The rise of Kaja Kallas: Towards a more hawkish EU policy on China?

Ursula von der Leyen has been re-elected as the President of the European Commission in 2024. Joining the new administration is former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, the new EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy–responsible for managing the EU’s foreign relations. Labelled as Europe’s new ‘iron lady’ (Truc, 2022), she achieved this notoriety by advocating for a more hardline policy towards Russia. This occurred after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine during her tenure as Estonia’s head of government. During this period, Kallas introduced policies such as the creation of  a war crimes tribunal for Russia and a ban on Russian tourists from entering the European Union (Wintour, 2024). 

Kallas’s appointment came after the EU saw its role expand from a mere economic cooperation institution to a geopolitical bloc oriented towards  international security. The appointment of Kaja Kallas, with more hawkish geopolitical views towards Russia, definitively signals that the EU intends to take a more active role in global geopolitics.

However, the EU’s geopolitical influence will not only be limited to Europe’s immediate periphery. With the bloc’s worldwide regulatory, economic, and political influence, any policy actions would impact countries globally. These include China, a country that the EU has designated as a competitor and systemic rival (European External Action Service, 2023). Therefore, how would the appointment of Kaja Kallas impact the EU’s relations with China? Moreover, what may be the hurdles facing her? Whilst she may have hawkish views of China and Russia, the individual interests of EU member states may challenge her ambitions to form an EU consensus on China. 

Kaja Kallas in her own words

Although Kaja Kallas is recognised for her hardline stance on Russia as Estonia’s Prime Minister, she has been notably reticent to discuss the Indo-Pacific region. This should not be welcomed as a surprise. After all, Estonia is significantly distant from the Indo-Pacific region, and she may have justifiably perceived that she must focus her foreign policy actions more on Russia, given its proximity as Estonia’s immediate neighbour. 

However, she did make forays into the Indo-Pacific, most notably whenattending the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2023). The Dialogue is a prestigious annual conference on Indo-Pacific security held by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. While she unsurprisingly commented about Russia’s threat to Europe, she did not explicitly comment about China’s support for Russia or towards a specific country. In lieu of this, she tried to ‘hedge’ and express her views more generally, by reinforcing liberal ideals of  sovereignty, non-intervention, non-usage of military force, and territorial integrity in Indo-Pacific international relations (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2023).

One element in particular, dominated Kallas’s perspective on the inextricable ties between European and Indo-Pacific security. “Security challenges in the Indo Pacific and Euro-Atlantic area,” she remarked, “are inseparable” (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2023). By taking this stance, she is justifying this security relationship with the need to ensure that the principles of the UN Charter, most notably “the right to exist as a country” (Government of the Republic of Estonia, 2023), are upheld worldwide .

Such emphasis on international law, the nexus between European and Indo-Pacific security, and the need to uphold international law worldwide hint that she may see China’s militaristic expansionism as hostile, particularly in regard to actions taken in the South China Sea (SCS), East China Sea, and towards Taiwan. If China continues its aggressive territorial expansion in the SCS that erodes legitimate maritime entitlements of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and Indonesia, its action will likely increase the probability of regional escalation.

Kallas presented her views on the Indo-Pacific more explicitly during her confirmation hearing as the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in November 2024. In this instance, she labelled China the country that “most covertly” seeks to “change the rules-based international order” with Russia and Iran’s support, and called on the Union to respond to this threat (European Parliament, 2024b). China, she stressed, has morphed into a competitor and a “systemic rival” (European Parliament, 2024a).

This time, her appeals went beyond idealistic rhetoric to uphold international law. Instead, she concretely asserted that China is engaging in “unfair competition” in trade due to structural imbalances between China and the EU (European Parliament, 2024a). It echoes the pronouncement made by European Commission President von der Leyen when she accuses China’s state-directed capitalist system of causing the imbalances in EU-China trade. This, she argues, is inflicted by China’s intentional overproduction of goods beyond market demand, thus depreciating its cost and worsening the EU’s trade deficit with China (European Commission, 2023). 

Such an appeal to trade is an alternative way to bolster the EU’s tougher stance towards China (Lau, 2024; see also Schmucker, 2024). Using idealistic justifications, such as the need to face China’s attempt to modify the so-called ‘rules-based international order,’ it can be challenging to persuade EU leaders to concur with their actions towards China since the benefits are  intangible and reaped in the longer term. However, trade is one of the main components of the EU’s integration (Gastinger, 2024). The impact of an ‘imbalanced trade’ between the EU and China can be readily seen, and its effects felt quickly, therefore EU leaders may be more easily swayed to support her China policies. 

Turning away from China, she refrained from discussing other Indo-Pacific powers, only making a passing remark about the need to strengthen the EU’s relations with Australia, South Korea, and Japan to tackle security challenges, including the South China Sea (European Parliament, 2024a). The fact that the SCS is mentioned signifies its importance to the EU’s global trade since 40% of the EU’s trade passes through the area (Keßler, 2024). As a result, one should expect that she would be more attentive and sensitive to the South China Sea dispute, particularly through her statements.

Idealism can only take you so far

However, any optimism—or pessimism—towards Kallas should be expressed only after factoring the extent of the authority held by an EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In addition, one should explore the extent of disagreement between EU member states regarding the EU’s relations with China.

Firstly, it is pivotal to establish the High Representative’s remit. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs cannot act independently according to its self-interest since it must garner unanimous agreement of  EU member states in the Council of the European Union (also referred to as the ‘European Council’) before taking a decision within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Council, n.d.). The EU’s official website (n.d.) stipulates that the High Representative “shapes and conducts the EU’s common foreign and security policy .” Note the word ‘common’, as this means an agreement between all EU member states on an EU’s proposed policy is required, before it can conduct any action or act on its proposal.

The requirement for unanimity means that it would be challenging for the High Representative to act on issues where the views of EU members are unaligned. Should EU members be paralyzed due to disagreements between its 27 member states, then the EU could be perceived as weak (Collado, 2024). Such paralysis was most explicitly displayed when the 27 members of the EU failed to act on Israel’s attacks on Gaza, as Germany eschewed any aspirations for a ceasefire and could only agree to call a ‘humanitarian pause’ (Jacqué & Ricard, 2024), instead of a ‘ceasefire’.

In more regrettable terms, the position of EU members is not united regarding China (see Anderlini, 2023 and Schuller, 2023), which can bring headwinds for Kallas when she attempts to steer the EU to stand up more towards China (Brzozowski, 2024) during her upcoming tenure. Some countries, such as those in Eastern Europe, may seek the EU to take a more hawkish economic and political approach towards China due to its support for Russia. However, the same cannot be argued for EU members whose economy significantly relies on Chinese trade and investment, making them highly averse to acting antagonistically toward China (Fehér, 2024). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who simultaneously held the rotating presidency of the European Council, famously visited China and Russia in July 2024 during what he described as a ‘peace mission.’ This act was unsanctioned by the European Commission, and endorsed China’s peace plan for Ukraine (Cash & Komuves, 2024). 

Whereas on trade –  a bulwark of the EU and an area where President von der Leyen claims the EU is facing an ‘imbalance’ vis-à-vis China (European Commission, 2024a) –  the views of member states remain far from a consensus. A limited minority of EU countries with extensive economic dependence on China opposed some tariffs on Chinese imports (Wang, 2024), as European business and economic interests, including their own, can be targets of Chinese retaliation. The recent European Commission vote to impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles in early October 2024 is a prime example to demonstrate the EU’s tentativeness towards China. Of the 27 EU members, only 10, less than half, agreed to impose the tariffs, and 12 decided to abstain (Reuters, 2024). Five EU members voted against its enactment, most notably Hungary, Germany, Slovenia, and Slovakia, countries whose economies are highly dependent on Chinese investment, trade, or access to the lucrative Chinese market (Reuters, 2024).

Fortunately, the vote on the European Commission lacked the obligation for  unanimity and therefore the tariff proposal was approved (Blenkinsop, 2024). Conversely, Kallas’s department, where unanimity is required before action can be taken or a decision made regarding the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Council, n.d.). She would face stark opposition to convince EU leaders to endorse her hawkish China policy. With some countries wanting to preserve their good economic relations with China, it will be challenging for her to realise the full extent of her policies. In fact, there is a precedent to this when Greece, Hungary, and Croatia blocked an attempt by the EU to state its support for the 2016 decision by the Permanent Court of Justice declaring China’s South China Sea claims to lack legal basis (Norman, 2016). Hence, resulting in the EU to water down its statement to a more neutral position (Nengye & Qi, 2018). 

Indeed, it is certain that Kaja Kallas viewed China with suspicion, if not hostility. However, with a paralytic EU on China policy, she may see her proposed policies and views be diluted, to maximise the likelihood of them being unanimously ratified.

Trystanto Sanjaya is a master’s student in Geopolitics and Business at the Rennes School of Business in Rennes, France, and a writer for the European Student Think Tank.

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