Lack of Politics and Lack of Outcomes? Understanding EU’s Stance at the COP29 and its Implications for COP30

Abstract

The COP29 negotiations were finalised a few months ago. Since then, new questions have emerged about the outcomes it produced. Specifically, the implications for the European Union (EU) climate policy-making must be analysed. 

 This article delves into the COP decision-making procedures. First, it explains the EU negotiating mandate. Second, it discusses the results of the COP29 in relation to EU Environmental Global Leadership. This paper argues that the EU needs to lead the pursuit of more ambitious international climate policies and must take a more assertive position in climate negotiations. 

Introduction

The 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) was surrounded with some controversial topics. Firstly, it has been named a “finance” COP.  The main negotiation points were focused on establishing more clear and binding goals for the mobilization of climate finance, especially from developed to developing countries. Secondly, the location of the COP also sparked controversies for the third time in a row it was held in a country that is strongly reliant on fossil fuels and has a poor human rights record. Finally and most significantly, it also put into question the EU’s self-proclaimed environmental leadership (Council of the EU, n.d.). This is connected to recent debates on the emergence of a “geopolitical turn” in the EU policies in the wake of the War in Ukraine, and leaving behind the value-based approach to politics (Siddi & Pranding, 2023).

This paper aims to analyse the COP29 from the EU’s perspective. Based on that, it will explore to what extent the EU displayed the environmental leadership that many scholars assign to it. The paper is structured accordingly: firstly background information on the COPs and the EU’s negotiating mandate will be provided; secondly, the EU’s position coming into COP will be discussed along with what actually happened in Baku; finally, the outcome of the COP and implications for EU’s environmental leadership, as well as, COP30 will be examined.

Background Information

COP refers to the Conference of Parties, which is a meeting between states that are part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, n.d.). During these annual gatherings, the decision-making procedures regarding any changes to the Convention take place. Furthermore, national progress indicators are monitored and revised based on established global climate goals, with the EU as one of the Parties taking part in the conference.

At the COP, the EU represents all of its 27 member states, making it a unique actor in the negotiating process (Council of the EU, 2024). In turn, it must present a robust unified position which represents all of its member states (Council of the EU, 2024). Furthermore, the institutional EU actors also present at the COP negotiations consisted of: the President of the European Council, the President of The European Commission, the representatives of The Presidency of the Council of the EU. The last one represents the member-states most directly, as the internal EU mandate is discussed during the Environmental Council meetings.

EU Preferences for COP29

This section will focus specifically on the scope of COP29 and what the EU’s position could be on these issues. For instance, the 2024 edition of the COP was centred around climate finance, especially from developed to developing countries (UNFCCC, 2024). The goal of the negotiations was to provide a more transparent and tangible framework for the mobilization of climate finance. In addition to that, another key priority was to shift more attention towards the need for investment into adaptation measures, as mitigation takes the majority of the available resources (UNEP, 2024).

While the actors taking part in the COP usually do not disclose their negotiating position. However, based on the past patterns and “geopolitical turn” it can be predicted what the EU’s stance on the respective issue. The EU was, most likely, willing to agree to increase their investment in developing countries. However, the justification for this commitment. This is because the Global South countries wanted to include both higher pledges from countries in the Global North, and clauses that contextualise pledges in terms of reparations for historical wrongdoings in the new agreement (Blos, 2024). The EU has a few reasons to avoid these topics during negotiations. First, it would require consensus between EU member states that they are significant contributors to climate change. Second, countries which do not prioritise climate change policies may view such statements as ideological. Furthermore, countries which do not see themselves as responsible for climate change may share this sentiment.

Extending the contributor base to include emerging economies may also have influenced the EU’s position (Gambale, 2024). For example, China and India were two emerging economies that contributed significantly to CO2 emissions (Gambale 2024). In 2023, China and India were the two most polluting countries (Global Carbon Budget, 2024). Respectively, they produced 31.5% and 8.1% of total carbon emissions that year (Global Carbon Budget, 2024). This puts into question the effectiveness of the polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibilities principles. The EU and US may have used this to justify not increasing financial commitments. This may be withstanding until all the responsible parties are obliged to increase their pledges. 

The Negotiations in Baku

This section will analyse what stance the EU actually presented at the COP29. It will do so in the context of aforementioned goals/preferences. It will also identify how the EU’s stance was influenced by external factors. Most importantly, although in the background information section, it was mentioned that the President of the European Commission represents the EU at the COP, this time Ursula von der Leyen did not attend the event (Rankin, 2024). 

In addition to that, the heads of delegations from the most influential member-states in terms of EU decision-making, such as France or Germany also did not make their usual appearances (DW 2024; Rankin 2024). Along with the missing EU representatives, presidents of other global powers such as the USA, China, Brazil and India also did not show up to the event (DW 2024). While the official reasons ranged from national elections and the need to focus on the domestic situation, unofficially it could be seen as a boycott of the COP due to Russia’s interference in the choice of Azerbaijan as the 2024 host. 

Nonetheless, no matter the (un)official reasoning, the result was that the COP29 had one of the lowest attendance of the head of state in the history of these conferences. This unfortunately showcases the lack of interest of the politicians in climate change and their disbelief in the urgency of the need to take action. Even though some people could argue that less politicization means more evidence-based discussion, which could lead to the implementation of new, better agreements, in reality, there is no progress in climate change if there is no political support and democratic discussions behind it (Youngs, 2024). This is clearly exemplified by the introduction of the Paris Agreement in 2016, as even though it is not perfect, it constitutes one of the most advanced international climate policy frameworks, which would not have been possible without major political debate at COP21. Therefore, the poor attendance of the EU delegations as well as other global powers was already a sign that the outcomes of the COP would not bring about the ambitious and brave policies that are needed.

Outcome of the COP29 and Implications for the Future

The biggest focus of the 2024 edition of the COP was the establishment of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) for climate finance for developing countries, which has been increased from USD 100 billion annually to USD 300 billion (UNFCCC, 2024). Another point that was agreed upon was to “secure efforts of all actors… to scale up finance to developing countries,” with the goal of mobilizing USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2024).

Countries in the Global North may have seen this as a success, but some caveats must be mentioned.  First, the NCQG is supposed to be reached by 2035 (UNFCCC, 2024). This absolves developed countries from concrete obligations to provide more finance in the next 10 years (UNFCCC, 2024). The NCQG just has to be reached in 2035. Second, establishing such a distant goal highlights how world leaders dismiss the urgency of climate change. Since the goal is set for 2035, they do not need to adjust their policies yet.  Finally, the USD 300 million is far from not only what the Global South countries expected, but also what the various expert reports estimate is necessary to close the finance gap (Blos, 2024; German Climate Finance, 2024). The need for investments is approximately USD 2.7 trillion by 2030, and with every year of lower funding and inaction, the numbers are rising (Moody’s, 2024). 

The EU and individual member-states could contribute more to climate finance. For example, in 2023, the EU spent EUR 111 billion on fossil fuel subsidies (EEA, 2025). This demonstrates an unwillingness to put available resources into climate action. If the EU wants to be perceived as an international environmental leader, it must make two changes. First, it must lead the world to implement more ambitious policies. In doing so, it must take more responsibility for historical emissions. Second, it must also mediate dialogue between the Global South and the Global North. There is no time to be neutral in this matter, the EU needs to clearly side with the developing countries. This will show the other Western Powers that it is the way to go if they want to save the planet.

Conclusions

Taking everything into account, the COP29 was a mix of unexpected and expected events. On the one hand, there was unexpectedly low attendance, while on the other hand, the expected outcomes of Global North countries downplaying any meaningful proposals. Therefore, this overall produced disappointing results for the developing countries, climate experts, civil societies and youth activists, which all showed up to the COP in 2024 with hope for changes to finally happen. On the contrary, the oil and gas industry, which is a major power holder in the host country, Azerbaijan, can be satisfied with the lack of agreement on the phase-out of the fossil fuel subsidies (IISD, 2024). 

This article provided background information on how COPs work, and what is the EU’s negotiating role, delved into details of COP29 focus points and the assumed EU standing on them, as well as, analysed how the 2024 COP played out in practice and what it means for the future. It has been argued that if the EU is serious about its climate leadership ambitions, it needs to take a stronger political stance during the COPs and thus, lead other global powers through transition to carbon-neutral economies.

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