inclusive growth, and respect for human rights.

6. Bibliography

On By European Student Think Tank

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