NATO’s Strategic Recalibration in the Cognitive Era

Abstract

This review examines NATO’s growing focus on cognitive warfare and its implications for contemporary strategic competition. It argues that cognitive warfare represents a shift from traditional information warfare, as the goal now extends beyond controlling information flows to influencing the cognitive processes through which individuals and institutions interpret reality and make decisions. By discussing how cognitive warfare differs from traditional forms of influence, including psychological operations and disinformation, the review situates the concept of cognitive superiority within NATO’s evolving strategic thinking. It examines the role of emerging technologies, particularly artificial intelligence, as force multipliers in the cognitive domain and explains why the cognitive domain represents a structural vulnerability for democratic societies. Finally, it discusses the implications of cognitive warfare for NATO’s deterrence posture and long-term ability to operate in an increasingly contested grey-zone environment.

NATO’s Strategic Recalibration in the Cognitive Era

In recent years, NATO has increasingly focused on the cognitive dimension of conflicts (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020). This shift suggests a broader understanding that strategic rivalries among international actors now centre on internal decision-making processes, with geopolitical competition seeking to influence adversary behaviour. The cognitive dimension, often described as a fifth operational domain, refers to the social and psychological processes through which individuals interpret information and make decisions (Deppe & Schaal, 2024). In NATO terminology, the cognitive domain refers to the space where perceptions and decision-making processes are formed, and how these influence the way in which individuals and political leaders interpret information and respond to strategic stimuli. Due to the inherent vulnerabilities of human cognition, both state and non-state actors have developed sophisticated strategies to exert influence in this domain, employing conventional methods alongside advanced technological tools to affect adversaries’ cognitive capabilities (Hung & Hung, 2022; Deppe & Schaal, 2024). Therefore, NATO’s emphasis on cognitive warfare reflects an evolving perspective on strategic competition. In this context, disinformation is not an isolated phenomenon but part of a broader, persistent dynamic (Lanoszka, 2019; Paul & Matthews, 2016). The cognitive dimension has become a central arena of confrontation, with the objective of influencing information by shaping how individuals and organizations interpret events and translate them into policy decisions.  This review contends that NATO’s focus on cognitive warfare signifies a clear recognition of the evolving strategic landscape. It further underscores the structural vulnerabilities of democratic systems, which render them particularly susceptible to cognitive operations (NATO, 2022). For this reason, the discussion looks at what the cognitive domain means for deterrence, resilience, and strategic coherence in the Alliance, paying particular attention to the tension between security needs and the normative constraints of democratic societies. 

From Information Warfare to Cognitive Warfare

Recent NATO documents, including the 2021 Warfighting Capstone Concept, the 2022 Strategic Concept, and the Chief Scientist’s report on Cognitive Warfare, emphasize the protection of decision-making processes and the resilience of democratic societies (NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2021; NATO, 2022; NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020). Collectively, these documents signal an evolution in the understanding of contemporary conflict, which now extends beyond information control to shaping the cognitive processes through which reality is interpreted (NATO, 2022). Specifically, they indicate a shift from viewing conflict as predominantly military and reactive to recognizing strategic competition as a continuous, multi-domain process, where cognitive superiority and rapid decision-making are central to deterrence and defence (NATO Allied Command Transformation, 2021). Traditional information warfare has focused on shaping narratives or restricting access to information, whereas cognitive warfare operates at a deeper level by altering how individuals interpret and process reality (Deppe & Schaal, 2024). While disinformation, propaganda, and psychological operations aim to influence public opinion, cognitive warfare seeks to shape the environment in which decisions are made, influencing how information is received, assessed, and acted upon (Lanoszka, 2019). This is not merely a terminological difference; if the objective is to affect information processing at the deepest level, traditional tools such as fact-checking or reactive message correction are insufficient. The true battleground becomes the attribution of meaning to reality by citizens and policymakers. NATO’s increasing focus on this dimension can be seen as an acknowledgment of the continuous and enduring nature of contemporary conflicts, where the boundary between peace and crisis is increasingly blurred (NATO, 2022). 

The Cognitive Dimension as a Structural Vulnerability

Developing a comprehensive response to cognitive warfare is particularly challenging for democratic societies characterized by pluralism, transparency, open political debate, and freedom of expression. While these features reinforce the legitimacy of political institutions and the legal order, they also increase vulnerability to cognitive warfare by enabling hostile actors to exploit political divisions and deepen internal polarization (Lanoszka, 2019; Nye, 2018). Building resilience in this context requires not only protecting infrastructure but also ensuring that societies can preserve stable decision-making processes under sustained pressure (NATO, 2024). Cognitive operations and forms of competition deliberately kept below the level of open armed conflict – commonly referred to as sub-threshold competition – often aim to erode public trust and undermine institutional credibility by fostering uncertainty in political discourse (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020; Rid, 2020). As trust diminishes, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments to sustain decisions that require internal consensus, particularly when such decisions involve significant costs or long-term risks. Consequently, even commitments within the Alliance may become more politically vulnerable, as their implementation depends on member states’ ability to maintain domestic cohesion and consensus, with direct implications for the credibility of deterrence and allied solidarity (Hedling & Ördén, 2025). Cognitive interference operates through forms of sub-threshold competition, where actions remain difficult to attribute and rarely manifest as singular, dramatic events. Instead, they gradually shape interpretative frameworks, often influencing electoral debates, defence spending decisions, or crisis responses before their effects are measurable (Hedling & Ördén, 2025). This dynamic can be observed, for instance, in the run-up to the 2024 European elections, where coordinated disinformation campaigns targeted voters in countries such as France and Germany through large-scale, unlabelled political content on social media, aiming to shape perceptions of political actors and institutions. Similarly, concerns over foreign interference emerged during the 2024 Romanian presidential election, where the rapid rise of a far-right outsider candidate was reportedly amplified through coordinated online activity and algorithm-driven visibility. Another significant challenge is therefore attribution, or the ability to identify with certainty the origin and responsibility for such operations. For NATO member states, this presents a fundamental strategic dilemma. Article 5 and its associated collective defence mechanisms were designed to address overt aggression by clearly identifiable actors, whereas this form of cognitive interference can undermine the Alliance’s deterrence and strategic coherence over time (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020; Mazarr, 2015). This makes it necessary for deterrence strategies to adapt to forms of competition that remain deliberately below the level of open conflict and to adversaries whose responsibility is difficult to establish. 

Emerging Technologies and the Amplification of Cognitive Effects

It is possible to observe how the dynamics described so far are further intensified by the technological developments applied in communication and information, thereby transforming the conditions under which perceptions are formed. Indeed, the functioning of contemporary digital platforms is largely based on algorithmic selection of content, and recommendation systems on major digital platforms tend to amplify emotionally charged or polarising content, thereby reinforcing pre-existing biases within specific audiences; at the same time, data analysis enables the identification of specific vulnerabilities within particular social groups (Hung & Hung, 2022). Moreover, artificial intelligence (AI) enables the rapid production of targeted content and the large-scale dissemination of messages that can influence behaviour and decision-making (Deppe & Schaal, 2024). NATO’s internal debate and the recent Chief Scientist’s report on cognitive warfare indicate that these technologies are increasingly viewed as force multipliers in the cognitive domain (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020). They enable large- scale operations more rapidly and at lower cost than traditional military tools, utilizing digital platforms, data analysis, and profiling techniques. Simultaneously, cognitive operations directly exploit vulnerabilities inherent in democratic societies. NATO’s approach emphasizes that effective countermeasures cannot rely solely on technological solutions (Lewandowsky & van der Linden, 2021). Strengthening resilience requires enhanced media literacy, increased institutional transparency, and sustained cooperation among Allies. These measures help preserve societies’ capacity to form informed judgments and support coherent policy decisions. Emerging technologies, including AI, do not create cognitive vulnerabilities but amplify their effects, making it easier to identify and exploit existing weaknesses in individual and collective decision-making processes. The structural fragility of democratic societies arises from their reliance on trust and a minimum level of shared interpretation of reality (Lanoszka, 2019). These elements can be gradually eroded through sustained cognitive operations, undermining the capacity to maintain coherent decisions and uphold political commitments over time. 

Deterrence in the Cognitive Era and the Democratic Dilemma for NATO NATO’s traditional deterrence posture relies on the development and maintenance of military capabilities and solidarity among allies. Cognitive warfare, however, can undermine the effectiveness of both elements (Hedling & Ördén, 2025). If public opinion within member states becomes fragmented or uncertain due to cognitive operations by foreign actors, the political will to support deterrence may weaken. Additionally, deterrence depends on clear signals from states and policymakers and the ability to identify the origin of hostile actions. Cognitive operations exploit ambiguity, often appearing as normal public debate and making it difficult to distinguish between external interference and internal political confrontation (Hedling & Ördén, 2025). In this context, it is necessary to question whether traditional deterrence can function effectively in a domain where responsibility is contested, and where prolonged cognitive interference complicates the Alliance’s ability to demonstrate resolve without risking escalation in the absence of military action. A further challenge for the Alliance is that addressing and countering cognitive operations may expose NATO and its member states to significant normative constraints. As liberal democracies with constitutional safeguards for freedom of expression and political participation, member states must ensure that defensive measures operate within these boundaries. This tension between reducing vulnerability and preserving constitutional guarantees is difficult to resolve and it remains a central challenge in responding to cognitive activities. Excessive regulation risks undermining legitimacy, while insufficient coordination may create strategic uncertainty. Although NATO cannot impose domestic policies on member states, domestic fragility can nonetheless become a strategic vulnerability for the Alliance as a whole (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020). Under these conditions, an effective response calls for coordinated action by member states, including strengthening transparency, promoting media literacy, improving institutional coordination, and promoting closer cooperation among Allies in information exchange and protection of the information environment (Rickli & Knappe, 2025). Such an approach requires a comprehensive strategy combining societal, educational, technological, and regulatory measures, aimed at strengthening societies’ resilience and public awareness of cognitive threats. In this sense, training in critical thinking and information literacy may improve the ability to recognise disinformation and assess digital content, while technological solutions should support transparency and responsible innovation, reducing the risks associated with opaque digital systems and the manipulation of online information environments. Policy and regulatory frameworks are also necessary to address the potential misuse of emerging technologies, including advanced data-driven tools that may pose new risks to individual autonomy and cognitive integrity (Rickli & Knappe, 2025). The objective is not to restrict or control internal political debate, which would risk violating constitutional guarantees, but to preserve the capacity to form informed and coherent judgments that counter cognitive interference and promote transparency (OECD, 2024). Achieving this goal necessitates collaboration among defence institutions, digital regulatory authorities, electoral bodies, and the scientific community to facilitate effective information sharing and develop common frameworks for protecting the integrity of the information environment (Council of Europe, 2025). This highlights significant questions for policymakers within the Alliance, as existing deterrence models may require significant adaptation to remain credible in a strategic environment characterized by ambiguity and persistent cognitive pressure. 

Conclusion: Implications for Long-Term Strategic Posture

As outlined above, the cognitive domain may represent a structural vulnerability for democratic societies, where political pluralism and open debate reinforce legitimacy but also create opportunities for exploitation by hostile actors (Nye, 2018). NATO’s increasing focus on cognitive warfare suggests that strategic competition is entering a phase in which mental processes themselves are a battleground, necessitating a profound strategic recalibration by member states (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020; Deppe & Schaal, 2024). The challenge for NATO is twofold: deterrence and resilience must adapt to an environment where boundaries are blurred and clear distinctions between war and peace are no longer possible, while simultaneously preserving the democratic foundations and functioning of member states (NATO, 2022; Hedling & Ördén, 2025).  Cognitive superiority should not be interpreted as thought control (NATO Science & Technology Organization, 2020), but as the capacity to maintain coherent and informed decisions under sustained strategic pressure. In the long term, the Alliance must integrate the cognitive dimension into planning cycles and exercises, including scenarios where prolonged pressure in grey zones shapes perceptions among individuals and policymakers, potentially undermining cohesion among Allies (Hedling & Ördén, 2025; Mazarr, 2015). Resilience strategies must go further than declaratory commitments to include measurable indicators of social resilience and technical standards for verifying content authenticity (Rickli & Knappe, 2025; OECD, 2024). Additionally, national and international teams that combine cybersecurity, communications, and intelligence capabilities should be established, and mandatory cognitive security training for senior leadership should be implemented (Rickli & Knappe, 2025). The relationship with emerging technologies necessitates proactive governance, as AI, platform accountability, and data security are now directly connected to defence policy and the countering of cognitive operations. Accordingly, it is essential to implement effective systems for monitoring and attribution, together with the capacity to respond to cognitive interference that can operate across both national and Alliance-level structures (Hedling & Ördén, 2025; Council of Europe, 2025).  

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