What Happened to the Polish Left? An Analysis of the Party’s Ideological Development and Changing Electoral Base

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), once the dominant left-wing party in Poland, has undergone substantial ideological transformations over the past decades. These shifts, coupled with various internal and external challenges, have significantly impacted the party’s electoral base and subsequent success. This article will firstly examine the policy positions through which the SLD asserted itself as one of the primary parties to emerge in the Polish post-communist system during the 1990s. Secondly, it will demonstrate how the party struggled to establish its identity amidst the changing landscape of the Polish party system in the mid-2000s. Finally, the article will highlight how the party managed to successfully reposition itself as a party focused on addressing new political issues in recent years. The article will conclude that, despite some enduring similarities, SLD’s role within the Polish party system has undergone a significant transformation over the last two decades. 

Early Ideology & Time in Power (1991-2005)

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) emerged as a coalition of left-wing parties stemming from the transformation of the communist Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) in 1991. Despite a relatively modest showing in its first parliamentary elections, SLD surged to capture over 20% of the vote in 1993, a result which enabled it to form a government in coalition with the Polish People’s Party (PSL). The party received a result of 27% in the 1997 elections, before emerging as the single largest party in 2001 with a substantial 41% vote share (Zubek, 1994; Smolar, 2019). This section will discuss two key ideological observations regarding SLD during the 1991-2005 period. Firstly, the party placed significant emphasis on issues related to modernisation and EU accession, which largely underpinned its support. Secondly, the party assumed a relatively uneven stance on economic matters, granting it substantial consideration only in the pre-2001 election cycle.

In the period immediately following the Soviet collapse, political conflict within the Polish party system centred predominantly around socio-cultural divisions. With both left-wing and right-wing economic policies proving unpopular with the post-communist electorate, political parties chose to emphasise issues relating to religion, culture and the nature of the state (Rovny, 2015; Coman, 2017). Within this framework, SLD advocated strongly in favour of modernisation and restricting the role of the Catholic Church in the political system (Jackson, Mach & Markowski, 2010). The issue of European integration also emerged as one of SLD’s key priorities during this time, with the party firmly positioning itself as the leading supporter of the European integration process. The party’s early electoral triumphs were therefore viewed as a testament to the Polish electorate’s endorsement of the country’s modernisation efforts, as well as enthusiasm concerning its future accession to the EU (Vermeersch, 2008). SLD’s success was additionally aided by the high level of unity and organisation amongst the Polish Left, contrasting significantly to the fragmented nature of the Polish Right, which proved unable to form a lasting government in 1991. Consequently, SLD was able to retain a stable base of its ex-communist electorate while also attracting new voters who endorsed the modernisation of Poland’s political system (Zubek, 1994). 

Given the secondary importance of economic issues within the Polish party system, SLD initially adopted a generally moderate economic ideological stance. The party quickly adapted to the need for market reforms, pursuing a range of liberal economic policies during its time in government (Smolar, 2019). At the same time, during its coalition with PSL, the party pushed for a slower pace of privatisation and increased social spending (Gwiazda, 2008). SLD’s balanced approach to economic policies at this time was reflected in the demographics of its electorate, with the party enjoying a stable voter base spanning both higher and lower income classes (Bell, 1997). The party’s moderate economic stance shifted in the run-up to the 2001 election, during which the party adopted a platform primarily focused on alleviating the suffering of those impacted by economic reforms. Its electoral promises included reducing unemployment, increasing real incomes, and maintaining high state pensions (Kaźmierczak, 2014; Berman & Snegovaya, 2019). However, after a landslide win in the election, the party again changed course on its economic promises. Under pressure to further liberalise the economy and prioritising EU accession, the party continued to cut social spending, lowered corporate taxes and made no efforts to increase levels of redistribution. As a result, SLD’s economic ideology throughout this electoral term proved difficult to characterise (Żuk, 2017). 

Electoral Decline & Challenged Identity (2005-2015) 

Following the 2001-2005 electoral term, support for SLD rescinded to its lowest level since the party’s emergence. The party secured only 11% of the vote share in the 2005 parliamentary elections and failed to exceed 13% in any subsequent election. In 2015, the party received only 7.55% of the vote, falling short of the 8% electoral threshold and failing to secure representation in parliament for the first time in its history (Rydliński, 2023). This section will discuss SLD’s struggle to define its political identity during the 2005-2015 period, characterised by the party’s inability to consolidate its position on economic matters and to effectively navigate the changing sociocultural political landscape. 

In the 2005 electoral cycle, economic concerns emerged as a foremost concern for the Polish electorate. Law and Justice (PiS) won the election based on a left-wing economic platform which resonated with lower-income and rural demographics, while Civic Platform (PO) emerged as the sole economic alternative, with a liberal economic platform which it utilised to attain power in 2007 (Gabryszak, 2019). SLD largely struggled to carve out its space within this new political context. Lacking a long-term plan for its ideological direction, the party adopted an uneven economic platform which attempted to balance the gains of socialism on one hand with the gains of its liberal reforms on the other (Skiba, 2005). Additionally, the party’s failure to adopt socially-oriented policies during its time in power prevented it from capitalising on public dissatisfaction with reform and, later, with the 2008 financial crisis (Berman & Snegovaya, 2019). Consequently, SLD largely lost its economic voter base during this period, with its support among low-income and rural voters falling to single digits. Although the party shifted decisively left on economic issues around the 2010 election, SLD never managed to regain the trust of these demographics (Materska-Sosnowska, 2010; Jaskiernia, 2017). 

At the same time, the party experienced a decline in its influence on socio-cultural policy issues. Forming a coalition with the centrist Democratic Party (PD) in 2007 diluted the distinctly left-wing character of its electoral program, and SLD’s stance on a variety of social issues remained relatively conservative in the years following this election (Materska-Sosnowska, 2010). The party adopted a moderate view on the role of the Church, allowing the religiosity debate to unfold primarily between PiS and PO. The party also failed to encompass emerging new political issues in its platform, showing reluctance to support the liberalisation of abortion laws and recognition of gay relationships (Materska-Sonsowska, 2010). Furthermore, as the prominence of the European integration issue largely diminished following Poland’s accession to the EU, SLD lost its stronghold in this policy area. While the party continued to propagate strong pro-European messages in its electoral manifestos, advocating for deeper integration and Poland’s accession into the eurozone, it failed to convey the union’s continued relevance to the Polish public (Master, 2014; Sanecka-Tyczyńska, 2020). 

Rebrand Efforts & Current Positioning (2015-present)

Prior to the 2019 elections, SLD formed an official political coalition with several other small left-wing parties. This included a new party, ‘Spring’ (‘Wiosna’), with which it subsequently merged in 2021 to form the ‘New Left’. The coalition achieved a respectable result in 2019, securing over 12% of the vote share. In 2023, the New Left entered into a coalition government with PO, PSL and the Third Way after garnering 8.6% of the vote in the elections. This marked SLD’s return to government for the first time since 2005 (Podemski, 2023). This section will explore how SLD effectively rebranded itself within the New Left, emerging as a party focused on new political issues, which now predominantly characterise its ideology (Rydliński, 2023). 

Since 2015, centre-left party politics in Poland have been dominated by sociocultural issues once again. The undemocratic actions of PiS following its assumption of power shifted the discourse within the political opposition towards issues concerning democracy, the rule of law and social values. Within this space, SLD and the New Left have successfully carved out their focus with regard to new political issues. The New Left’s campaigns have centred on matters such as abortion, same-sex marriage, animal welfare and environmental protection. The party has also inserted itself into the debate regarding the Catholic Church again, advocating for a total separation of Church from state (Kancik-Kołtun, Wallner & Michalczuk-Wlizło, 2021; Wenzel & Żerkowska-Balas, 2021). The New Left’s focus on these issues has earned the party a stable electorate, particularly among young voters, who now form a significant portion of its voter base. While socio-economic issues remain a secondary priority for the party, its policy agendas strongly emphasise the need for better housing policies and the promotion of equal access to higher education, stances which also primarily appeal to young voters (Rydliński, 2023). Notably, while the debate surrounding European integration has resurfaced in Poland in recent years, the issue has been largely co-opted by the PO party, with the Left playing a much smaller role in the debate (Ryzak, 2024). Nevertheless, the New Left’s position remains highly pro-European, diverging from the trend observed in many other party systems where small left-wing parties prove more Eurosceptic than the centrist mainstream (Van der Ejik & Franklin, 2004).

SLD’s role within the Polish party system has therefore undergone a significant transformation since its foundation in 1991. Initially appealing to a broad electorate which included working-class, rural and older voters, its appeal has shifted to primarily target young voters and those with a higher education (Rydliński, 2023). Accordingly, SLD’s electoral performance experienced a substantial decline, as the party shifted from being the largest party in the country to a small opposition party. Many of its once defining issues have been coopted by PO, diminishing the party’s influence on key political debates such as European integration (Ryzak, 2024). However, two key similarities in the party’s ideology persist: The New Left remains the most progressive party on social issues within the Polish party system. Noting of course, that its platform now centres on new political topics which were not part of the discourse in the 1990s (Wenzel & Żerkowska-Balas, 2021). The other similarity can be found in the struggle to establish a strong and certain presence in economics matters. Despite shifting considerably to the left since the early 2000s, economics to this day remains a secondary focus in its electoral agenda (Żuk, 2017).

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