Shielding the Union: Countering Transatlantic Nationalist Influence

Introduction 

In early 2026, the European Union faces a novel threat to its democratic system, which underpins the current international liberal order. The novel challenge doesn’t involve exclusively military pressure or economic tariffs, but ideological alliances that operate transnationally and are well- funded. US conservative think tanks, such as the Heritage Foundation, are actively coordinating with research institutes in European Member States to promote their vision for major institutional reforms in Europe (Gardinier, 2025; Roberts, 2025). However, these networks may engage in a form of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), a concept defined in the 3rd European External Action Service EEAS Report, as a series of manipulative actions by foreign non- state actors, often using domestic proxies, that aim to threaten democratic values and political processes. The article argues that these frameworks are insufficient to counter influence originating from traditional allies, namely, transatlantic influences. Despite this, they represent a first step towards democratic resilience. To demonstrate this, it analyses how the networks would use institutional blind spots to achieve their intentions, while noting the difficult relationship between safeguarding freedom of expression and safeguarding democracy. 

The Heritage Foundation, EU conservative think tanks and the mutual influence

These developments illustrate a changing environment in transatlantic relations, characterised by an increasing alignment between US conservative organisations and European far-right governments. Several reports from conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation or Ordo Iuris articulate a vision to steer the EU away from further integration, positions that closely align with the policy priorities of both the current US administration and far-right governments across Europe. For instance, Project 2025 is a key policy roadmap for Donald Trump’s second-term policy orientation. It is developed by the think tank The Heritage Foundation,, and advocates for a Europe of sovereign nations, with NATO remaining the central hub for European defense (Miller, 2025). Additionally, it suggests the US should prioritise bilateral relations with individual Member States rather than treating the EU as a unified bloc (Skinner, 2025, ). Given the close ties between think tanks, this position has been exported to European conservative far-right research centres, mostly the Polish Ordo Iuris and the Hungarian Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC), which are closely linked to the Law and Justice (PiS) party and Fidesz, respectively (Shapiro & Végh, 2025).  The Great Reset report, jointly published by the two organisations, outlines major institutional changes to the EU’s federalist structure and proposes reducing the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to purely technical bodies, and renaming the bloc the “European Community of Nations”; (Ballester & Devenyi, 2025). Its presentation took place at a Warsaw conference co-hosted by the US-based Heritage Foundation, therefore proving a growing transatlantic network (Roberts, 2025). 

However, the core problem is not the existence of anti-EU rhetoric, but the scale of their influence and financing. The former, whose president is also Hungary’s former president’s political director, Viktor Orbán, has been funded by the Hungarian government since 2020. On the other hand, MCC received a 10 per cent stake of the Hungarian oil company MOL and the pharmaceutical company Gedeon Richter. In total, the think tank received $462 million in cash and $9 million in property (Fox, 2022). To put the data into perspective, in 2019, the total value of assets transferred to MCC exceeded the annual budgets of all 27 Hungarian public higher education institutions combined (Léotard, 2021). 

In practice, think tanks use these vast resources to establish themselves in strategic locations, such as Brussels or Vienna, and to actively shape mainstream EU discourse (Kensy, 2025; Hanelt, 2025). Furthermore, the Great Reset report was presented at a Warsaw conference co-hosted by the Heritage Foundation. It inaugurates a season of transatlantic alliance that increasingly overlaps with the political far-right, as testified by meetings with various representatives of the Patriots for Europe political group (Roberts, 2025). These events introduce new elements into an old debate, namely the boundary between research, advocacy, and political influence. The financial scale directly influences the EU’s institutional setting, such as in the case of MCC’s state-funded budget. Indeed, it enables the organisation to undertake more impactful activities than a traditional think tank, while also allowing for more effective mainstreaming of illiberal policies across the EU (Kensy, 2025; Hanelt, 2025). 

FIMI, the European Democracy Shield and the EU transparency register

To protect Europe’s democratic space, the European Commission introduced the European Democracy Shield (EDS). It prescribes the creation of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience to prevent FIMI, as well as the implementation of transparency measures to make digital campaigning more accountable. However, it is a body that remains in the planning stages as of early 2026. Ultimately, the framework includes measures to prevent journalists and NGOs from being subject to foreign influence. This entails stronger safeguards of editorial independence from political pressure, as well as legal and digital protections against harassment and SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) (European Commission & High Representative of the  Union, 2025). Despite the enforcement particularly targeting adversaries’ countries, such as Russia or China, the framework becomes less effective when the influence derives from within or from traditionally allied countries (Youngs et al., 2026). To operationalise these defences, the EDS relies on tools like the Digital Services Act (DSA) to restrict the algorithmic spread of hostile campaigns, alongside an independent European Network of Fact-Checkers to actively debunk disinformation (EPRS, 2026).

The EU’s understanding of these threats is actively evolving. The third European External Action Service Report on FIMI Threats marks a shift toward addressing behavioural patterns that undermine values, procedures, and political processes (European External Action Service, 2025). Despite this, the framework primarily focuses on foreign authoritarian regimes and pays less attention to transatlantic cooperation, in which a Member State establishes ties with a foreign actor to influence internal affairs (Quaritsch, 2025). Such alliances are significantly harder to regulate because they operate through open, well-funded legal channels, such as think tanks, fellowships, and joint summits, which blur the line between legitimate transnational political networking and coordinated democratic interference (Benson, 2026).

On the financial note, the EU Transparency Register governs the relationship between the EU institutions and interest representatives through a database shared by the European Council, the Commission, and the Parliament. It mandates that every organisation seeking to influence the policy-making process must disclose their financial sources that exceed 10% of the total budget and the legislative files they are targeting, such as pending EU directives or regulations, like the European Media Freedom Act (European Court of Auditors, 2025). While Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Belgium and Ordo Iuris are both registered, the Heritage Foundation is absent.

At the national level, transparency effectiveness is undermined by fragmentation within the legal framework. Transparency International EU published a report on the matter, highlighting that only 15 of the 27 Member States have mandatory lobbying rules, and even fewer successfully enforce them (Kergueno, 2024). Therefore, the differences are likely to prove themselves more prone to foreign influence by lobbying in poorly regulated Member States. The positions are ultimately carried in intergovernmental EU settings and shape European policy from the bottom up (Kergueno, 2024).

Policy considerations for improving transparency and sovereignty at the EU level 

To effectively address the gap in the European Democracy Shield, a dual-track approach, financial and sovereignty-related, may be required. Firstly, a more aggressive stance from the European regulatory systems on ideological influence should be reflected in the effective implementation of  the Transparency Register. It should mandate the full disclosure of think tanks funded, directly or indirectly, by state-led organisations. (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2024). By doing so, the think tanks would be registered for clearer monitoring of their activity in the EU policymaking environment. Additionally, the European External Action Service, despite taking concrete steps towards effective screening of FIMI, may broaden the definition to include coordinated ideological subversion (Quaritsch, 2025). However, the concept should not be limited to authoritarian regimes openly adversarial to the EU supranational model, but should also encompass transatlantic influence that challenges existing EU policy paradigms. The empowerment of the European Democracy Shield also involves strengthening digital sovereignty. In this framework, the Digital Services Act (DSA) serves as an enforcement tool to compel platforms to address systemic risks. Therefore, robust mitigation measures, such as clearly labelling foreign influence and disinformation, may be required to ensure effective implementation (Quaritsch, 2026). Radical transparency does not necessarily translate into censorship, only for framing state-funded organisations that call for reorganising the EU as foreign interference. Instead, it proves useful for safeguarding democratic space, as highlighted in the European Commission’s Defence of Democracy Package (2023). To this end, the European Democracy Shield addresses various challenges with implications across different policy domains that are fundamental to increasing sovereignty and independence at the EU level, including a Digital Rulebook (Quaedvileg, 2025). 

Conclusion 

The rising transatlantic network of nationalist influence represents a novel challenge to European integration, given its ideological objectives that go beyond traditional protectionism or political conservatism. However, the anti-EU rhetoric does not represent the problematic aspect, but rather the financial ambiguities and the range of foreign influence that the organisations bring with them, by exploiting the fragmentation of transparency laws across the Member States (Kergueno, 2024). To effectively counter the phenomenon, a unified defensive framework is essential for both digital sovereignty and safeguarding democratic accountability (Kergueno, 2024; Quaedvlieg, 2025). Global alliances are changing towards a variable geometry system, and the EU’s approaches have to change with them. Nowadays, foreign interference does not originate exclusively from authoritarian regimes, but also from what are considered allies. Therefore, these relationships require a more attentive approach to positions, as they may undermine the EU’s sovereignty (Young et al. 2026). To this end, the enforcement of the Digital Rulebook is fundamental to granting independence from opaque influence (Quaedvileg, 2025). In this context, future legislation (and, possibly, harmonisation) will be crucial to determine the EU’s democratic resilience capacities.

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