Evaluating Neutrality: The Role and Future of Neutral Countries within the EU

1. Introduction

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent deterioration of the security situation, the EU has had to significantly rethink its defence strategy, emphasising the need for a more cohesive and coordinated security framework. Additionally, the prospect of another Trump presidency and the potential withdrawal of the United States from NATO have added urgency to these endeavours.

While this poses a multitude of challenges, one less frequently discussed is what this means for the future role of the neutral countries in the European Union (Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus). The EU was originally formed as an economic union, and being part of it has never constituted any military alignment. However, with plans to transform the EU into a “fully-fledged defence union” by 2025 (Franke and Cramer, 2021), including initiatives like the European Defence Fund and the appointment of a European Defence Commissioner, it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that EU membership does not involve a form of military alignment.

To discuss this issue, the following article will examine the concept of neutrality within the context of international relations, and whether it is time to re-evaluate the role of neutral countries within the EU.

2. What is Neutrality?

Neutrality, in the context of international relations, refers to a state’s decision to abstain from military alliances and conflicts, maintaining an impartial stance (Franke and Cramer, 2021). This principle is intended to prevent the state from being drawn into wars or conflicts, often also allowing it to act as a mediator. Neutrality can take different forms, ranging from full neutrality, where a state refrains from any military engagement, to military non-alignment, where a state does not formally join military alliances but may participate in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Austria’s neutrality, enshrined in its 1955 State Treaty, prohibits it from joining military alliances or hosting foreign military bases (Gressel, 2021). This policy emerged from the aftermath of World War II and the desire to establish Austria as a sovereign state free from the influence of occupying powers, particularly the Soviet Union. The treaty was a condition for the withdrawal of Allied forces and the restoration of Austrian independence (Misik, 2022). However, Austria still participates in EU and UN missions, such as the UN mission in the Balkans (Gressel, 2021).

While not formally included in its constitution, Ireland’s neutrality has been a cornerstone of its foreign policy since the 1930s and is deeply ingrained in its political culture and public opinion  (Quain, 2021). This stance was influenced by a combination of historical, political, and cultural factors, including a desire to assert its sovereignty against that of its former colonial ruler, the United Kingdom (Quain, 2021). Ireland’s neutrality has been specifically characterised by non-membership in military alliances and a focus on peacekeeping missions as part of the United Nations (Quain, 2021). Nevertheless, Ireland chose to become a member of the Partnership for Peace Program in 1999 (Quain, 2021), which is a NATO initiative for cooperation between NATO states and non-member EU states, as well as joining the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in 2019 (Quain, 2021). 

Malta’s neutrality is embedded in its constitution, emphasising non-alignment and the refusal to participate in military alliances (Pace, 2021). This policy reflects Malta’s strategic location in the Mediterranean and its desire to maintain independence and avoid being drawn into regional conflicts. 

Cyprus, while not having neutrality enshrined in its constitution, remains outside NATO, primarily due to its geopolitical tensions with Turkey (Wilson, 2019). This non-alignment stems from the complex and unresolved conflict between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which has led Turkey to block Cyprus’ accession to NATO (Wilson, 2019).

3. Neutral Member States and the Mutual Defence Clause

The EU’s Mutual Defence Clause, Article 42.7 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, obliges member states to aid any member that becomes a victim of armed aggression on its territory. This clause is similar to NATO’s Article 5 but includes an opt-out for neutral or non-aligned states, often referred to as the “Irish Clause” (Franke and Cramer, 2021). Ireland initially rejected the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in a 2008 referendum, with concerns about its implications for Irish neutrality being one of the significant factors (Quain, 2021). To address these concerns, the EU provided legally binding assurances that the treaty would not affect Ireland’s traditional policy of neutrality. This included the addition of the “Irish Clause” in Article 42.7, which explicitly allows neutral countries to comply with mutual defence obligations in a manner consistent with their neutrality policies (Franke and Cramer, 2021). These assurances played a crucial role in securing public support for the treaty in a second referendum in 2009, leading to its eventual ratification.

The first and so far only invocation of Article 42.7 occurred following the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015 (Franke and Cramer, 2021). In response to this unprecedented activation, Austria and Ireland showed their differing interpretations of the EU’s mutual defence obligations. While Ireland was quick to ensure Paris all the help it could provide (while still adhering to its safeguard clause to keep its neutrality) (Quain, 2021), Austria chose to make use of the Irish Clause and did not send military or humanitarian support to France (Gressel, 2021). 

This shows how these special status states create ambiguity regarding the EU’s mutual defence obligations by allowing them to choose to opt-out of providing assistance. The resulting question is whether such uncertainty surrounding the responsibilities and contributions expected from all member states poses a major hurdle to the EU’s claim as a functional defence union. 

4. The EU as a Defence Union: Should Neutrality Be Maintained or Reevaluated?

The primary argument for countries maintaining their neutrality is its deep historical and cultural significance. For them, neutrality is more than a policy; it is an integral part of their national identities, reflecting their historical experiences and cultural values (Geets and Neuhold, 2022). This sentiment is echoed by Austria’s federal chancellor Karl Nehammer, who reassured his country’s commitment to neutrality in the context of discussions about the EU becoming a defence union: “We are, and will remain, militarily neutral even if — like all the other member states — our military budget is increasing” (Gressani, 2024). 

Furthermore, neutrality provides these states with diplomatic flexibility, allowing them to act as mediators in conflicts and providing a platform for dialogue and negotiation (Geets and Neuhold, 2022). For instance, Austria values its inclusion in the Iran nuclear negotiations and hosts one of the United Nations headquarters – roles it can play partly due to its neutral stance (Geets and Neuhold, 2022). Neutral territories can be beneficial in negotiations, as exemplified by Switzerland, which often hosts peace talks and diplomatic discussions due to its longstanding policy of neutrality.

On the other hand, the primary argument against allowing these member states to maintain neutrality is the need for collective security (Glassner & Fuchshuber, 2023). In a defence union, collective security requires all member states to participate fully in mutual defence obligations. Neutrality can undermine this principle by creating gaps in the EU’s defence capabilities (Schüssel, 2024). Moreover, the evolving geopolitical realities, such as the Russian aggression in Ukraine which could spill over into neighbouring countries and threaten the rest of the EU, necessitate a coordinated and robust defence strategy. Finland’s decision to abandon its military non-alignment and join NATO showcases the urgency which is being felt throughout the EU (Glassner and Fuchshuber, 2023).  As seen above, the mixed responses from neutral countries after Article 42.7 was invoked in 2015 illustrate that uncertainty about their level of support can impede a coordinated response and complicate preparations for worst-case scenarios.

Furthermore, many view neutrality within the EU as hypocritical, as these countries often rely on the defence capabilities of other EU (and NATO) members in case of an attack, while contributing less to collective defence (Cepparulo & Pasimeni, 2024). For example, Austria spends only about 0.7% of its GDP on defence (Gressel, 2021), while Ireland allocates around 0.3% (Bury & Murphy, 2023). To put this into perspective, Ireland and Austria rank lowest and fourth lowest respectively among all EU states in 2020-2022 (Cepparulo & Pasimeni, 2024). This reliance on the defence contributions of other states raises questions about fairness and responsibility within the EU. Austria, mainly due to its location, benefits from the security guarantees provided by other EU and NATO member states, allowing it to maintain a minimal defence expenditure (Misik, 2022). Similarly, Ireland, while maintaining a policy of neutrality, benefits from NATO’s security umbrella indirectly through the shared security and defence initiatives of EU member states, as well as its close ties to the US (Bury & Murphy, 2023). 

This situation raises several concerns. Firstly, it questions the fairness of the burden-sharing within the EU and NATO which could lead to tension within the EU, especially among member states with higher defence expenditures (The Economist, 2023). As the economic benefits of EU membership, such as access to the Single Market and funding from EU programs, are enjoyed by all member states equally, this creates a situation where neutral states may be benefiting from EU security guarantees while contributing less to the collective defence efforts compared to other member states. 

Secondly, due to rising geopolitical tensions worldwide, determining true neutrality and what constitutes breaking it is becoming increasingly difficult (Schmitt, 2023). Clinging to neutrality without addressing the EU’s growing military nature and changing requirements limits neutral countries’ ability to respond to crises, creating confusion among decision-makers regarding acceptable actions (Franke & Cramer, 2021). While ambiguity can provide flexibility, it may not be suitable for today’s challenges. Hence, a serious discussion is needed at the policy level and among the public, to determine if neutrality still fits the current security environment. If countries like Ireland and Austria choose to maintain their neutral stance, they should clearly define what this entails.

Additionally, the EU needs to debate the future role of neutral states within its defence framework. This debate should include reassessing the operationalisation of Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty. One option would be to implement a protocol for the Union’s response to an invocation of the article. In 2015, France had to approach each country individually for help due to a lack of coordination structures (Franke & Cramer, 2021). Drafting such a protocol could also define the role of neutral states, reducing current uncertainties on both sides. 

5. Conclusion

The evolving geopolitical landscape and the increasing defence character of the EU present significant challenges to the traditional concept of neutrality held by countries like Austria, Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus. While neutrality has deep historical and cultural roots, providing diplomatic flexibility and a role in mediation, the growing need for a cohesive and robust EU defence strategy calls for a reassessment of this stance.

The disparity in defence spending and reliance on the protection offered by other EU and NATO members raises questions about fairness and burden-sharing within the Union, and the mixed responses to the invocation of Article 42.7 in 2015 highlight the uncertainties and coordination challenges that arise from the current neutral status of these member states.

Ultimately, the EU’s ambition to become a fully-fledged defence union requires evaluating the definition of neutrality and its compatibility with collective security objectives. Without this, both sides risk compromising their long-term interests.

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